Listed 68 sub titles with search on: Biographies for destination: "KARCHIDON Ancient city TUNISIA".
Hanno. In the first half of the sixth century BCE, the Carthaginian admiral
Hanno made a long voyage along the African west coast. His logbook contains a
description of a fully active volcano and the first known report about gorillas.
This is the first of three articles.
Introduction
The eighteen lines of Hanno's artless account of his journey along
the west coast of Africa are a unique document. It is the only known first-hand
report on these regions before those of the Portuguese, which were written two
thousand years later. It is the longest known text by a Phoenician author. Besides,
Hanno has a fascinating story to tell: we visit a mysterious island, have to fight
hostile natives, survive an erupting volcano and encounter gorillas.
Probably, Hanno made his voyage on the outer sea in the first half
of the sixth century BCE. (A date in the fifth century is impossible, because
a Greek author who lived c.500, mentions one of Hanno's colonies.) He had orders
to found several colonies on the Moroccan coast; after this, he established a
trading post on a small island off the Mauritanian coast. Having completed this
mission, he ventured further south, making a reconnaissance expedition along the
African coast until he reached modern Gabon, where he was forced to return because
he was running out of supplies. There is some reason to doubt the truth of the
latter statement, because the Roman encyclopedist Pliny the Elder says that Hanno
circumnavigated Africa and reached the borders of Arabia.
On his return, Hanno dedicated an inscription to one of the Carthaginian
gods, in which he told what he had done. (It is possible that he was not the author.
As we will see below, an irregularity in the texts disappears when we accept the
hypothesis that a scribe interviewed two sailors.) In the fifth century, someone
translated this text into a rather mediocre Greek. It was not a complete rendering;
several abridgments were made. The abridged translation was copied several times
by Greek and Byzantine clerks. At the moment, there are only two copies, dating
back to the ninth and the fourteenth centuries. The first of these manuscripts
is known as the Palatinus Graecus 398 and can be studied in the University Library
of Heidelberg. The other text is the so-called Vatopedinus 655; parts of it are
in the British Museum in London and in the Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris.
Many scholars have tried to identify the places Hanno mentions. Nowadays,
most puzzles -such as the question of the volcano called 'Chariot of the Gods'-
seem to be solved. In the commentary below, many toponyms are discussed. All places
under discussion can be found in the 1998 edition of the Times Atlas of the world.
Jona Lendering, ed.
This text is cited July 2003 from the Livius Ancient History Website URL below, which contains interesting hyperlinks.
Charon, of Carthage, wrote an account of all the tyrants of Europe and Asia, and also the lives of illustrious men and women. (Suid. s. v.)
Felix, Flavius, an African who flourished towards the close of the fifth century, the author of five short pieces in the Latin Anthology. Of these the first four celebrate the magnificence and utility of the " Thermae Alianae," constructed in the vicinity of Carthage by King Thrasimund, within the space of a single year; the fifth is a whining petition for an ecclesiastical appointment, addressed to Victorianius, the chief secretary of the Vandal monarch. (Anhol. Lat. iii. 34-37)
Hippagoras, a writer mentioned by Athenaeus (xiv. p. 630 A.) as the author of a treatise Peri tes Karchedonion Politeias.
Hamilcar. There is a Carthaginian author, of the name of Hamilcar, mentioned (together with Mago) by Columella (xii. 4) as having written on the details of husbandry; but nothing more is known concerning him.
Mago. A Carthaginian of uncertain date, who wrote a work upon agriculture in the Punic language, which is frequently mentioned by Roman authors in terms of the highest commendation. He is even styled by Columella the father of agriculture-- rusticationis parents (De R. R. i. 1. 13). Nothing is known of the period at which he flourished, or of the events of his life, except that he was a man of distinction in his native country, and had held important military commands. (Colum. xii. 4. 2; Plin. H. N. xviii. 5.) Heeren's conjecture that he was the same as No. 1, is wholly without foundation: the name of Mago was evidently too common at Carthage to afford any reasonable ground for identifying him with any of the persons known to us from history. His work was a voluminous one, extending to twenty-eight books, and comprising all branches of the subject. So great was its reputation even at Rome, that after the destruction of Carthage, when the libraries which had fallen into the hands of the Romans were distributed among the princes of Africa, an exception was made in favour of the work of Mago, and it was ordered by the senate that it should be translated into Latin by competent persons, at the head of whom was D. Silanus. (Plin. H. N. xviii. 5; Colunm. i. 1. 13.) It was subsequently translated into Greek, though with some abridgment and alteration, by Cassius Dionysius of Utica, and an epitome of it in the same language, brought into the compass of six books, was drawn up by Diophanes of Bithynia, and dedicated to king Deiotarus. (Varro, de R. R. i. 1. 10; Colum. i. 1. 10.) His precepts on agricultural matters are continually cited by the Roman writers on those subjects, Varro, Columella, and Palladius, as well as by Pliny: his work is also alluded to by Cicero (De Orat. i. 58) in terms that imply its high reputation as the standard authority upon the subject on which it treated. It is said to have opened with the very sound piece of advice that if a man meant to settle in the country, he should begin by selling his town house. (Colum. i. 1. 18; Plin. H. N. xviii. 7.) All the passages in Roman authors in which the work of Mago is cited or referred to are collected by Heeren. (Ideen, vol. iv. p. 527, &c.)
This text is from: A dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology, 1873 (ed. William Smith). Cited Oct 2006 from The Perseus Project URL below, which contains interesting hyperlinks
Hamilcar. Surnamed Barca, an epithet supposed to be related to the Hebrew Barak,
and to signify "lightning." (Gesenius, Ling. Phoenic. Monum.) It was merely
a personal appellation, and is not to be regarded as a family name, though from
the great distinction that he obtained, we often find the name of Barcine applied
either to his family or his party in the state. (Niebuhr, Lect. on Rom. Hist.
vol. i. p. 134, not.) We know nothing of him previous to his appointment to the
command of the Carthaginian forces in Sicily, in the eighteenth year of the first
Punic War, B. C. 247. He was at this time quite a young man (admodum adolescentulus,
Corn. Nep. Hamilc. 1), but had already given proofs of his abilities in war, which
led to his being named as the successor of Carthalo. His first operations fully
justified the choice, and were characterised by the same energy and daring as
distinguished the whole of his subsequent career. At the time that he arrived
in Sicily the Romans were masters of the whole island, with the exception of the
two fortresses of Drepanum and Lilybaeum, both of which were blockaded by them
on the land side, and the Carthaginians had for some time past contented themselves
with defending these two strongholds, and keeping open their communication with
them by sea. But Hamilcar, after ravaging with his [p. 328] fleet the shores of
Bruttium, suddenly landed on the north coast of Sicily, and established himself
with his whole army on a mountain named Hercte (now called Monte Pellegrino).
in the midst of the enemy's country, and in the immediate neighbourhood of Panormus,
one of their most important cities. Here he succeeded in maintaining his ground,
to the astonishment alike of friends and foes, for nearly three years. The natural
strength of the position defied all the efforts of the enemy, and a small, but
safe and convenient, harbour at the foot of the mountain enabled him not only
to secure his own communications by sea, but to send out squadrons which plundered
the coasts of Sicily and Italy even as far north as Cumae. By land, meanwhile,
he was engaged in a succession of almost continual combats with the Romans, which
did not, indeed, lead to any decisive result, but served him as the means of training
up a body of infantry which should be a match for that of Rome, while he so completely
paralysed the whole power of the enemy as to prevent their making any vigorous
attempts against either Drepanum or Lilybaeum. So important did it appear to the
Romans to expel him from his mountain fastness, that they are said to have at
one time assembled a force of 40,000 men at the foot of the rock of Hercte. (Diod.
Exc. Hoesch. xxiii.) Yet Hamilcar still held out; and when, at length, he relinquished
his position, it was only to occupy one still more extraordinary and still more
galling to the enemy. In 244 he abruptly quitted Hercte, and, landing suddenly
at the foot of Mount Eryx, seized on the town of that name, the inhabitants of
which he removed to Drepanum, and converted it into a fortified camp for his army.
The Romans still held the fort on the summit of the mountain, while one of their
armies lay in a strongly intrenched camp at the foot of it. Yet in this still
more confined arena did Hamilcar again defy all their exertions for two years
more; during which period he had not only to contend against, the efforts of his
enemies, but the disaffection and fickleness of the mercenary troops under his
command, especially the Gauls. In order to retain them in obedience, he was obliged
to make then large promises, the difficulty of fulfilling which was said to have
been afterwards one of the main causes of the dreadful war in Africa. (Polyb.
i. 66, ii. 7; Appian, Hisp. 4.) But while he thus continued to maintain his ground
in spite of all obstacles, the Romans, despairing of effecting any thing against
him by land, determined to make one great effort to recover the supremacy by sea.
A powerful fleet was sent out under Lutatius Catulus, and the total defeat of
the Carthaginian admiral Hanno off the Aegates, in B. C. 241, decided the fate
of the war. The Carthaginian government now referred it to Hamilcar to determine
the question of war or peace; and seeing no longer any hopes of ultimate success,
he reluctantly consented to the treaty, by which it was agreed that the Carthaginians
should evacuate Sicily. Lutatius had at first insisted that the troops on Mount
Eryx should lay down their arms; but this was peremptorily refused by Hamilcar,
and the Roman consul was forced to, abandon the demand. Hamilcar descended with
his army to Lilybaeum, where he immediately resigned the command, leaving it to
Gisco to conduct the troops to Africa. (Polyb. i. 56-62, 66; Diod. Exc. xxiv.;
Zonar. viii. 16, 17; Corn. Nep. Hamile. 1.)
He himself returned to Carthage, filled with implacable animosity
against Rome, and broolding over plans for future vengeance under more favourable
circumstances. (Polyb. iii. 9 ) But all such projects were for a time suspended
by a danger nearer home. The great revolt of the mercenary troops, headed by Spendius
and Matho, which broke out immediately after their return from Sicily, and in
which they were quickly joined by almost all the native Africans, brought Carthage
in a moment to the brink of ruin. Hamilcar was not at first employed against the
insurgents; whether this arose from the predominance of the adverse party, or
that he was looked upon as in some measure the author of the evils that had given
rise to the insurrection, from the promises he had been compelled to make to the
mercenaries under his command, and which there were now no means of fulfilling,
we know not; but the incapacity of Hanno, who first took the field against the
rebels, soon became so apparent. that all parties concurred in the appointment
of Hamilcar to succeed him. He found affairs in a state apparently almost hopeless:
Carthage itself was not actually besieged, but all the passes which secured its
communications with the interior were in the hands of the insurgents, who were
also masters of all the open country, and were actively engaged in besieging Utica
and Hippo, the only towns that still remained faithful to the Carthaginians. The
forces placed at the disposal of Hamilcar amounted to only 10,000 men and 70 elephants;
but with thes he quickly changed the face of affairs, forced the passage of the
river Bagradas, defeated the enemy with great slaughter, and re-opened the communications
with the interior. He now traversed the open country unopposed, and reduced many
towns again to the subjection of Carthage. On one occasion, indeed, lie seems
to have been surprised and involved in a situation of much difficulty, but was
saved by the opportune accession of Naravas, a Numidian chief, with whose assistance
he totally defeated the rebels under Spendius and Autaritus. Many captives having
fallen into his hands on this occasion, Hamilcar treated them with the utmost
lenity, receiving into his army all that were willing to enlist, and dismissing
the rest in safety to their homes, on condition of their not bearing arms against
him again. But this clemency was so far from producing the desired effect, that
it led Spendius and Matho, the leaders of the insurgents, from apprehension of
the influence it might exercise upon their followers, to the most barbarous measures,
and they put to death Gisco and all their other prisoners, in order, by this means,
to put an end to all hopes of recnciliation or pardon. This atrocity drove Hamilcar
to measures of retaliation, and he henceforth put to death, without mercy, all
the prisoners that fell into his hands. (Polyb. i. 75-81; Diod. Exc. Vales. xxv.
2.) The advantages hitherto gained by Barca were now almost counterbalanced by
the defection of Utica and Hippo; and Hanno having been (for what reason we know
not) associated with him in the command, the dissensions which broke out between
the two generals effectually prevented their co-operating to any successful resullt.
These disputes were at length terminated by the Carthaginian government leaving
it to the army to decide which of the two generals should resign, and which should
retain his command. The soldiers chose Hamilcar, who accordingly remained at his
post, and Hannibal succeeded Hanno as his colleague. Matho and Spendius, the leaders
of the insurgents, had taken advantage of the dissensions among their adversaries,
and after many successes had even ventured to lay siege to Carthage itself; but
Hamilcar, by laying waste the country behind them, and intercepting their supplies,
reduced them to such distress, that they were compelled to raise the siege. Spendius
now took the field against Hamilcar; but though his forces were greatly superior,
he was no match for his adversary in generalship; and the latter succeeded in
shutting him up, with his whole army, in a position from which there was no escape.
Hence, after suffering the utmost extremities of hunger, Spendius himself, together
with nine others of the leaders of the rebels, repaired to the camp of Hamilcar
to sue for mercy. That general agreed to allow the army to depart in safety, but
without arms or baggage, and retaining to himself the power of selecting for punishment
ten of the ringleaders. These terms being agreed to, he immediately seized on
Spendius and his companions as the ten whom he selected: the rebel army, deeming
themselves betrayed, rushed to arms; but Hamilcar surrounded them with his elephants
and troops, and put them all to the sword, to the number, it is said, of 40,000
men. (Polyb. i. 82-85.) But even this fearful massacre was far from putting an
end to the war: a large force still remained under the command of Matho, with
which he held the important town of Tunis. Here Hamilcar and Hannibal proceeded
to besiege him with their combined forces; but Matho took advantage of the negligence
of the latter, to surprise his camp, cut to pieces great part of his army, aud
take Hannibal himself prisoner. This disaster compelled Hamilcar to raise the
siege of Tunis, and fall back to the river Bagradas. The Carthaginian senate,
in great alarm, now exerted themselves to bring about a reconciliation between
Hamilcar and Hanno; and this being at length effected, the two generals again
took the field in concert. They soon succeeded in bringing matters to the decision
of a general battle, in which the rebels were completely defeated, and Matho himself
taken prisoner; after which almost all the revolted towns submitted to the Carthaginians.
Utica and Hippo alone held out for a time, but they were soon reduced. the one
by Hamilcar and the other by Hanno; and this sanguinary war at length brought
to a successful close (B. C. 238), after it had lasted three years and four months.
(Polyb. i. 86-88; comp. Diod. Exc. Hoeschel. xxv. 1; and for the chronology see
Clinton, F. H. vol. iii. an. 238.)
There is much obscurity with regard to the conduct of Hamilcar after
the termination of the war of the mercenaries. Polybius states simply (ii. 1)
that the Carthaginians immediately afterwards sent him with an army into Spain.
Diodorus and Appian, on the contrary, represent him as engaging in intrigues with
the popular party at Carthage against the aristocracy; and the latter author asserts
that it was in order to escape a prosecution brought against him by the adverse
party for his conduct in Sicily, that he sought and obtained employment in a war
against the Numidians, in which Hanno was associated with him as his colleague;
and on the latter being recalled to Carthage, Hamilcar crossed over into Spain.
Both Appian and Zonaras expressly assert that he took this important step without
any authority from the government at home, trusting to the popular influence at
Carthage to ratify his measures subsequently; and it is said that he secured this
confirmation not only by his brilliant successes, and by the influence of his
son-in-law Hasdrubal, one of the chief leaders of the democratic party at Carthage,
but by employing the treasures which he obtained in Spain in purchasing adherents
at home. (Appian, Hisp. 4, 5, Annib. 2; Zonar. viii. 17; Diod. Exc. Vales. xxv.)
Whatever weight we may attach to these statements (which are probably derived
from Fabius), it is certain that Hamilcar was supported by the popular or democratic
party at Carthage, in opposition to the old aristocracy, of whom Hanno was the
chief leader: and it was in order to strengthen this interest that he allied himself
with Hasdrubal, who, both by his wealth and popular manners, had acquired a powerful
body of adherents in the state. It seems probable also that we are to attribute
to Hamilcar alone the project to which he henceforth devoted himself with so much
energy, and which was so ably followed up after his death by Hasdrubal and Hannibal,--that
of forming in Spain a new empire, which should not only be a source of strength
and wealth to Carthage, and compensate for the loss of Sicily and Sardinia, but
should be the point from whence he might at a subsequent period renew hostilities
against Rome. (Polyb. iii. 9, 10.) His enmity to that state, and his long-cherished
resentment for the loss of Sicily, had been aggravated by the flagrant injustice
with which the Romans had taken advantage of the weakness of Carthage after the
African war, to force from her the cession of Sardinia, one of her most valued
possessions; and the intensity of this feeling may be inferred from the well-known
story of his causing his son Hannibal, when a child of nine years old, to swear
at the altar eternal hostility to Rome. (Polyb. iii. 11.) But his views were long-sighted,
and he regarded the subjugation of Spain as a necessary preliminary to that contest
for life or death, to which he looked forward as his ultimate end. The Carthaginians,
whether or not they sanctioned his plans in the beginning, did not attempt to
interfere with them afterwards, and left him the uncontrolled direction of affairs
in Spain from his first arrival there till his death, a period of nearly nine
years. But of all that he accomplished during this long interval we know, unfortunately,
almost nothing. Previous to this time the Carthaginians do not appear to have
had any dominion in the interior of Spain, though Gades and other Phoenician colonies
gave them in some measure the command of the southern coasts; but Hamilcar carried
his arms into the heart of the country, and while lie reduced some cities and
tribes by force of arms. gained over others by negotiation, and availed himself
of their services as allies or as mercenaries. The vast wealth he is said to have
acquired by his victories was probably derived not only from the plunder and contributions
of the vanquished nations, but from the rich silver mines in part of the country
which he subdued. We are told also that he founded a great city, which he destined
to be the capital of the Carthaginian empire in Spain, at a place called the White
Promontory (Akra Leuke), but this was probably superseded by New Carthage, and
its situation is now unknown. The progress which the arms of Hamilcar had made
in the peninsula may be in some measure estimated by the circumstance that the
fatal battle in which he perished is stated to have been fought against the Vettones,
a people who dwelt between the Tagus and the Guadiana. (Corn. Nep. Hamilc. 4;
Strab. iii.) According to Livy (xxiv. 41), it occurred near a place called Castrum
Album, but the exact site is unknown. The circumstances of his defeat and death
are very differently told by Diodorus and by Appian. The account of the latter
author is confirmed by Zonaras; but all writers agree that he displayed the utmost
personal bravery in the fatal conflict, and that his death was not unworthy of
his life. It took place in 229 B. C., about ten years before his son Hannibal
was able to commence the realisation of the great designs in the midst of which
he was thus himself cut off. (Polyb. ii. 1; Diod. Exc. Hoeschiel. xxv. 2; Zonar.
viii. 19; Corn. Nep. Hamilc. 4; Liv. xxi. 1, 2; Oros. iv, 13.)
We know very little concerning the private character of Hamilcar:
an anecdote of him preserved by Diodorus (Exc. Val. xxiv. 2, 3) represents in
a favourable light his liberality and even generosity of spirit; and we have seen
that he at first displayed much leniency towards the insurgents in the African
war, though the atrocities of his opponents afterwards led him to acts of frightful
cruelty by way of retaliation. His political relations are so obscure that it
is difficult to form a judgment concerning his conduct in this respect; but there
certainly seems reason to suppose that, like many other great men, the consciousness
of his own superiority rendered him impatient of control; and it is not improbable
that he sought in Spain greater freedom of action and a more independent career
than existing institutions allowed him at home. An odious imputation cast on his
relations with Hasdrubal was probably no more than a calumny of the opposite faction.
(Corn. Nep. Hamilc. 3; Liv. xxi. 2, 3.) Of the military genius of Hamilcar our
imperfect knowledge of the details of his campaigns scarcely qualifies us to judge,
but the concurrent testimony of antiquity places him in this respect almost on
a par with his son Hannibal. He left three sons, Hannibal, Hasdrubal, and Mago,
all of whom bore a distinguished part in the second Punic war.
This text is from: A dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology, 1873 (ed. William Smith). Cited Nov 2005 from The Perseus Project URL below, which contains interesting hyperlinks
1. Adherbal (Atarbas). A Carthaginian commander in the first Punic war, who was
placed over Drepana, and completely defeated the Roman consul P. Claudius in a
sea-fight off Drepana, B. C. 249. (Polyb. i. 49-52; Diod. Ecl. xxiv.)
2. Adherbal. A Carthaginian commander under Mago in the second Punic war, who
was defeated in a seafight off Carteia, in Spain, by C. Laelius in B. C. 206.
(Liv. xxviii. 30.)
Bostar, a Carthaginian general, who was sent by Hasdrubal, the commander-in-chief of the Carthaginian forces in Spain, to prevent the Romans under Scipio from crossing the Iberus in B. C. 217. But not daring to do this, Bostar fell back upon Saguntum, where all the hostages were kept which had been given to the Carthaginians by the different states in Spain. Here he was persuaded by Abelox, who had secretly gone over to the Romans, to set these hostages at liberty, because such an act would secure the affections of the Spanish people. But the hostages had no sooner left the city, than they were betrayed by Abelox into the hands of the Romans. For his simplicity on this occasion, Bostar was involved in great danger. (Polyb. iii. 98, 99; Liv. xxii. 22)
Bostor (Bostor, Polyb. iii. 98; Bodtaros, Polyb. i. 30; Bodostor, Diod. Erc. xxiv.). A Carthaginian general, who, in conjunction with Hamilcar and Hasdrubal, the son of Hanno, commanded the Carthaginian forces sent against M. Atilius Regulus when he invaded Africa in B. C. 256. Bostar and his colleagues were, however, quite incompetent for their office. Instead of keeping to the plains, where their cavalry and elephants would have been formidable to the Romans, they retired to the mountains, where these forces were of no use; and they were defeated, in consequence, near the town of Adis, with great slaughter. The generals, we are told, were taken prisoners; and we learn from Diodorus, that Bostar and Hamilcar were, after the death of Regulus, delivered up to his family, who behaved to them with such barbarity, that Bostar died of the treatment he received. The cruelty of the family, however, excited so much odium at Rome, that the sons of Regulus thought it advisable to burn the body of Bostar, and send his ashes to Carthage. This account of Diodorus, which, Niebuhr remarks, is probably taken from Philinus, must be regarded as of doubtful authority. (Polyb. i. 30; Oros. iv. 8; Eutrop. ii. 21; Flor. ii. 2; Diod. Exc. xxxiv.; Nicbuhr, Hist. of Rome, iii.)
This text is from: A dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology, 1873 (ed. William Smith). Cited Oct 2005 from The Perseus Project URL below, which contains interesting hyperlinks
Bomilcar, commander of the Carthaginian supplies which were voted to Hannibal after the battle of Cannae, B. C. 216, and with which he arrived in Italy in the ensuing year. (Liv. xxiii. 13, 41.) In B. C. 214, he was sent with fifty-five ships to the aid of Syracuse, then besieged by the Romans; but, finding himself unable to cope with the superior fleet of the enemy, he withdrew to Africa. (Liv. xxiv. 36.) Two years after, we again find him at Syracuse; for we hear of his making his escape out of the harbour, carrying to Carthage intelligence of the perilous state of the city (all of which, except Achradina, was in the possession of Marcellus), and returning within a few days with 100 ships. (Liv. xxv. 25.) In the same year, on the destruction by pestilence of the Carthaginian land-forces under Hippocrates and Himilco, Bomilcar again sailed to Carthage with the news, and returned with 130 ships, but was prevented by Marcellus from reaching Syracuse. He then proceeded to Tarentum, apparently with the view of cutting off the supplies of the Roman garrison in that town; but, as the presence of his force only increased the scarcity under which the Tarentines themselves suffered, they were obliged to dismiss him. (Liv. xxv. 27, xxvi. 20; comp. Polyb. Spicil. Rel. ix. 1; Schweig. ad loc.)
This text is from: A dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology, 1873 (ed. William Smith). Cited Nov 2005 from The Perseus Project URL below, which contains interesting hyperlinks
Carthalo (Karthalon), a commander of the Carthaginian fleet in the first Punic war, who was sent by his colleague Adherbal, in B. C. 249, to burn the Roman fleet, which was riding at anchor off Lilybaeum. While Carthalo was engaged in this enterprise, Himilco, the governor of Lilybacum, who perceived that the Roman army on land was anxious to afford their support to the fleet, sent out his mercenaries against the Roman troops, and Carthalo endeavored to draw the Roman fleet into an engagement. The latter, however, withdrew to a town on the coast and prepared themselves for defence. Carthalo was repulsed with some loss, and after having taken a few transports, he retreated to the nearest river, and watched the Romans as they sailed away from the coast. When the consul L. Junius Pullus, on his return from Syracuse, had doubled Pachynum, he ordered his fleet to sail towards Lilybaeum, not knowing what had happened to those whom he had sent before him. Carthalo informed of his approach, immediately sailed out against him, in order to meet him before he could join the other part of the fleet. Pullus fled for refuge to a rocky and dangerous part of the sea, where Carthalo did not venture to attack him ; but he took his station at a place between the two Roman fleets to watch them and prevent their joining. Soon after a fearful storm arose which destroyed the whole of the Roman fleet, while the Carthaginians, who were better sailors, had sought a safe place of refuge before the storm broke out. (Polyb. i. 53, 54)
This text is from: A dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology, 1873 (ed. William Smith). Cited Nov 2005 from The Perseus Project URL below, which contains interesting hyperlinks
Carthalo, the Carthaginian commander of the cavalry in the army of Hannibal. In
B. C. 217, he fought against L. Hostilius Mancinus, in the neighbourhood of Casilinum,
and put him to flight. The Romans, under Mancinus, who were merely a reconnoitering
band which had been sent out by the dictator, Q. Fabius, at last resolved to make
a stand against the enemy, but nearly all of them were cut to pieces. This Carthalo
is probably the noble Carthaginian of the same name, whom Hannibal, after the
battle of Cannae, in B. C. 216, sent to Rome with ten of the Roman prisoners to
negotiate the ransom of the prisoners, and to treat about peace. But when Carthalo
approached Rome, a lictor was sent out to bid him quit the Roman territory before
sunset. In B. C. 208, when Tarentum was re-conquered by the Romans, Carthalo was
commander of the Carthaginian garrison there. He laid down his arms, and as he
was going to the consul to sue for mercy, he was killed by a Roman soldier. (Liv.
xxii. 15, 58, xxvii. 16; Appian, de Bell. Annib. 49; Dion Cass. Fragm. 152)
Diogenes, a Carthaginian, who succeeded Hasdrubal in the command of a place called Nepheris, in Africa, where he was attacked by Scipio Africanus the Younger, who however left Laelius to continue the attack, while he himself marched against Carthage. However, Scipio soon returned, and after a siege of twenty-two days, the place was taken : 70,000 persons are said to have been killed on that spot, and this victory of Scipio was the first great step towards the taking of Carthage, which had been supplied with provisions from Nepheris. The capture of the place, moreover, broke the courage of the Africans, who still espoused the cause of Carthage. (Appian, Pun. 126.)
Epicydes, (Epikudes). A Syracusan by origin, but born and educated at Carthage, and the son of a Carthaginian mother, his grandfather having been banished by Agathocles, and having settled at Carthage. (Polyb. vii. 2; Liv. xxiv. 6.) He served, together with his elder brother Hippocrates, with much distinction in the army of Hannibal, both in Spain and Italy; and when, after the battle of Cannae, Hieronymus of Syracuse sent to make overtures to Hannibal, that general selected the two brothers as his envoys to Syracuse. They soon gained over the wavering mind of the young king, and induced him to desert the Roman alliance. (Polyb. vii. 2-5; Liv. xxiv. 6-7.) But the murder of Hieronymus shortly after, and the revolution that ensued at Syracuse, for a time deranged their plans: they at first demanded merely a safe-conduct to return to Hannibal, but soon found that they could do more good by their intrigues at Syracuse, where they even succeeded in procuring their election as generals, in the place of Andranodorus and Themistus. But the Roman party again obtained the upper hand; and Hippocrntes having been sent with a force to Leontini, Epicydes joined him there, and they set at defiance the Syracusan government. Leontini was, indeed, quickly reduced by Marcellus, but his cruelties there alienated the Syracusans, and still more the foreign mercenaries in their service; a disposition of which Hippocrates and Epicydes (who had made their escape to Erbessus) ably availed themselves, induced the troops sent against them to mutiny, and returned at their head to Syracuse, of which they made themselves masters with little difficulty, B. C. 214. (Liv. xxiv. 21-32.) Marcellus immediately proceeded to besiege Syracuse, the defence of which was conducted with ability and vigour by the two brothers, who had been again appointed generals. When the Roman commander found himself obliged to turn the siege into a blockade, Epicydes continued to hold the city itself, while Hippocrates conducted the operations in other parts of Sicily. The former was, however, unable to prevent the surprise of the Epipolae, which were betrayed into the hands of Marcellus ; but he still exerted his utmost efforts against the Romans, and co-operated zealously with the army from without under Himilco and Hippocrates. After the defeat of the latter he went in person to meet Bomilcar, who was advancing with a Carthaginian fleet to the relief of the city, and hasten his arrival; but, after the retreat of Bomilcar, he seems to have regarded the fall of Syracuse as inevitable, and withdrew to Agrigentutum. (Liv. xxiv. 33-39, xxv. 23-27.) Here he appears to have remained and co-operated with the Numidian Mutines, until the capture of Agrigentum (B. C. 210) obliged him to fly with Hanno to Carthage, after which his name is not again mentioned. (Liv. xxvi. 40.)
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Hippocrates. Brother of Epicydes. When the Roman general, having failed in all his attacks upon the city, found himself compelled to turn the siege into a blockade, it was agreed that while Epicydes continued to hold the command within the walls, Hippocrates should co-operate in other parts of Sicily with Himilco, who had just landed at Heraclea with a large force. He accordingly succeeded in breaking his way through the Roman lines, and, though defeated by Marcellus at Acrae, effected a junction with Himilco at Agrigentum, and we find him united with that general in the subsequent operations in the interior of Sicily. Marcellus having at length made himself master of the greater part of Syracuse, while Achradina and the island of Ortygia still held out, a final attempt was made by Hippocrates and Himilco, with their combined forces, to raise the siege, but their attacks on the Roman lines were unsuccessful, and having encamped in the marshy ground on the banks of the Anapus, a pestilence broke out among their troops, to which Hippocrates, as well as Himilco, fell a victim. (Liv. xxiv. 35-39, xxv. 26.)
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Gisco. Son of Hanno, and probably the father of Hamilcar, the adversary of Agathocles. He is mentioned by Diodorus (xvi. 81) as being in exile at the time of the great defeat sustained by the Carthaginians at the river Crimissus (B. C. 339). According to Polyaenus he had been banished, as implicated in the designs of his brother Hamilcar to possess himself of the sovereign power (Polyaen. v. 11, see also Justin. xxii. 7); but it appears that he had previously distinguished himself, both by his courage and skill as a general, and after the disaster just alluded to the Carthaginians thought fit to recal him from exile, and send him, at the head of a fresh army of mercenaries, to restore their affairs in Sicily. But though he succeeded in cutting off two bodies of mercenary troops, in the service of Syracuse, he was unable to prevent the destruction of Mamercus of Catana, and Hicetas of Leontini, the two chief allies of the Carthaginians; and shortly afterwards the ambassadors who had been sent from Carthage succeeded in concluding a treaty with Timoleon, by which the river Halycus was fixed as the boundary of the contending powers (B. C. 338). After this victory we hear no more of Gisco. (Plut. Timol. 30-34; Diod. xvi. 81, 82; Justin. xxii. 3, 7.)
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Hamilcar. Son of Gisco, was appointed to succeed the preceding in the command of the Carthaginian province in Sicily. (Justin. xxii. 3.) The government of Carthage having resolved to engage seriously in war with Agathocles, committed the conduct of it to Hamilcar,who was at that time, according to Diodorus, the most eminent among all their generals. The same writer elsewhere styles him king, that is, of course, suffete. (Diod. xix. 106, xx. 33.) Having assembled a large fleet and army, Hamilcar sailed for Sicily (B. C. 311); and though he lost sixty triremes and many transports on the passage, soon again restored his forces with fresh recruits, and advanced as far as the river Himera. Here he was met by Agathocles, and, after a short interval, a decisive action ensued in which the Syracusans were totally defeated with great slaughter. Agathocles took refuge in Gela; but Hamilcar, instead of besieging him there, employed himself in gaining over or reducing the other cities of Sicily, most of which gladly forsook the alliance of the Syracusan tyrant and joined the Carthaginians. (Diod. xix. 106-110; Justin. xxii. 3.) It was now that Agathocles adopted the daring resolution of transferring the seat of war to Africa, whither he proceeded in person, leaving his brother Antander to withstand Hamilcar in Sicily. The latter does not appear to have laid siege to Syracuse itself, contenting himself with blockading it by sea, while he himself was engaged in reducing other parts of Sicily. On receiving intelligence from Carthage of the destruction of the fleet of Agathocles, he made an attempt to terrify the Syracusans into submission; but having been frustrated in this as well as in the attempt to carry the walls by surprise, he again withdrew from before the city. (Diod. xx. 15, 16.) At length, having made himself master of almost all the rest of Sicily (B. C. 309), he determined to direct his efforts in earnest against Syracuse; but being misled by an ambiguous prophecy, he was induced to attempt to surprise the city by a night attack, in which his troops were thrown into disorder and repulsed. He himself, in the confusion, fell into the hands of the enemy, by whom he was put to death in the most ignominious manner, and his head sent to Agathocles in Africa as a token of their victory (Diod. xx. 29, 30; Justin. xxii. 7; Cic. de Div. i. 44; Val. Max. i. 7, ext. § 8.)
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Hamilcar. A general of the Carthaginians in the first Punic War. We know nothing of his family or connections, but he must be carefully distinguished from the great Hamilcar Barca, with whom he has been confounded by Zonaras (viii. 10), as well as by some modern writers. It was in the third year of the war (B. C. 262) that he was appointed to succeed Hanno in the command, when that general had failed in averting the fall of Agrigentum. (Diod. xxiii. Exc. Hoeschel. 9.; Zonar.) His first operations were very successful; and notwithstanding the great defeat of the Carthaginian fleet off Mylae by Duilius (B. C. 260), Hamilcar for a time maintained the superiority by land. Learning that the Roman allies were encamped near Therma, apart from the legionary troops, he fell suddenly upon them, surprised their camp, and put 4000 of them to the sword. (Polyb. i. 24.) After this he appears to have traversed the island with his victorious army, as we find him making himself master of Enna and Camarina, both of which were betrayed to him by the inhabitants. He at the same time fortified the stronghold of Drepanum, which became in the latter part of the war one of the most important fortresses of the Carthaginians. (Diod. xxiii.; Zonar. viii. 11.) In the year 257 he commanded the Punic fleet on the north coast of Sicily, and fought a naval action with the Roman consul C. Atilius, in which, according to Polybius, the victory was undecided, though the Roman commander was honoured with a triumph. (Polyb. i. 25, 27; Zonar. viii. 12; Fast. Capitol.) In the following year (256), we find him associated with Hanno in the command of the great Carthaginian fleet, which was designed to prevent the passage of the Roman expedition to Africa under the consuls M. Atilius Regulus and L. Manlius Vulso. The two fleets met off Ecnomus, on the south coast of Sicily: that of the Carthaginians consisted of 350 quinqueremes, while the Romans had 330 ships of war, besides transports. In the battle that ensued, Hamilcar, who commanded the left wing of the Carthaginiar. fleet, at first obtained some advantage, but the Romans ultimately gained a complete victory. Above 30 of the Carthaginian ships were sunk or destroyed, and 64 taken. (Polyb. i. 25-28; Zonar. viii. 12; Eutrop. ii. 21; Oros. iv. 8.) Hamilcar escaped with his remaining ships to Heraclea Minoa, where he soon after received orders to repair immediately to Carthage, now threatened by the Roman army, which had effected its landing in Africa. On his arrival, he was associated with Hasdrubal and Bostar in the command of the army, which was opposed to Regulus, and must consequently share with those generals the blame of the want of skill and judgment so conspicuous in the conduct of the campaign. This incapacity on their part led to the defeat of the Carthaginian army at Adis: we are not told by Polybius what became of the generals after this battle, but his expressions would seem to imply that they still retained their command; it appears at least probable that the Hamilcar mentioned by Orosius (iv. 1) as being sent immediately after the defeat of Regulus to subdue the revolted Numidians was the one of whom we are now treating. On the other hand, it is vaguely asserted by Florus (ii. 2) that the Carthaginian generals were either slain or taken prisoners; and it may perhaps be this Hamilcar of whom Diodorus relates (Exc. Vales. xxiv.) that he was given up, together with Bostar, to the kindred of Regulus, and tortured by them in a cruel manner, in revenge for the fate of their kinsman. It is not, however, clear whether in this story, which is at best but a doubtful one, Hamilcar and Bostar were represented as captives or as hostages. (See Niebuhr, Hist. of Rome, vol. iii.; Polyb. i. 30, 31; Eutrop. ii. 21; Oros. iv. 8; Florus, ii. 1.)
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Hamilcar. Son of Bomilcar (probably the Suffete of that name), is mentioned as one of the generals in Spain in B. C. 215, together with Hasdrubal and Mago, the two sons of Barca. The three generals, with their united armies, were besieging the city of Illiturgi, when the two Scipios came up to its relief; and notwithstanding the great inferiority of their forces, totally defeated the Carthaginians, and compelled them to raise the siege. (Liv. xxiii. 49.) No other mention is found of this Hamilcar, unless he be the same that is named by Polybius (iii. 95) as commanding the fleet of Hasdrubal in 217. That officer is, however, called by Livy (xxii. 19) Himilco. From the perpetual confusion between these two names it seems not impossible that the person of whom we are now speaking is the same as the Himilco whom Livy had previously mentioned (xxiii. 28) as being sent into Spain with a large force to support Hasdrubal.
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Hannibal. A general in the war of the Carthaginians against their revolted mercenaries, B. C. 240--238, who was appointed to succeed Hanno, when the dissensions between that general and Hamilcar Barca had terminated in the deposition of the former. It is probable that the new commuander, if not distinctly placed in subordination to Hamilcar, was content to follow his directions, and we hear nothing of him separately until the two generals besieged Tunis with their combined forces. On this occasion Hamilcar encamped with a part of the army on one side of the city, Hannibal on the other; but the latter was so wanting in vigilance, that Matho, the commander of the besieged forces, by a sudden sally, broke into his camp, made a great slaughter among his troops, and carried off Hannibal himself prisoner. The next morning the unfortunate general was nailed to the same cross on which Spendius, the chief leader of the insurgents, had been previously crucified by Hamilcar. (Polyb. i. 82, 86; Diod. Exc. Vat. xxv. 1.)
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Hanno. Son of Hannibal, was sent to Sicily by the Carthaginians with a large force
immediately after the events just related. Alarmed at the support given to the
Mamertines by the Romans, he concluded an alliance with Hieron, and they hastened
to besiege Messana with their combined forces (B. C. 264). Hieron encamped on
the south side of the town, while Hanno established his army on the north, and
his fleet lay at Cape Pelorus. Yet he was unable to prevent the passage of the
Roman army, and the consul, Appius Claudius, landed at Messana with a force of
20,000 men, with which he first attacked and defeated Hieron, and then turned
his arms against the Carthaginians. Their camp was in so strong a position, that
they at first repulsed the Romans, but were afterwards defeated, and compelled
to retire towards the west of Sicily, leaving the open country at the mercy of
the enemy. (Diod. Exc. Hoeschel. xxiii. 2; Polyb. i. 11, 12, 15; Zonar. viii.
9.)
It seems probable that this Hanno is the same as is styled by Diodorus
" the elder " (ho presbuteros), when he is next mentioned, in the third
year of the war (Diod. Exc. Hoeschel. xxiii. 8): of this, however, there is no
proof. Hannibal, the other Carthaginian general in Sicily, was at that time shut
up in Agrigentum, where he had been besieged, or rather blockaded, by the Romans
more than five months, and was now beginning to suffer from want of provisions,
when Hanno was ordered to raise the siege. For this purpose he assembled at Lilybaeum
an army of 50,000 men, 6000 horse, and 60 elephants, with which formidable force
he advanced to Heraclea; but though he made himself master of Erbessus, where
the Romans had established their magazines, and thus reduced them for a time to
great difficulties; and though he at first obtained some advantages by means of
his Numlidian cavalry, he was eventually defeated in a great battle, and compelled
to abandon Agrigentum to its fate, B. C. 262. (Polyb. i. 18, 19; Diod. Exc. Hoeschel.
xxiii. 8, 9; Zonar. viii. 10; Oros. iv. 7.) For this ill success Hanno was recalled
by the Carthaginian senate, and compelled to pay a fine of 6000 pieces of gold
(Diod. Exc. Hoeschel. xxiii. 9): he was succeeded by Hamilcar, but six years afterwards
(B. C. 256), we again find him associated with that general in the command of
the Carthaginian fleet at the great battle of Ecnomus. (Polyb. i. 27; Oros. iv.
8.) After that decisive defeat, Hanno is said to have been sent by Hamilear, who
appears to have held the chief command, to enter into negotiations with the Roman
generals; but failing in this, he sailed away at once, with the ships that still
remained to him, to Carthage. (Dion Cass. Exc. Vat. 63; Zonar. viii. 12; Val.
Max. vi. 6. f. § 2.) His name is not mentioned in the subsequent operations; but
as two generals of the name of Hanno are spoken of as commanding the Carthaginian
army which was defeated at Clupea in 255 by the consuls Aemilius Paullus and Fulvius
Nobilior (Oros. iv. 9), it is not impossible that he was one of them.
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Hasdrubal, (Asdroubas). According to Gesenius (d. Pthoen. Mon.) this name is more
correctly written Asdrubhal, without the aspiration, which has been adopted from
a mistaken analogy with Hannibal, Hamilcar, &c. (See Drakenborch, ad Liv.
xxi. 1.) The same writer explains it as signifying cujus auxilium est Baal. 1.
A Carthaginian general, son of Mago, is represented by Justin as being, together
with his father and his brother, Hamilcar, one of the chief founders of the military
power and dominion of Carthage. According to that writer he was eleven times invested
with the chief magistracy, which he calls dictatorship (dictatura, by which it
is probable that he means the chief military command, rather than the office of
suffete), and four times obtained the honours of a triumph, an institution which
is not mentioned on any other occasion as existing at Carthage. But the only wars
in which Justin speaks of him as engaged, are one against the Africans, which
appears to have been on the whole unsuccessful, and one in Sardinia, in which
Hasdrubal himself perished. (Just. xix. 1.) He left three sons, Hannibal, Hasdrubal,
and Sappho, who are said to have followed up their father's career of conqutest,
and to have held, together with their cousins, the three sons of Hamilcar, the
chief direction of all affairs at Carthage; but their particular actions are not
specified. (Id. xix. 2). The chronology of this part of the Carthaginian history,
as related by Justin, is extremely uncertain.
A Carthaginian general in the first Punic war, called by Polybius
son of Hanno. He is first mentioned as one of the two generals appointed to take
the field against Regulus in B. C. 256, and who, by their injudicious management,
brought Carthage to the brink of ruin. (Polyb. i. 30-31.) Though the virtual command
of the army was soon after transferred to Xanthippus, it does not appear that
the generals were ever deposed; and after the final defeat of Regulus, Hasdrubal
was immediately despatched to Sicily, with a large army, and not less than 140
elephants. (Id. 38.) The terror with which these animals at this time inspired
the Romans rendered them unwilling to encounter Hasdrubal in the field, and thus
gave him the command of the open country, notwithstanding which he appears to
have wasted his time in unaccountable inactivity; and during a period of two years
to have effected nothing beyond a few unimportant skirmishes. At length, in the
beginning of B. C. 250, he was aroused to exertion, and advanced to attack the
Roman consul, L. Caccilius Metellus, under the walls of Panormus. But Metellus,
by his skilful dispositions, not only repulsed his attack, but totally defeated
his army; and, what was of the greatest consequence, killed or took captive all
his elephants. This defeat had more than almost any other a decisive influence
on the fate of the war, as from this time the Roman superiority by land was almost
undisputed. Hasdrubal escaped from the action to Lilybaeum, but was put to death
on his return to Carthage. (Polyb. i. 39, 40; Diod. Exc. Hoesch. xxiii. 14; Zonar.
viii. 14; Oros. iv. 9.)
Hasdrubal. Son of the great Hamilcar Barca, and brother of the still more famous
Hannibal. He is mentioned as being present in the battle in which his father lost
his life, and from which he escaped, together with his brother Hannibal, to the
city of Acra Leuce. (Diod. Exc. Hoesch. xxv. 2.) This is the only notice we find
of him previous to the departure of Hannibal for Italy; but it is evident that
he must not only have been trained up in war, but must have already given proofs
of his ability, which led his brother to confide to him the important command
of the army in Spain, when he himself set out on his daring march to Italy, B.
C. 218. The troops left under his command amounted to less than 13,000 foot and
2500 horse, principally Africans (Polyb. iii. 33); but he doubtless greatly increased
this number by levies among the Spaniards themselves. With a part of this force
he advanced to support Hanno, who had been left in charge of the province between
the Iberus and the Pyrenees, against Cn. Scipio; but that general was defeated,
and his army destroyed before he could arrive, and he was obliged to content himself
with cutting off a body of the Roman soldiers who were attached to the fleet.
(Polyb. iii. 76; Liv. xxi. 61.) The next spring (B. C. 217) he advanced from New
Carthage, where he had wintered, with the intention of dispossessing Cn. Scipio
of the province north of the Iberus; but the loss of his fleet, which was almost
destroyed by that of the Romans, appears to have paralysed his movements, and
he did not even cross the Iberus. Before the end of the season, P. Scipio joined
his brother with large reinforcements from Rome, and they now assumed the offensive,
and crossed the Iberus, without Bostar, who had been despatched by Hasdrubal to
oppose them, venturing to meet them in the field. No decisive action took place
before the winter; but Bostar, by suffering the Spanish hostages to fall into
the hands of the Romans, gave a shock to the Carthaginian influence throughout
Spain which it hardly recovered. (Polyb. iii. 95-99; Liv. xxii. 19-22.) The campaign
of the next year, 216, which was marked in Italy by the great victory of Cannae,
was signalised by no decisive results in Spain, Hasdrubal having apparently confined
himself to defensive operations, or to enterprises against the Spanish tribes.
But when the news of the battle of Cannae reached Carthage, orders were immediately
sent to Hasdrubal to march at once into Italy, in order to support and co-operate
with the victorious Hannibal, and Himilco was sent with a fresh army to supply
his place in Spain. But the execution of this plan was frustrated by the total
defeat of Hasdrubal in a battle with the two Scipios near the passage of the Iberus;
and this disaster was followed by the defection of many of the native tribes.
(Liv. xxiii. 26-29, 32; Zonar. ix. 3.) The Carthaginians now sent to his relief
his brother Mago, with a force of 12,000 foot, 1500 horse, and 20 elephants, which
had been previously destined for the assistance of Hannibal in Italy; and we henceforward
find the two brothers cooperating in the war in Spain. But our knowledge of their
proceedings is very imperfect: the Roman accounts are full of the most palpable
and absurd exaggerations; and it is utterly impossible to form any thing like
a clear conception of the military operations of either side. Hence a very brief
notice of the leading events of the war is all that can be here attempted. It
may be observed, however, that the operations of the generals on both sides must
naturally have been determined in great measure by the fluctuating policy of the
different Spanish tribes, concerning which we have scarcely any information; and
this circumstance may sometimes serve to explain changes of fortune which would
otherwise appear wholly unaccountable.
In the year 215 we find Hasdrubal and Mago employed with their united
forces in the siege of Illiturgi, when the two Scipios came up to the relief of
the city, totally defeated them, and took their camp. But this disaster did not
prevent them from soon after forming the siege of Indibilis, where, it is said,
they again experienced the like ill fortune. (Liv. xxiii. 49.) The next year,
214, was marked by the arrival in Spain of a third Carthaginian general, Hasdrubal
the son of Gisco, with a considerable army; but, notwithstanding this reinforcement,
nothing memorable was effected. The Roman accounts indeed speak of two successive
victories gained by Cn. Scipio, but followed (as usual) by no apparent results.
(Liv. xxiv. 41, 42.) Of the campaign of 213 no particulars are recorded by Livy;
but according to Appian (Hisp. 15), Hasdrubal was employed during a part of this
year in Africa, having been sent for by the government at home to carry on the
war against the revolted Numidians, which he brought to a successful termination,
and then returned to Spain. The following year (B. C. 212) was at length marked
by a decisive success on the part of the Carthaginians. The two Scipios appear
to have roused themselves to make a great effort, and dividing their forces, marched
to attack the separate Carthaginian armies at the same time. The result was fatal:
Cn. Scipio, who was opposed to Hasdrubal, was at once paralysed by the defection
of 20,000 Celtiberian mercenaries, who were gained over by the Carthaginian general:
meanwhile his brother Publius had fallen in an engagement with the Numidian cavalry
of Hasdrubal son of Gisco and Mago; and those two generals having hastened to
join their forces with those of the son of Barca, Cn. Scipio was surrounded by
their united armies, his camp taken, and he himself slain, with the greater part
of his troops. (Liv. xxv. 32-36; Appian, Hisp. 16.)
This victory appeared to be decisive of the fate of the war in Spain;
and we do not see what now remained to prevent Hasdrubal from setting out on his
march to Italy. Yet we hear of no measures tending to this result, and are unable
to account for the loss of so valuable an opportunity. But the history of this
part of the war has been so effectually disguised, that it is impossible to conjecture
the truth. It appears that the remains of the Roman armies had been collected
together by a Roman knight, named L. Marcius, who established his camp to the
north of the Iberus; and was able to defend it against the attacks of the enemy;
but the accounts (copied by Livy from Claudius Quadrigarius and Valerius of Antium)
of his great victories over the Carthaginian armies, and his capture of their
camps, are among the most glaring exaggerations with which the history of this
war has been encumbered by the Roman annalists. Still more palpably absurd is
the story that the Roman praetor, Claudius Nero, landing in Spain with a force
of 6000 men, found Hasdrubal encamped in so disadvantageous a position, that his
whole army must have fallen into the power of Claudius, had he not deluded that
general by a pretended negotiation, under cover of which he drew off his forces.
(Liv. xxv. 37-39, xxvi. 17; comp. Appian, Hisp. 17, and Zonar. ix. 5, 7; and see
some judicious remarks on this part of Livy's history by a soldier and a statesman
in Raleigh's History of the World, book 5, ch. 13, sect. 11.) All that is certain
is, that when the youthful P. Scipio (the son of that Publius who had fallen in
the preceding year) landed in Spain in 211, he found the whole country south of
the Iberus in the undisputed possession of the Carthaginian generals. Their three
armies were, however, separated in distant quarters of the peninsula, probably
engaged in establishing their dominion over the native tribes: while the more
settled Carthaginian province was comparatively neglected. Of this disposition
Scipio ably availed himself, and by a sudden blow, made himself master of New
Carthage, the heart of the enemy's dominion, and the place where their principal
stores had been collected. (Polyb. x. 7-20; Liv. xxvi. 20, 41-48; Appian, Hisp.
19-24.)
Hasdrubal had been occupied in the siege of a small town of the Carpetanians,
at the time that this blow was struck: we know nothing of the measures which either
he or his colleagues adopted in consequence; but we are told that the conquest
of New Carthage co-operating with the personal popularity of Scipio, caused the
defection of many of the Spanish tribes from the alliance of Carthage, among others
that of Indibilis and Mandonius, two of the most influential, and hitherto the
most faithful of her supporters. Hasdrubal, alarmed at this increasing disaffection,
determined to bring matters to the issue of a decisive battle, with the view of
afterwards putting in execution his longmeditated advance to Italy. But while
he was still engaged in his preparations for this purpose, and was collecting
a supply of money from the rich silver mines of Andalusia, he was attacked by
Scipio in his camp at Baecula, and, notwithstanding the strength of his position,
was forced from it with heavy loss. The defeat, however, can hardly have been
so complete as it is represented by the Roman writers, for it appears that Hasdrubal
carried off his treasure and his elephants in safety, and withdrew unmolested
towards the more northern provinces of Spain. Here he held a consultation with
the other two generals (his brother Mago and Hasdrubal the son of Gisco), at which
it was agreed that he himself should proceed to Italy, leaving his two colleagues
to make head against Scipio in Spain. (Polyb. x. 34-40; Liv. xxvii. 17-20.)
Of the expedition of Hasdrubal to Italy, though it is one of the most
important events of the war, we have very little real knowledge. The line of his
march was necessarily different from that pursued by Hannibal, for Scipio was
in undisputed possession of the province north of the Iberus, and had secured
the passes of the Pyrenees on that side; hence Hasdrubal, after recruiting his
army with fresh troops, levied among the northern Spaniards, crossed the Pyrenees
near their western extremity, and plunged into the heart of Gaul. What were his
relations with the Gallic tribes--whether the period spent by him among them was
occupied in peace or war--we know not; but, before he reached the foot of the
Alps, many ot them had been induced to join him, and the mention among these of
the Arverni shows how deep into the country he had penetrated. The chronology
is also very obscure. It is certain that the battle of Baecula was fought in B.
C. 209, but whether Hasdrubal crossed the Pyrenees the same year we have no evidence:
he must, at all events, have spent one winter in Gaul, as it was not till the
spring of 207 that he crossed the Alps, and descended into Italy. The passage
of the Alps appears to have presented but trifling difficulties, compared with
what his brother Hannibal had encountered eleven years before; and he arrived
in Italy so much earlier than he was expected, that the Romans had no army in
Cisalpine Gaul ready to oppose him. Unfortunately, instead of taking advantage
of this, to push on at once into the heart of Italy, he allowed himself to be
engaged in the siege of Placentia, and lost much precious time in fruitless efforts
to reduce that colony. When at length he abandoned the enterprise, he continued
his march upon Ariminum, having previously sent messengers to Hannibal to apprise
him of his movements, and concert measures for their meeting in Umbria. But his
despatches fell into the hands of the Roman consul, C. Nero, who instantly marched
with a light detachment of 7000 men to join his colleague, M. Livius, in his camp
at Sena, where his army was now in presence of Hasdrubal. Emboldened by this reinforcement,
the two consuls proceeded to offer battle to the Carthaginian general; but Hasdrnbal,
perceiving their augmented forces, declined the combat, and retreated towards
Ariminum. The Romans pursued him, and he found himself compelled to give them
battle on the right bank of the Metanurus. It is admitted by his enemies that
on this occasion Hasdrubal displayed all the qualities of a consummate general,
but his forces were greatly inferior to those of the enemy, and his Gaulish auxiliaries
were of little service. The gallant resistance of his Spanish and Ligurian troops
is attested by the heavy loss of the Romans; but all was of no avail, and, seeing
the battle irretrievably lost, he rushed into the midst of the enemy, and fell
sword in hand, in a manner, says Livy, worthy of the son of Hamilcar and the brother
of Hannibal. The loss on his side had amounted, according to Polybius, to 10,000
men, while it is exaggerated by the Roman writers (who appear anxious to make
the battle of the Metaurus a compensation for that of Cannae), to more than 50,000.
But the amount of loss is unimportant; the battle was decisive of the fate of
the war in Italy. (Polyb. xi. 1-3; Liv. xxvii. 36, 39, 43-49; Appian, Hisp. 28,
Annib. 52, 53; Zonar. ix. 9; Oros. iv. 18; Eutrop. iii. 18.) The consul, C. Nero,
hastened back to Apulia almost as speedily as he had come, and is said to have
announced to Hannibal the defeat and death of his brother, by throwing down before
his camp the severed head of Hasdrubal. (Liv. xxvii. 51.)
The merits of Hasdrubal as a general are known to us more by the general
admission of his enemies, who speak of him as a worthy rival of his father and
his brother, than from any judgment we can ourselves form from the imperfect and
perverted accounts that have been transmitted to us. Of his personal character
we know nothing : not a single anecdote, not a single individual trait, has been
preserved to us by the Roman writers of the man who for so many years maintained
the struggle against some of their ablest generals. We can only conjecture, from
some of the events of the Spanish war, that he possessed to a great degree the
same power over the minds of men that was evinced by other members of his family;
and his conduct towards the subject tribes seems to have been regarded as presenting
a favourable contrast to that of his namesake, the son of Gisco. (Polyb. ix. 11.)
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Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, one of the Carthaginian generals in Spain during the Second Punic War. He is first
mentioned as arriving in that country, with a considerable army, in B. C. 214,
and as cooperating with Hasdrubal and Mago, the two sons of Hamilcar, in the campaign
of that year. But, notwithstanding the union of their three armies, they were
able to effect nothing decisive. The outline of the events which marked the Spanish
war from this year until the departure of Hasdrubal the son of Hamilcar to Italy,
has been already given in the life of the latter, and it seems unnecessary to
recapitulate it, in order to point out the share which the son of Gisco took in
the successes or reverses of the Carthaginian arms. From an early period of the
war, dissensions arose between the three generals, which doubtless contributed
not a little to the fluctuations of its success, and which appear to have risen
to a still greater height after the defeat and death of the two Scipios (B. C.
212) had left them apparently undisputed masters of Spain. The particular part
which the son of Gisco took in these is nowhere mentioned, but it is difficult
to avoid the conjecture that they were in great part owing to his jealousy of
the sons of Hamilcar; and Polybius expressly charges him (ix. 11, x. 35, 36) with
alienating the minds of the Spaniards by his arrogance and rapacity, among others
that of Indibilis, one of the chiefs who had been most faithfully attached to
the Carthaginian cause.
When Hasdrubal the son of Hamilcar, after his defeat at Baecula by
Scipio (B. C. 209), moved northwards across the Tagus, he was joined by his two
colleagues, and, at the council of war held by them, it was agreed, that while
the son of Hamilcar should prosecute his march to Italy, the son of Gisco should
confine himself to the defence of Lusitania and the western provinces of Spain,
taking care to avoid a battle with Scipio (Liv. xxvii. 20). This accounts for
his inaction during the following year. In the summer of 207 we hear of him in
the extreme south, near Gades, where he was joined by Mago with the remains of
his army, after his defeat by M. Silanus. But though Scipio followed Mago to the
south, and endeavoured to bring Hasdrubal to a battle, that general evaded his
designs, and the campaign came to a close without any decisive action. The next
year (206) having greatly augmented his army by fresh levies, Hasdrubal found
himself at the head of a force of 70,000 foot and 4500 horse, with which he and
Mago no longer hesitated to meet the enemy in the field. They were attacked by
Scipio at a place called by Polybius Elinga, by Livy Silpia, situated apparently
in the mining district of Baetica, and, after a long and obstinate combat, totally
defeated. This battle, which seems to have been one of the most striking instances
of Scipio's military genius, was decisive of the war in Spain; Hasdrubal and Mago,
with the remains of their scattered army, took refuge within the walls of Gades
(Polyb. xi. 20-24; Liv. xxviii. 1-3, 12-16; Appian, Hisp. 24-28). The former appears
to have henceforth abandoned all hopes of prosecuting the war in Spain, and turned
all his attention to Africa, where Scipio had already entered into negotiations
with Syphax, the powerful king of the Massaesylians. Hasdrubal, alarmed at these
overtures, hastened in person to the court of the Numidian king, where it is said
he arrived at the same time with Scipio himself, and spent some days in friendly
intercourse with his dreaded adversary (Liv. xxviii. 17, 18; Appian, Hisp. 30).
He was, however, successful in detaching Syphax from his meditated alliance with
Rome, a success said to have been owing in great part to the charms of his daughter
Sophonisba, whom he gave in marriage to the Numidian prince; but this same measure
had the effect of completing the alienation of Masinissa, prince of the Massylians,
to whom Sophonisba had been previously promised. Hasdrubal, however, did not regard
his enmity in comparison with the friendship of Syphax, whom he not long after
instigated to invade the territories of Masinissa, and expel that prince from
the whole of his hereditary dominions (Liv. xxix. 23, 31; Appian, Pun. 10-12;
Zonar. ix. 11, 12).
Such was the state of affairs when Scipio landed in Africa, in B.
C. 204. Hasdrubal, who was at this time regarded as one of the chief citizens
in his native state, was immediately placed at the head of the Carthaginian land
forces, and succeeded in levying an army of 30,000 foot and 3000 horse, which
was quickly joined by Syphax with a force of 50,000 foot and 10,000 horse. The
approach of these two powerful armies compelled Scipio to raise the siege of Utica,
and establish his camp in a strong position on a projecting headland, while Hasdrubal
and Syphax formed two separate camps to watch and, as it were, blockade him throughout
the winter. The Numidian king, however, allowed himself to be engaged in negotiations
with Scipio, during the course of which the Roman general was led to form the
dreadful project of burning both the hostile camps. With the assistance of Masinissa,
he was enabled fully to accomplish this horrible scheme: the camp of Hasdrubal
and that of Syphax were set on fire at the same time, while they were surrounded
by the enemy's troops: thousands of their men perished in the flames, the rest
fell by the sword of the enemy in the darkness and confusion: out of 90,000 men,
it is said that a few fugitives alone escaped, to tell the tale of this fearful
massacre. Among these, however, was Hasdrubal himself, who hastened from the scene
of the disaster to Carthage, where he succeeded in persuading the senate once
more to try the fortune of war. Syphax had also escaped, and was soon able to
raise another army of Numidians, with which he again joined Hasdrubal. But their
united forces were a second time overthrown by Scipio; and while Syphax fled once
more into Numidia, Hasdrubal returned to Carthage, B. C. 203 (Polyb. xiv. 1-8;
Liv. xxix. 35, xxx. 3-8; Appian, Pun. 13-23; Zonar. ix. 12). This is the last
notice of him that occurs in Polybius or Livy; according to Appian, on the contrary,
he avoided returning to Carthage, from apprehension of the popular fury, and assembled
a force of mercenary and Numidian troops, with which he kept the field on his
own account, having been condemned to death for his ill success by the Carthaginian
government. Notwithstanding this, he continued to concert measures, and co-operate
with his successor, Hanno the son of Hamilcar; and on the arrival of Hannibal
from Italy his sentence was reversed, and the troops he had collected placed under
the command of that general. But the popular feeling against him had not subsided:
he was compelled to conceal himself within the city, and, on some occasion of
a sudden outbreak of party violence, he was pursued by his enemies, and with difficulty
escaped to the tomb of his family, where he put an end to his life by poison.
His head was cut off and paraded in triumph by the populace through the city (Appian,
Pun. 24, 29, 30, 36, 38; Zonar. ix. 12, 13).
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Hasdrubal, general of the Carthaginians in their last fatal struggle with Rome, known by the name of the Third Punic War. He is first mentioned at the time of the breaking out of the war with Masinissa, which immediately preceded that with Rome, B. C. 150. Hasdrubal at this time held the office called by Appian boetharch (Boetharchos), the nature of which is very uncertain; but when Masinissa, after the insult offered to his two sons, Gulussa and Micipsa, whom he had sent to Carthage as ambassadors, commenced open hostilities by the siege of Oroscopa, Hasdrubal was sent against him at the head of 25,000 foot and 400 horse, which forces were quickly increased by the accession of 6000 Numidiai cavalry, who deserted from Masinissa. With this force he did not hesitate to give battle to the Numidian king: the action which ensued was fiercely contested from morning till night, without any decisive advantage on either side; negotiations were then commenced by the intervention of Scipio, who was accidentally present; but these proved abortive, and Masinissa afterwards succeeded in shutting up Hasdrubal in such a position that he was able to cut off his supplies, and finally compelled him by famine to capitulate. By the terms of the treaty, the Carthaginians were allowed to depart in safety, leaving their arms and baggage; but these conditions were shamefully violated: the Numiidians attacked them on their march in this defenceless state, and cut to pieces by far the greater part of them; very few made their escape, together with Ilasdrubal, to Carthage. (Appian, Pun. 70-73.) After this disaster, the Carthaginians, apprehensive of the danger that threatened them from Rome, sought to avert it by casting the responsibility of the late events upon individuals, and accordingly passed sentence of banishment on Hasdrubal, together with all the other leaders in the war against Masinissa. He thereupon took refuge among the neighbouring Africans, and soon collected around his standard an army of 20,000 men, with which lie awaited the issue of events. The Carthaginians found, when too late, that all concessions were unavailing to conciliate their inexorable enemies; and while they prepared for a desperate resistance within the city, they hastened to recal the sentence of Hasdrubal, and appointed him to the chief command without the walls, B. C. 149. His own army gave him the complete command of the open country, and enabled him to secure abundant supplies to the city, while the Romans with difficulty drew their provisions from a few detached towns on the coast. Hovering in the neighbourhood of Carthage, without approaching close to the enemy, Hasdrubal prevented them from regularly investing the city, and, by means of his light cavalry, harassed and impeded all their movements. At length the Roman consul, Manilius, was induced to undertake an expedition against Nepheris, a stronghold in the interior, where Hasdrubal had established his headquarters; but far from succeeding in dislodging him from thence, he was repulsed with heavy loss, and suffered severely in his retreat (Appian, Pun. 74, 80, 93, 94, 97, 102-104; Liv. Epit. xlix.). A second attempt on the part of Manilius having proved equally unsuccessful, Hasdrubal became so elated that he aspired to the sole command, and procured the deposition of the other Hasdrubal, the grandson of Masinissa, who had hitherto held the command within the city (Id. 108, 111). On the arrival of Scipio (B. C. 147) to carry on the war, which had been so much mismanaged by his predecessors, Hasdrubal advanced close to the walls of Carthage, and encamped within five stadia of the city, immediately opposite to the camp of the Roman general. But notwithstanding this proximity, he did not prevent Scipio from surprising by a night attack the quarter of the city called Megara. By way of revenging himself for this disaster, Hasdrubal, who had now withdrawn his forces within the walls of Carthage, put to death all the Roman prisoners, having previously mutilated them in the most horrible manner, and in this state exposed them on the walls to the eyes of their countrymen. By this act of wanton barbarity he alienated the minds of many of his fellow-citizens at the same time that he exasperated the enemy; and the clamour was loud against him in the senate of Carthage. But he now found himself in the uncontrolled direction of the military force within the city, a position of which he availed himself to establish a despotic authority: he put to death many of the senators who were opposed to him, and assumed the garb and manners of royalty. When Scipio had at length succeeded in completely investing the city, and famine began to make itself felt within the walls, Hasdrubal carefully reserved the supplies which from time to time were introduced, and distributed them only among his soldiers and those of the citizens on whom he mainly relied for the defence. At the same time he opened negotiations with Scipio, through the medium of Gulussa; but that general having offered him terms only for himself with his family and a few friends, he refused to purchase his personal safety by the abandonment of his country. Meanwhile the siege of Carthage was more and more closely pressed, and in the spring of 146 Hasdrubal saw himself compelled to abandon the defence of the port and other quarters of the city, and collect all his forces into the citadel called Byrsa. Against this Scipio now concentrated all his attacks; the ground was contested foot by foot, but the Romans renewed their assaults without ceasing, both by night and day, and gradually advanced by burning and demolishing the houses along all the streets which led to the citadel. At length the mass of the inhabitants submitted to Scipio, and were received as prisoners; the Roman deserters alone. with a few others who despaired of pardon, took refuge in the sacred precincts of the temple of Aesculapius, and still held out with the fury of desperation. Hasdrubal at first fled thither with his wife and children; but afterwards made his escape secretly to .Scipio, who spared his life. It is said that his wife, after upbraiding him with his weakness, threw herself and her children into the flames of the burning temple. Scipio carried him prisoner to Rome, where, after adorning the triumph of his conqueror, he spent the rest of his life in an honourable captivity in some one of the provincial towns of Italy (Appian, Pun. 114, 118, 120, 126-131; Polyb. Exc. xxxix.; Zonar. ix, 29, 30; Liv. Epit. li.; Oros. iv. 22, 23; Flor. ii. 14). Polybius, from whom all our accounts of this war are directly or indirectly derived, has drawn the character of Hasdrubal in the blackest colours, and probably not without prejudice : the circumstances in which he was placed must have palliated, if not excused, many arbitrary acts; and however justly he may be reproached with cruelty, there seems strong evidence of his being a man of much greater ability than the historian is willing to allow. Nor must we forget that he refused to purchase his own personal safety so long as there remained even the slightest chance of obtaining that of his country.
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Hasdrubal, a grandson of Masinissa by the mother's side, but apparently a Carthaginian by birth. He was appointed to the chief command within the walls of the city, when the Carthaginians, in B. C. 149, prepared for their last desperate resistance against the Roman consuls Censorinus and Manilius. How far we are to ascribe to his authority or directions the energetic measures adopted for the defence of the city, or the successful resistance opposed for more than a year to the Roman arms, we know not, as his name is not again mentioned by Appian until after the defeat of Calpurnius Piso at Hippo in the following year, B. C. 148. This success following the repeated repulses of Manilius in his attacks on Nepheris, had greatly elated the Carthaginians; and in this excitement of spirits, they seem to have been easily led to believe a charge brought by his enemies against Hasdrubal of having betrayed their interests for the sake of his brother-in-law, Gulussa. The accusation was brought forward in the senate, and before Hasdrubal, astounded at the unexpected charge, could utter a word in his defence, a tumult arose, in the midst of which he was struck down, and despatched with blows from the benches of the senators used as clubs. According to Appian, his destruction was caused by the intrigues of his rival and namesake. (Appian, Pun. 93, 11 ; Oros. iv. 22.)
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Himilco. Son of Hanno, commander, together with Hannibal, the son of Gisco, in
the great Carthaginian expedition to Sicily, B. C. 406. His father is probably
the same Hanno mentioned by Justin (xix. 2) among the sons of Hamilcar, in which
case Himilco and Hannibal were first cousins. Diodorus (xiii. 80) expressly states
them to have been of the same family. It was probably this relationship that induced
the Carthaginians, when Hannibal manifested some reluctance to undertake the command
of a new expedition, to associate Himilco with him. The forces placed under their
joint command amounted, according to Timaeus and Xenophon, to 120,000 men: Ephorus,
with his usual exaggeration, stated them at 300,000. (Diod. xiii. 80; Xen. Hell.
i. 5.21.) With this great army the two generals formed the siege of Agrigentum,
and directed their attacks against it on several points at once. In the course
of the works they constructed for this purpose, they destroyed many sepulchres,
a circumstance to which the superstitious fears of the multitude attributed a
pestilence that broke out in the camp soon afterwards, and which carried off many
victims, Hannibal among the rest. Himilco, now left sole general, after attempting
to relieve the religious apprehensions of his soldiers by propitiatory sacrifices,
continued to press the siege with vigour. The arrival of Daphnaeus with a body
of Syracusan and other auxiliaries for a time changed the face of affairs, and
Himilco was even blockaded in his camp, and reduced to great straits for want
of provisions; but having, with the assistance of his fleet, intercepted a Syracusan
convoy, he was relieved from this difficulty, and soon recovered the advantage.
The famine, which now made itself felt in its turn in the besieged city, the dissensions
of the Sicilian generals, and the incapacity or treachery of some among them,
at length led to the abandonment of Agrigentum, of which Himilco thus became master,
after a siege protracted for nearly eight months. (Diod. xiii. 80-89; Xen. Hell.
i. 5.21, ii. 2.24.) Here he took up his quarters for the winter, and in the spring
of 405 advanced against Gela, to which he laid siege. Dionysius, then just established
as tyrant of Syracuse, led a large force to its relief, but was defeated in the
first encounter, on which he at once withdrew, taking with him the whole population,
not only of Gela, but of Camarina also. The cities, thus abandoned, naturally
fell, without a struggle, into the hands of Himilco; but of his farther operations
we know nothing, except that a pestilence broke out in his army, which led him
to make offers of peace to the Syracusans. These were gladly accepted, and the
terms of the treaty were highly advantageous to Carthage, which retained, in addition
to its former possessions, Selinus, Himera, and Agrigentum, besides which Gela
and Camarina were to pay her tribute, and remain unfortified. (Diod. xiii. 91,
108-114.)
Himilco now returned to Africa, but his army carried with it the seeds
of pestilence, which quickly spread from the soldiers to the inhabitants, and
committed dreadful ravages, which appear to have extended through a period of
several years. Carthage was thus sorely weakened, and wholly unprepared for war,
when, in 397, Dionysius, who had spent several years in preparations, sent a herald
to declare war in form against the Carthaginians. They were thus unable to prevent
his victorious progress from one end of the island to the other, or even to avert
the fall of Motya, their chief, and almost their last, strong-hold in Sicily.
All that Himilco, who still held the chief command, and who was about this time
advanced to the voluntary dignity of king or suffete (Diod. xiv. 54), could do,
was to attempt the destruction of Dionysius's fleet, by attacking it suddenly
with 100 triremes, when most of the ships were drawn up on shore ; but foiled
in this, he was obliged to return to Africa. Meanwhile, however, he had been actively
engaged in preparations, and by the following spring (B. C. 396), he had assembled
a numerous fleet and an army of 100,000 men, with which he landed at Panormus,
though not without heavy loss, having been attacked on the voyage by Leptines,
and many of his ships sunk. But once arrived in Sicily, he quickly regained the
advantage, recovered possession of Eryx and Motya, and corpelled Dionysius to
fall back towards the eastern side of the island, on which the Sicanians immediately
declared in favour of Carthage.
Thus again master of the western part of Sicily, Himilco advanced
along the north coast both with his fleet and army; and having effected his march
without opposition as far as Messana, surprised that city during the absence of
most of the inhabitants, and levelled it to the ground; after which he directed
his march southwards, against Syracuse itself. Dionysius had advanced with a large
army to meet him, but the defection of his Sicilian allies, and the total defeat
of his fleet by that of the Carthaginians under Mago, excited his apprehensions
for the safety of Syracuse, and he hastened to shut himself up with his army within
the walls of that city. Himilco, thus finding no enemy to oppose him in the field,
advanced at once with his army to the very gates of Syracuse, and encamped on
the same ground previously occupied by the Athenians under Nicias, while his fleet
of 208 triremes, besides a countless swarm of transports, occupied, and almost
filled, the great port. For 30 days Himilco ravaged the neighbouring country unopposed,
and repeatedly offered battle to the Syracusans; but though he made himself master
of one of the suburbs, he does not appear to have made any vigorous attacks on
the city itself. Meanwhile, a fever, caused by the marshy nature of the ground
in which he was encamped and the great heat of the summer, broke out in his army,
and soon assumed the character of a malignant pestilence. This visitation was
attributed by the Greeks to the profanation of their temples; and Dionysius took
advantage of the confidence thus inspired to make a sudden attack upon the Carthaginian
camp both by sea and land, which proved completely successful; a great part of
their fleet was either sunk, burnt, or captured; and Himilco, despairing of retrieving
his fortune, immediately sent proposals to Dionysius for a secret capitulation,
by which he himself, together with the native Carthaginians under his command,
should be permitted to depart unmolested, on payment of a sum of 300 talents.
These terms were gladly accepted by the Syracusans, and Himilco made his escape
under cover of the night, leaving all the forces of his allies and mercenary troops
at the mercy of Dionysius. But though lie thus secured his personal safety, as
well as that of the Carthaginian citizens in his army, a termination at once so
ignominions and so disastrous to a campaign that had promised so much, caused
him, on his return to Carthage, to be overwhelmed with obloquy, until at length
unable to bear the weight of odium that he had incurred, he put an end to his
life by abstinence. (Diod. xiv. 41, 47-76; Justin. xix. 2.)
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Himilco, a Carthaginian, who commanded the fleet of Hasdrubal in Spain in 217 B. C. He was attacked by Cn. Scipio at the mouth of the Iberus, and completely defeated, twenty-five ships out of forty taken, and the rest driven to the shore, where the crews with difficulty made their escape. (Liv. xxii. 19, 20; Polyb. iii. 95, by whom he is called Hamilcar).
Himilco. Commander of the Carthaginian forces in Sicily during a part of the second Punic war. He is first mentioned as commanding the fleet which was sent over from Carthage in B. C. 214, about the time that Marcellus first arrived in Sicily; but he appears to have remained inactive at Cape Pachynus, watching the operations of the enemy, but without effecting any thing decisive (Liv. xxiv. 27, 35). From thence he returned to Carthage; and having received from the government there, who were now determined to prosecute the war in Sicily with energy, an army of 25,000 foot and 3000 horse, he landed with this force at Heraclea Minoa, and quickly made himself master of Agrigentum. Here he was joined by Hippocrates from Syracuse; and following Marcellus, who retreated before him, he advanced to the banks of tile Anapus. But the Roman camp was too strong to be forced, and Himilco, feeling confident that the Syracusans could be left to their own resources, turned his attention to the other cities of Sicily. The spirit of hostility to Rome was rapidly spreading among these, and several openly declared in favour of the Carthaginians. Murgantia, where great part of the Roman magazines had been collected, was betrayed into the hands of Himilco; and the still more important fortress of Enna was only prevented from following its example by the barbarous massacre of its inhabitants by the orders of the Roman governor, Pinarius. But in the following spring (212) the surprise of the Epipolae by Marcellus, which put him in possession of three out of the five quarters of Syracuse, more than counterbalanced all these advantages of the Carthaginians. Himilco saw the necessity of an immediate effort to relieve Syracuse, and again advanced thither in conjunction with Hippocrates. But their attacks on the Roman lines were repulsed; and a pestilence, caused by the marshy ground on which they were encamped, broke out in their army, which carried off Himilco, as well as his colleague, Hippocrates (Liv. xxiv. 35-39, xxv. 23, 26; Zonar. ix. 4).
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Mago. Commander of the Carthaginian fleet under Himilco in the war against Dionysius, B. C. 396. He is particularly mentioned as holding that post in the great sea-fight off Catana, when he totally defeated the fleet of the Syracusans under Leptines, the brother of Dionysius, sinking or destroying above 100 of their ships, besides capturing many others. (Diod. xiv. 59, 60.) We have no information as to the part he bore in the subsequent operations against Syracuse itself; but after the disastrous termination of the expedition, and the return of Himilco to Africa, Mago appears to have been invested with the chief command in Sicily, where he endeavoured by measures of lenity and conciliation towards the Greek cities, and by concluding alliances with the Sicilian tribes, to reestablish the Carthaginian power in the island. In 393 he advanced against Messana, but was attacked and defeated by Dionysius near Abacaenum, which compelled him to remain quiet for a time. The next year, however, having received powerful reinforcements from Sardinia and Africa, he assembled an army of 80,000 men, with which he advanced through the heart of Sicily as far as the river Chrysas, but was there met by Dion sins, who having secured the alliance of Agyris, tyrant of Agyrium, succeeded in cutting off the supplies of the enemy, and by this means reduced them to such distress, that Mago was compelled to conclude a treaty of peace, by which he abandoned his allies the Sicilians to the power of Dionysius. (Id. xiv. 90, 95, 96.) After this Mago returned to Carthage, where he was not long after raised to the office of king or suffete, a dignity which he held in B. C. 383, when the ambition and intrigues of Dionysius led to the renewal of hostilities between Carthage and Syracuse. Mago landed in Sicily with a large army, and after numerous petty combats, a pitched battle at length took place, in which, after a severe contest, the Carthaginians were defeated, and Mago himself slain. (Diod. xv. 15.)
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Mago. Commander of the Carthaginian fleet and army in Sicily in B. C. 344. When Timoleon had made himself master of the citadel of Syracuse after the departure of Dionysius, IIicetas, finding himself unable to cope single-handed with this new and formidable rival, called in the assistance of Mago. who appeared before Syracuse with a fleet of 150 triremes, and an army of 50,000 men. He did not, however, accomplish anything worthy of so great a force; not only were both he and Hicetas unable to make any impression on the island citadel, but while they were engaged in an expedition against Catana, Neon, the Corinthian governor of Syracuse, took advantage of their absence to make himself master of Achradina. Jealousies likewise arose between the Carthaginians and their Syracusan allies, and at length Mago, becoming apprehensive of treachery, suddenly relinquished the enterprise, and on the approach of Timoleon at the head of a very inferior force, sailed away with his whole fleet, and withdrew to Carthage. Here his cowardly conduct excited such indignation, that he put an end to his own life, to avoid a worse fate at the hands of his exasperated countrymen, who, nevertheless, proceeded to crucify his lifeless body. (Plut. Timol. 17-22; the same events are more briefly related by Diodorus, xvi. 69, but without any mention of the name of Mago.)
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Mago. Commander of a Carthaginian fleet, which, according to Justin, was despatched to the assistance of the Romans during the war with Pyrrhus, apparently soon after the battle of Asculum (B. C. 279). The Roman senate having declined the proffered aid, Mago sailed away to the south of Italy, where he had an interview with Pyrrhus himself, in which he endeavoured to sound that monarch in regard to his views on Sicily. (Justin, xviii. 2.) It was probably part of the same fleet which we find mentioned as besieging Rhegium and guarding the straits of Messana, to prevent the passage of Pyrrhus. (Diod. Exc. Hoesclel. xxii. 9, p. 496.)
Mago. One of the chief officers of Hannibal in Italy, whose name is appended to the treaty concluded by that general with Philip V., king of Macedonia. (Polyb. vii. 9.) It would seem probable that he is the same who was sent immediately afterwards with Bostar and Gisco to accompany the Macedonian ambassadors back to the court of Philip, and obtain the ratification of the treaty by that monarch, but who unfortunately fell into the hands of the Romans, and were carried prisoners to Rome. (Liv. xxiii. 34.) Schweighaeuser, on the contrary, supposes him to be the same with the following.
Mago. Surnamed the Sannite (o Saunites), was one of the chief officers of Hannibal in Italy, where he held for a considerable time the chief command in Bruttium. Here he is mentioned in B. C. 212 as co-operating with Hanno, the son of Bomilcar, in the siege and capture of Thurii; and not long after he was enabled by the treachery of the Lucanian Flavius to lead the Roman general Tib. Gracchus into an ambuscade in which he lost his life. Mago immediately sent his lifeless body, together with the insignia of his rank, to Hannibal. (Liv. xxv. 15, 16; Diod. Exc. Vales. xxvi. p. 569; Val. Max. i. 6. Β§ 8.) In 208 we find him defending the city of Locri against the Roman general L. Cincius, who pressed the siege with so much vigour both by land and sea, that Mago could with difficulty hold out, when the opportune arrival of Hannibal himself compelled the Romans to raise the siege with precipitation. (Liv. xxvii. 26, 28; comp. Frontin. Strateg. iv. 7. 29.) According to Polybius (ix. 25), this Mago had been the companion and friend of Hannibal from his earliest youth: he was involved by the Carthaginians themselves in the same general charge of avarice with his great commander.
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Mago. An officer who commanded a body of Carthaginian cavalry at Capua in B. C. 212, and by a sudden sally threw the Roman army under the two consuls App. Claudius and Fulvius into confusion, and occasioned them heavy loss. (Liv. xxv. 18.) It is probably the same whom we find shortly afterwards commanding a body of horse under Hannibal himself, and taking a prominent part in the defeat of the praetor Cn. Fulvius at Herdonea. (Id. 21.)
Mago. Commander of the garrison of New Carthage when that city was attacked by P. Scipio in B. C. 209. So little had the Carthaginian generals thought it necessary to provide for the defence of this important post, that Mago had only 1000 regular troops under his orders when the enemy appeared before the walls. He, however, armed about 2000 more as best he could, and seems to have displayed all the qualities of an able and energetic officer; making a vigorous sally in the first instance, and repulsing the troops of Scipio in their first assault. But all his efforts were ineffectual: the Romans scaled the walls where they had been supposed to be guarded by a lagoon, and made themselves masters of the town; and Mago, who had at first retired into the citadel, with the intention of holding out there, at length saw that all further resistance was hopeless, and surrendered to Scipio. He himself, with the other more eminent of the Carthaginian captives, was sent a prisoner of war to Rome. (Polyb. x. 8, 12-15, 18, 19; Liv. xxvi. 44-46, 51; Appian, Hisp. 19-22.) Eutropius (iii. 15) and Orosius (iv. 18) have confounded this Mago with the brother of Hannibal.
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Maharbal (Maarbas), son of Himilco, and one of the most distinguished Carthaginian officers in the Second Punic War. He is first mentioned as commanding the besieging force at the siege of Saguntum, during the absence of Hannibal, when he carried on his operations and pressed the siege with so much vigour that neither party, says Livy, felt the absence of the general-in-chief. (Liv. xxi. 12.) We next find him detached with a body of cavalry to ravage the plains near the Po, soon after the arrival of Hannibal in Italy, but from this service he was recalled in haste to rejoin his commander before the combat on the Ticinus. (Id. xxi. 45.) After the victory of Thrasymene (B. C. 217), he was sent with a strong force of cavalry and Spanish infantry to pursue abody of 6000 Romans who had escaped from the battle and occupied a strong position in one of the neighbouring villages. Finding themselves surrounded, they were induced to lay down their arms, on receiving from Maharbal a promise of safety. Hannibal refused to ratify the capitulation, alleging that Maharbal had exceeded his powers; but he dismissed, without ransom, all those men who belonged to the Italian allies, and only retained the Roman citizens as prisoners of war. (Polyb. iii. 84, 85; Liv. xxii. 6, 7; Appian, Annib. 10.) Shortly after Maharbal had an opportunity of striking a fresh blow by intercepting the praetor C. Centinius, who was on his march to join Flaminius with a detachment of 4000 men, the whole of which were either cut to pieces or fell into the hands of the Carthaginians. (Polyb. iii. 86; Liv. xxii. 8; Appian, Annib. 11.) He is again mentioned as sent with the Numidian cavalry to ravage the rich Falernian plains; and in the following year he commanded, according to Livy, the right wing of the Carthaginian army at the battle of Cannae. Appian, on the contrary, assigns him on that occasion the command of the reserve of cavalry, and Polybius does not mention his name at all. But, whatever post he held, it is certain that he did good service on that eventful day; and it was he that, immediately after the victory, urged Hannibal to push on at once with his cavalry upon Rome itself, promising him that if he did so, within five days he should sup in the Capitol. On the refusal of his commander, Maharbal is said to have observed, that Hannibal knew indeed how to gain victories, but not how to use them; a sentiment which has been confirmed by some of the best judges in the art of war. (Liv. xxii. 13, 46, 51; Appian, Annib. 20, 21; Florus, ii. 5; Zonar. ix. 1; Cato ap. Gell. x. 24; Pllltarch, Fab. 17, erroneously assigns this advice to a Carthaginian of the name of Barca.) Except an incidental notice of his presence at the siege of Casilinum (Liv. xxiii. 18), Maharbal from this period disappears from history. A person of that name is mentioned by Frontinus (Strateg. ii. 5. 12) as employed by the Carthaginians against some African tribes that had rebelled, but whether this be the same as the subject of the present article, or to what period the event there related is referable, we have no means of judging.
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Clitomachus, a native of Carthage. In his early years he acquired a fondness for learning, which induced him to visit Greece for the purpose of attending the schools of the philosophers. From the time of his first arrival in Athens he attached himself to Carneades, and continued his disciple until his death, when he became his successor in the academic chair. He studied with great industry and made himself master of the systems of the other schools, but professed the doctrine of suspension of assent, as it had been taught by his master. Cicero relates that he wrote four hundred books upon philosophical subjects. At an advanced age he was seized with a lethargy. Recovering in some measure the use of his faculties, he said, "The love of life shall deceive me no longer," and laid violent hands upon himself. He entered, as we have said, upon the office of preceptor in the Academy immediately after the death of Carneades, and held it thirty years. According to Cicero, he taught that there is no certain criterion by which to judge of the truth of those reports which we receive from the senses, and that, therefore, a wise man will either wholly suspend his assent, or decline giving a peremptory opinion; but that, nevertheless, men are strongly impelled by nature to follow probability. His moral doctrine established a natural alliance between pleasure and virtue. He was a professed enemy to rhetoric, and thought that no place should be allowed in society to so dangerous an art.
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Cleitomachus (Kleitomachos), a Carthaginian by birth, and called Hasdrubal in
his own language, came to Athens in the 40th year of his age, previously at least
to the year 146 B. C. He there became connected with the founder of the New Academy,
the philosopher Carneades, under whose guidance he rose to be one of the most
distinguished disciples of this school; but he also studied at the same time the
philosophy of the Stoics and Peripatetics. Diogenes Laertius, to whom we are indebted
for these notices of the life of Cleitomachus, relates also (iv. 67), that he
succeeded Carneades as the head of the Academy on the death of the latter, B.
C. 129 (Comp. Steph. Byz. s. v. Karchedon). He continued to teach at Athens till
as late as B. C. 11?, at all events, as Crassus heard him in that year (Cic. de
Orat. i. 11).
Of his works, which amounted to 400 books (biblia, Diog. Laert.),
only a few titles are preserved. His main object in writing them was to make known
the philosophy of his master Carneades, from whose views he never dissented. Cleitomachus
continued to reside at Athens till the end of his life; but he continued to cherish
a strong affection for his native country, and when Carthage was taken in B. C.
146, he wrote a work to console his unfortunate countrymen. This work, which Cicero
says he had read, was taken from a discourse of Carneades, and was intended to
exhibit the consolation which philosophy supplies even under the greatest calamities
(Cic. Tusc. iii. 22). Cicero sterns indeed to have paid a good deal of attention
to the works of Cleitomachus, and speaks in high terms of his industry, penetration,
and philosophical talent (Acad. ii. 6). He sometimes translates from the works
of Cleitomachus, as for instance from the "De sustinendis Offensionibus", which
was in four books (Acad. ii. 31).
Cleitomachus appears to have been well known to his contemporaries
at Rome, for two of his works were dedicated to illustrious Romans; one to the
poet C. Lucilius, and the other to L. Censorinus, consul in B. C. 149 (Cic. Acad.
ii. 32). Cleitomachus probably treated of the history of philosophy in his work
on the philosophical sects (peri haireseon) (Diog. Laert. ii. 92; Suid. s. v.
Kleitomachos).
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Herillus, (Herillos). A native of Carthage, a Stoic philosopher, the disciple
of Zeno of Citium, though differing from him in various points of doctrine. He
held that the chief good is knowledge (episteme), a notion attacked by Cicero.
Herillus, (Herillos), of Carthage, a Stoic philosopher, was the disciple of Zeno of Cittium. He did not, however, confine himself to the opinions of his master, but held some doctrines directly opposed to them. He held that the chief good consisted in knowledge (episteme). This notion is often attacked by Cicero, who in two places speaks of his tenets as "jamdiu fracta et exstincta," and as "jampridem explosa." He wrote some books, which, according to Diogenes, were short, but full of force. Their titles were Peri askeseos, Peri pathon, Peri hupolepseos, Nomothetes, Maieutikos, Antiphemon didaskalos, Diaskenazon, Euthunon, Hermes, Medeia, Dialogoi, Theseis ethikai. Cleanthes wrote against him. (Diog. Laert. vii. 165, 166, 174; Cic. Acad. ii. 42, de Fin. ii. 11, 13, iv. 14, 15, v. 8. 25, de Offic. i. 2, de Orat. iii. 17; Brucker, Hist. Philos. vol. i.; Ritter, Gesch. d. Philos. vol. iii.; Fabric. Bibl. Graec. vol. iii.; Krug, Herilli de summo Bono Sententia explosa non explodenda, in the Symbol. ad Hist. Phil. Lips. 1822, 4to.)
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Publius Terentius Afer was born at Carthage and was a slave of Terentius
Lucanus, a Roman Senator, who, perceiving him to have an excellent understanding
and an abundance of wit, not only bestowed on him a liberal education, but gave
him his freedom very early in life. The poet was beloved and much esteemed by
noblemen of the first rank in the Roman commonwealth, living in great intimacy
with Scipio Africanus and C. Laelius, to whom, also, as Porcius states, his personal
attractions recommended him:
Seeking the pleasures and deceitful praise
Of nobles, while the Bard with greedy ears
Drinks in the voice divine of Africanus,
Happy to sup with Furies and with Laelius,
Caress'd and often, for his bloom of youth,
Whirl'd to Mount Alba; amidst all these joys,
He finds himself reduced to poverty.
Wherefore withdrawing from all eyes, and flying
To the extremest parts of Greece, he dies
At Stymphalus, a village lit Arcadia.
When Terence, as he is commonly called in English speech, offered
his first play, the Andrian, to the aediles, he was ordered to read it to Caecilus.
Arriving at the poet's house, he found him at table; and being very meanly dressed,
was suffered to read the opening lines seated on a very low stool, near the couch
of Caecilus; but as soon as he had repeated a few verses, Caecilus invited him
to sit doivn to supper with him, after which Terence proceeded with his play,
and finished it to the great admiration of his host.
The Eunuch met with such remarkable success that it was acted twice
in one day, and Terence was paid for it 8,000 sesterces, a greater silm than was
ever paid for any comedy before. It is commonly said that Scipio, and Laelius
assisted the author in his plays; and, indeed, Terence himself increased that
suspicion by the little pains he took to refute it. Nepos asserts that he had
been informed, on good authority, that Laelius, being at his villa, at Puteoli,
on a certain first day of March, was requested by his lady to sup sooner than
his usual hour, but he entreated her not to interrupt his studies. Coming in to
supper rather late, he declared he had never employed his time with better success
than he had then done, and, being asked what he had written, repeated some verses
from the Self-Tormentor.
To wipe off the aspersion of plagiarism, or perhaps to make himself
a master of the customs and manners of the Grecians, in order to delineate them
the better in his writings, Terence left Rome
in the twenty-fifth year of his age, after having exhibited the six comedies which
are still extant; and he never returned. Some ancient writers relate that he died
at sea.
He is said to have been of middle stature, genteel and of a swarthy
complexion. He left a daughter, who was afterward married to a Roman knight; and,
according to the best authorities, at the time of his death he was possessed of
a house, together with six acres of land, on the Appian way.
Alfred Bates, ed.
This text is cited July 2003 from the TheatreHistory URL below.
Carthaginian voyager, the first Mediterranean sailor known to have reached the
northwestern shores of Europe. He wrote a story about his adventures, which is
now lost. It is quoted, however, by two Roman authors, and we are therefore able
to reconstruct some of his travels.
The name 'Himilco' is Latin; it renders the Phoenician name Chimilkat,
which means 'my brother is milkat' - but it is unclear to us what a milkat was.
Pliny on Himilco
The oldest available source on Himilco's voyage is the Natural
history by the Roman scientist Pliny the Elder (23-79 CE). He writes:
When the power of Carthage flourished, Hanno sailed round from Cadiz to the extremity
of Arabia, and published a memoir of his voyage, as did Himilco when he was dispatched
at the same date to explore the outer coasts of Europe. (Pliny the Elder, Natural
history 2.169a)
These words make Himilco a contemporary of Hanno; this great discoverer
probably lived in the sixth century, because one of the towns he founded is mentioned
by a Greek author who lived c.500 BCE. If Pliny is right, Himilco lived in the
sixth century, but it should be stressed that 'when the power of Carthage
flourished' is extremely vague and can indicate anything between c.800 and c.250.
However, it seems that Pliny can be relied on when he states that
Himilco's aim was 'to explore the outer coasts of Europe'. A later author, the
Roman aristocrat Rufus Festus Avienus (c.350 CE; or almost nine hundred years
after Himilco), quotes Himilco's narrative three times when he describes the Atlantic
coast in his poem The sea shore. This corroborates Pliny's words, although it
remains possible that Himilco's report included descriptions of other parts of
the world as well.
Trade in the sixth century
Himilco was not the first to sail on the northern Atlantic ocean.
Avienus reports that the Tartessians -native iron age Andalusians- visited the
Oestrumnidan isles to trade with the inhabitants; later, Carthaginian tradesmen
traveled along the same route (Sea shore 113-115). Avienus offers several clues
to locate the Oestrumnides: they were at two days' sailing distance from Ireland,
and they
were rich in the mining of tin and lead. A vigorous tribe lives here, proud
spirited, energetic and skillful. On all the ridges trade is carried on.
This makes it possible to identify the Oestrumnidan isles with Cornwall,
the Scilly islands or Brittany. It is difficult to choose between these three
possibilities. Cornwall is rich in metal, but cannot be regarded as an archipelago,
which is implied in the plural Oestrumnides; the Scilly's are a group of islands,
but there were no mines. The most likely candidate is Brittany, which is rich
in ore and surrounded by several small islands.
Moreover, Avienus states that the region beyond the Oestrumnides is
the country of the Celts. In ancient literature, the word 'Celt' is never used
to describe the inhabitants of the British isles; on the other hand, the people
of modern France were often called Celtic, most famously in the opening lines
of Julius Caesar's War in Gaul. (That many modern Irishmen, Welshmen and Scots
call themselves Celts, has to do with their native languages, which are related
to the language spoken by the ancient Gauls; but there is no ancient precedent
for this word use.)
Whatever the precise location of the Oestrumnidan isles, it is certain
that the native Andalusians (the 'Tartessians') traded with the inhabitants of
Brittany, Cornwall, Wales and Ireland. Much of this trade must have been indirect,
but it is certain that there was commerce. Archaeologists have discovered that
during the second millennium (the 'bronze age'), tin was brought to Andalusia
in increasing quantities. Along Europe's Atlantic fringe, there were close cultural
contacts and it is probable that Tartessian tradesmen could communicate with people
in the far north.
Phoenician interest in the Atlantic tin trade may have started as
early as the eleventh century BCE: according to several Greek and Roman authors,
modern Cadiz was founded c.1100. Up till now, archaeologists have not been able
to verify or refute this ancient tradition. There is more evidence for the period
after c.800, when the Phoenicians founded Carthage and several colonies on the
Costa del Sol (a.o., Malaga). Himilco was, therefore, not sailing
into foreign waters: he knew what he was looking for (tin and other precious metals)
and knew where to find it. If his expedition took place in the sixth century,
it is also possible to understand why he decided to go north. It seems that the
Phoenicians and Tartessians had become enemies at the end of the seventh century,
and it is certain that the Phoenician world was shocked by he conquest of the
mother country (modern Lebanon) in 587 BCE by the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar.
Carthage established itself as the new capital of an informal empire of Phoenician
colonies; we know that Cadiz was captured by a Carthaginian army. That a Carthaginian
admiral explored the territories beyond newly acquired Cadiz is not surprising.
In the sixth century, we also find Greek sailors in the west; Marseille
is their most famous colony. They and the Carthaginians were usually hostile towards
each other; the Carthaginians considered Andalusia,
Corsica, and Sardinia
as their backyard and drowned every foreigner venturing west of Sicily.
When Himilco published his account, he did everything to describe his voyage as
one of hardship and trouble: it discouraged the Greeks from going west and had
the additional benefit that his own exploits were more impressive.
Avienus on Himilco
Three times Avienus quotes Himilco (Sea shores 114-129, 380-389, 404-415).
Although the Roman author claims to have read the Carthaginian account himself
(SS 414), this is probably not true.
In the first of the three 'Himilco blocks' in The sea shores, Avienus
states that Himilco wrote that it took four months to reach the Oestrumnides (SS
117). Even when we assume that these isles were the Scilly islands, four month
is too long. Himilco must have landed at many ports; perhaps he founded colonies
- Hanno did the same. Two towns may be mentioned as possible candidates: modern
Abul and Alcacer do Sol, not far from Lisbon.
Avienus goes on to say that the sea route was difficult: on large
parts of the route, there was no wind (SS 120). Elsewhere, seaweed made progress
difficult (SS 122); this may refer to Cabo de San Vicente in the southwest of
modern Portugal, where weeds gather in the summer. Avienus also mentions sand
bars (SS 125-6) and sea monsters (SS 128-9).
In SS 380-389, Avienus repeats what he said: he mentions the Ocean's
vastness and the absence of wind. The new element is fog, which Himilco can have
encountered everywhere on his voyage to the north. The third Himilco block (SS
404-415) is again repetition: shallow waters, weeds, and monsters.
As we have already seen, it is likely that Himilco exaggerated the
troubles he encountered, because he wanted to boast of his own exploits and scare
off the Greek competitors.
We may speculate that Himilco also visited Helgoland, which is four
months from Cadiz. This was the place where the ancients found amber and it may
have been a goal of Himilco's expedition too. Avienus does not mention a northern
voyage, but this silence does not prove that Himilco did not visit the North sea
- Avienus is interested in the Atlantic ocean, not in the neighboring seas. A
hypothetical visit of Himilco to Helgoland would help explain why several sixth-century
Greek authors start to speculate about a legendary amber river, which they call
Eridanus.
Jona Lendering, ed.
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Himilco, (Himilkon). Considerable variations are found in the MSS. (especially
of Greek authors) in the mode of writing this name, which is frequently confounded
with Hamilcar, and written Amilkon, Himilkas, or even Amilkas (see Wesseling,
ad Diod. xiv. 49). It is probable indeed that Hamilcar and Himilco are only two
forms of the same name: both were of common occurrence at Carthage.
A Carthaginian, mentioned by Pliny (H. N. ii. 67) as having conducted a voyage
of discovery from Gades towards the north, along the western shores of Europe,
at the same time that Hanno undertook his well-known voyage along the west coast
of Africa. He is not elsewhere referred to by Pliny, but is quoted repeatedly
as an authority by Festus Avienus in his geographical poem called Ora Maritima
(vv. 117, 383, 412, ed. Wernsdorf, in the Poelae Latini Minores, vol. v. pars
3). It appears from the passages there cited that Himilco had represented his
farther progress as prevented by the stagnant nature of the sea, loaded with sea
weed, and the absence of wind, statements which do not speak highly for his character
as a discoverer. His voyage is said to have lasted four months, but it is impossible
to judge how far it was extended. Perhaps it was intentionally wrapt in obscurity
by the commercial jealousy of the Carthaginians, and the fabulous statements just
alluded to may have been designed to prevent navigators of other nations from
following in the same track. We have no clue to the period at which this expedition
was undertaken: Pliny says only that it was during the flourishing times of Carthage
(Carthaginis potentia florente). Heeren (Ideen. vol. iv.) and Botticher (Gesch.
d. Carthager) are disposed to regard this Himilco as the same with No. 2, the
grandson of Mago; but there are no sufficient grounds for this supposition.
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Himilco (equivalent in Punic to gratia Milcaris, "the favour of Milcar").
The Greek form is Himilkon. The name of several Carthaginians. (1) A Carthaginian
commander, who is said by Pliny to have been contemporary with Hanno the navigator.
He was sent by his government to explore the northwestern coast of Europe. A few
fragments of this voyage are preserved by Avienus, in which the Hiberni and Albioni
are mentioned, and also a promontory, Oestrymnis, and islands called Oestrymnides,
which are usually considered to be Cornwall and the Scilly Islands.
Hanno, (Annon), a Carthaginian navigator, under whose name we possess a periplous,
or a short account of a voyage round a part of Libya. The work was originally
written in the Punic language, and what has come down to us is a Greek translation
of the original. The work is often referred to by the ancients, but we have no
statement containing any direct information by means of which we might identify
its author, Hanno, with any of the many other Carthaginians of that name, or fix
the time at which he lived. Pliny (H. N. ii. 67, v. 1, 36) states that Hanno undertook
the voyage at the time when Carthage was in a most flourishing condition. (Punicis
rebus florentissimis, Carthaginis potentia florente.) Some call him king, and
others dux or imperator of the Carthaginians, from which we may infer that he
was invested with the office of suffetes. (Solin. 56; Hanno, Peripl. Introd.)
In the little Periplus itself Hanno says that he was sent out by his countrymen
to undertake a voyage beyond the Pillars of Hercules, and to found Libyphoenician
towns, and that he sailed accordingly with sixty pentecontores, and a body of
men and women, to the number of 30,000, and provisions and other necessaries.
On his return from his voyage, he dedicated an account of it, inscribed on a tablet,
in the temple of Cronos, or, as Pliny says, in that of Juno. (Comp. Pomp. Mela,
iii. 9; Marc. Heracl. Epit. Artemid. et Menip. ; Athen. iii. 83.) It is therefore
presumed that our periplus is a Greek version of the contents of that Punic tablet.
These vague accounts leaving open the widest field for conjecture
and speculation, have led some critics to place the expedition as early as the
Trojan war or the time of Hesiod, while others place it as late as the reign of
Agathocles. Others, as Falconer, Bougainville, and Gail, with somewhat more probability,
place Hanno about B. C. 570. But it seems preferable to identify him with Hanno,
the father or son of Hamilcar, who was killed at Himera, B. C. 480. The fact of
such an expedition at that time had nothing at all improbable, for in the reign
of the Egyptian king Necho, a similar voyage had been undertaken by the Phoenicians,
and an accurate knowledge of the western coast of Africa was a matter of the highest
importance to the Carthaginians. The number of colonists, 30,000, is undoubtedly
an error either of the translator or of later transcribers. This circumstance,
as well as many fabulous accounts contained in the periplus, and the difficulties
connected with the identification of the places visited by Hanno, and with the
fixing of the southernmost point to which Hanno penetrated, are not sufficient
reasons for denying the genuineness of the periplus, or for regarding it as the
product of a much later age, as Dodwell did. The first edition of Hanno's Periplus
appeared at Basel, 1534, 4to., as an appendix to Arrian, by S. Gelenius. This
was followed by the editions of J. H. Boecler and J. J. Muller (Strassburg, 1661,
4to.), A. Berkel (Leyden, 1674, 12mo., with a Latin version by M. Gesner), and
Thomas Falconer (London, 1797, whit an English translation, two dissertations
and maps). It is also printed in Hudson's Geographi Minores, vol. i., which contains
Dodwell's dissertation, De vero Peripli, qui Hannonis nomine circumfertur, Tempore,
in which Dodwell attacks the genuineness of the work; but his arguments are satisfactorily
refuted by Bougainville (Mem. de l'Acad. des Inscript. xxvi., xxviii.), and by
Falconer in his second dissertation.
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Demetrius, οf Carthage, a rhetorician, who lived previous to the time of Thrasymachus. (Diog. Laert. v. 83.)
Eulogius Favonius, a rhetorician of Carthage, and a contemporary and disciple of St Augustin. (August. de Cur. pro Mort. 11.) Under his name we possess a disputation on Cicero's Somnium Scipionis, which contains various discussions on points of the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers. The treatise was first printed by A. Schott at the end of his Quaestiones Tallianae (Antwerp, 1613, 8vo.), and afterwards in the edition of Cicero's de Offwiis, by Graevius (1688), from which it is reprinted with some improvements in Orelli's edition of Cicero, vol. v. part. 1.
Alexon, an Achaean who served in the Carthaginian garrison at Lilybaeum while it was besieged by the Romans in B. C. 250. During this siege some of the Gallic mercenaries engaged in the service of the Carthaginians formed the plan of betraying the fortress into the hands of the Romans. But Alexon, who had on a former occasion saved the town of Agrigentum from a similar attempt of treacherous mercenaries, now acted in the same faithful spirit, and gave information of the plot to the Carthaginian commander Himilco. He also assisted him in inducing the mercenaries to remain faithful and resist the temptations offered by their comrades. (Polyb. i. 43, ii. 7)
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Matho (Mathos), an African who served as a mercenary soldier in the army of the
Carthaginians in Sicily during the first Punic war. In the mutiny which broke
out among the mercenaries after their return to Africa, B. C. 241, he took so
prominent a part, that he became apprehensive of being singled out for punishment,
in case the mutineers should be induced to disband themselves. Hence when Gisco
was at length sent to the camp at Tunis, with full powers to satisfy their demands,
Matho united with Spendius, a Campanian deserter, who was influenced by similar
motives, in persuading the soldiers to reject the proffered terms. These two leaders
quickly obtained so much influence with the mixed multitude of which the army
consisted, that the troops would listen to no one else, and Matho and Spendius
were soon after formally appointed generals. Their first object was now to render
the breach with Carthage irreparable, for which purpose they induced the soldiery
to seize on Gisco and the other Carthaginian deputies, and throw them into prison
; after which they proceeded to declare open war against Carthage, and Matho sent
messengers to the African subjects of that state, calling upon them to assert
their independence. The latter were easily induced to avail themselves of an opportunity
of throwing off a yoke which they had long felt to be galling and oppressive,
and almost universally took up arms, thus at once imparting a national character
to the rebellion. The two cities of Utica and Hippo alone refused to join in the
revolt, and these were in consequence immediately besieged by the insurgents.
Matho and Spendius now found themselves at the head of an army of 70,000 Africans,
in addition to the mercenary troops originally assembled; and having the command
of the open country, they were abundantly supplied with provisions, while they
held Carthage itself effectually blockaded on the land side. Hanno, who was at
first appointed to take the command against them, proved no match for troops which
had been trained up in Sicily under Hamilcar Barca: the rebels even surprised
his camp, and obtained possession of all his baggage. The great Barca himself
now took the field, forced the passage of the Bagrada, and restored the communications
of the city with the open country. Hereupon the two leaders separated, and while
Spendius undertook to oppose Hamilcar in the field Matho continued to press the
siege of Hippo. But the successes of Hamilcar, and still more the favourable impression
produced by the clemency with which he treated those prisoners who had fallen
into his hands, began once more to alarm the chiefs of the insurgents, lest the
fidelity of their adherents should be shaken. They in consequence determined to
render pardon impossible, by involving them all in still deeper guilt; and Spendius
and Matho united with a Gaul named Autaritus in urging the soldiers to the execution
of Gisco and all the other Carthaginian captives. Not only was this sanguinary
resolution carried out, with circumstances of the utmost barbarity, but the rebels
refused to give up the dead bodies, and even threatened to treat in like manner
any Carthaginian heralds who should for the future be sent to them. These atrocities
quickly led to sanguinary measures of retaliation on the part of the Carthaginian
generals, and the war was henceforth marked by a character of ferocity unparalleled
in the whole course of ancient history.
Meanwhile, the dissensions between the Carthaginian generals Hamilcar
and Hanno prevented their carrying on any effectual operations against the insurgents,
and the latter soon after obtained an important accession to their cause in the
two powerful cities of Utica and Hippo, which at length abandoned the alliance
of the Carthaginians, murdered the garrisons that occupied them, and opened their
gates to the rebels. Thus strengthened, Matho and Spendius now ventured to lay
siege to Carthage itself; but while they cut off the city from all communications
on the land side, they were themselves threatened from without by the army of
Hamilcar, who by means of his Numidian horse was now completely master of the
open country, and so effectually intercepted their supplies, that they were finally
compelled to raise the siege. Not long afterwards Spendius, who had again attempted
to oppose Hamilcar in the field, with an army of 50,000 men, was compelled by
the superior skill and generalship of his opponent to surrender, and was himself
made prisoner, while almost the whole of his army was put to the sword. This catastrophe
was followed by the submission of most of the revolted cities, and Matho, with
the remainder of his forces, took refuge in Tunis, where he was closely besieged
by Hamilcar on the one side and his new colleague Hannibal on the other. But the
negligence of the latter soon afforded Matho an opportunity of surprising his
camp, which he took, with great slaughter, carrying off an immense booty, and
Hannibal himself as a prisoner, whom he immediately caused to be crucified, in
revenge for the like cruelty inflicted upon Spendius. This blow compelled Hamilcar
to raise the siege of Tunis, but it was the last success obtained by the rebels:
a reconciliation being brought about between the two Carthaginian generals, they
again took the field in concert, and Matho, after several partial actions, in
which he was for the most part worsted, was at length driven to risk a general
battle, and was totally defeated. The greater part of his troops fell on the field,
and he himself was made prisoner, and carried in triumph to Carthage, where he
was shortly after put to death with every species of indignity. (Polyb. i. 69-88;
Diod. xxv. Exc. Hoesch. pp. 509, 510, Exc. Vales. pp. 566, 567, Exc. Vat. pp.
55, 56 ; Appian, Pun. 5.)
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Hermogenes. A painter, perhaps a native of Carthage, who. lived at the time of Tertullian, about the end of the second and the beginning of the third century of our era, and is known to us only through Tertullian, who attacked him most severely, and wrote a work against him. (Adversus Hermogenem.) He seems to have been originally a pagan, but afterwards to have become a convert to Christianity. The cause of the hostility is not very clear; we learn only that Hermogenes married several times, for which Tertullian calls him a man given to voluptuousness and a heretic. It would also seem that Hermogenes, who was a man of high education and great knowledge, continued to study the pagan philosophers after his conversion to Christianity; and attempted to reconcile scriptural statements with the results of philosophical investigations, though, according to Tertullian's own statement, Hermogenes did not advance any new or heretical opinion on the person of Christ. His enemy also calls him a bad painter, and says, illicite pingit, but to what he alludes by this expression is uncertain: some think that Hermogenes painted subjects taken from the pagan mythology, which Tertullian would surely have expressed more explicitly. The philosophical views which Tertullian endeavours to refute seem to have been propounded by Hermogenes in a work (adv. Hermog. 2), for his enemy repeatedly refers to his argumentationes. (Comp. August. de Haeres. xli.; Tertull. de Monogam. 16; Theodoret. Fab. Haeret. i. 19.) Theodoretus and Eusebius (Hist. Eccles. iv. 24) state, that Theophilus of Alexandria and Origen also wrote against Hermogenes, but it is uncertain whether this is the same as the painter.
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Hamilcar. A Carthaginian admiral, who commanded the fleet of observation which the Carthaginians kept up during the second Punic war, to watch the movements of the Romans in Sicily. (Polyb. viii. 3.8.) He is probably the same who in the summer of 210 ravaged the coasts of Sardinia with a fleet of 40 ships (Liv. xxvii. 6); and whom we find holding the chief naval command at Carthage when the seat of war was transferred to Africa. (Appian, Pun. 24.) After the defeat of Hasdrubal and Syphax by Scipio in 203, Hamilcar made a sudden attack upon the Roman fleet as it lay at anchor before Utica. He had hoped to have taken it by surprise, and destroyed the whole; but the vigilance of Scipio anticipated his design, and after an obstinate combat he was only able to carry off six ships to Carthage. In a subsequent attack he effected still less. (Appian, Pun. 24, 25, 30; Liv. xxx. 10).
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Hannibal. Surnamed Monomachus, an officer in the army of the preceding, who, according to Polybius, was a man of a ferocious and sanguinary disposition, and the real author or adviser of many cruelties which were attributed to the great commander. Among other things, he is said to have recommended Hannibal to teach his soldiers to live upon human flesh, a piece of advice which could not have been seriously meant, though it is gravely urged by Roman writers as a reproach against the son of Hamilcar. (Polyb. ix. 24; Liv. xxiii. 5; Dion Cass. Fr. Vat. 72, p. 191, ed. Mai.)
Hanno. Son of Bomilcar, one of the most distinguished officers in the service
of Hannibal during his expedition to Italy. According to Appian (Annib. 20) he
was a nephew of that great general ; but a consideration of the ages of Hannibal
and Hamilcar, as well as the silence of Polybius, renders this statement improbable.
He was, however, a man of high rank, his father having been one of the kings or
suffetes of Carthage. (Polyb. iii. 42.) His name is first mentioned at the passage
of the Rhone, on which occasion lie was detached by Hannibal to cross that river
higher up than the spot where the main army was to effect its passage. This Hanno
successfully performed, and, descending the left bank of the river, fell upon
the flank and rear of the Gauls, who were engaged in obstructing the passage of
Hannibal, and utterly routed them, so that the rest of the army was enabled to
cross the river without opposition. (Polyb. iii. 42, 43; Liv. xxi. 27, 28.) We
meet with no farther account of his services until the battle of Cannae (B. C.
216), on which memorable day he commanded the right wing of the Carthaginian army.
(Polyb. iii. 114; Appian, Annib. 20, says the left.) After that great victory,
he was detached by Hannibal with a separate force into Lucania, in order to support
the revolt of that province. Here he was opposed in the following year (215) by
a Roman army under Ti. Sempronits Longus, who defeated him in an action at Grumentum,
in consequence of which he was compelled to withdraw into Bruttium. Before the
close of the summer he was joined by Bomilcar with the reinforcements that had
been sent from Carthage to Hannibal, and which he conducted in safety to that
general in his camp before Nola. When Hannibal, after his unsuccessful attempts
to reduce Nola, at length withdrew, to take up his winter-quarters in Apulia,
he sent Hanno to resume the command in Bruttium, with the same force as before.
The Bruttians themselves had all declared in favour of Carthage, but, of the Greek
cities in that province, Locri alone had as yet followed their example. Hanno
now added the important conquest of Crotona. Having thus effectually established
his footing in this country, he was able to resume offensive operations, and was
advancing (early in the summer of 214) to support Hannibal in Campania, with an
army of about 18,000 men (chiefly Bruttians and Lucanians), when he was met near
Beneventum by the praetor, Tib. Gracchus, and, after an obstinate combat, suffered
a complete defeat. Yet we are told that he soon after gained in his turn a considerable
advantage over Gracchus, notwithstanding which, he thought fit to retreat once
more into Bruttium. (Liv. xxiii. 37, 41, 43, 46, xxiv. 1-3, 14-16, 20; Zonar.
ix. 4.) Here he was opposed the following summer (213) by an irregular force,
collected together by one L. Pomponius, which he utterly routed and dispersed.
(Liv. xxv. 1.) The next year (212) he was ordered by Hannibal to advance with
a convoy of stores and provisions, for the supply of Capua, which the Romans were
threatening to besiege. The service was a delicate one, for both the Roman consuls
were in Samnium with their respective armies, notwithstanding which Hanno conducted
his lorce in safety to the neighbourhood of Beneventum, but the negligence of
the Capuans, in not providing means of transport, caused so much delay, that the
Romans had time to come up, and not only seized the greater part of the stores,
but storied aitd plundered the camp of Hanno, who himself made his escape, with
the remains of his force, into Bruttium. Not long after his return thither, he
was able in some degree to compensate his late disaster by the important acquisition
of Thurii. (Liv. xxv. 13-15; Appian, Annib. 34.)
From this time we in great measure lose sight of Hanno; though it
is probable that it is still the same whom we find in command at Metapontum, in
207, and who was sent by Hannibal from thence into Bruttium, to raise a fresh
army. (Liv. xxvii. 42.) As we hear no more of his actions in Italy, and the Hanno
who was appointed in 203 B. C., to succeed Hasdrubal Gisco in the command in Africa,
is expressly called by Appian son of Bomilcar, there can be little doubt that
it was the same as the subject of the present article, though we have no account
of his return to Africa. It was after the final defeat of Hasdrubal and Syphax
by Scipio, that Hanno assumed the command; and, in the state of affairs which
he then found, it is no reproach to him that he effected little. He joined with
Hasdrubal, although then an outlaw, in a plot for setting fire to the camp of
Scipio, but the project was discovered, and thereby prevented; and he was repulsed
in an attack upon the camp of Scipio before Utica. After this he appears to have
remained quiet, awaiting the return of Hannibal from Italy: on the arrival of
that general he was deposed from his command, the sole direction of all military
affairs being confided to Hannibal. (Appian, Pun. 24, 29, 30, 31; Zonar. ix. 12,
13.)
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Himilco. Surnamed Phamaeas or Phameas (Phamaias, Appian; Phameas, Zonar.), commander of the Carthaginian cavalry in the third Punic war. Being young, active, and daring, and finding himself at the head of an indefatigable and hardy body of troops, he continually harassed the Roman generals, prevented their soldiers from leaving the camp for provisions or forage, and frequently attacked their detachments with success, except, it is said, when they were commanded by Scipio. By these means he became an object of terror to the Romans, and contributed greatly to the success of the Carthaginian army under Hasdrubal, especially on occasion of the march of Manilius upon Nepheris. But in the course of this irregular warfare having accidentally fallen in with Scipio (at that time one of the tribunes in the Roman army), he was led by that officer into a conference, in which Scipio induced him to abandon the cause of Carthage as hopeless, and desert to the Romans. This resolution he put in execution on occasion of the second expedition of Manilius against Nepheris (B. C. 148), when he went over to the enemy, carrying with him the greater part of the troops under his command. He was sent by Manilius with Scipio to Rome, where the senate rewarded him for his treachery with a purple robe and other ornaments of distinction, as well as with a sum of money. After this he returned to Africa, but we do not learn that he was able to render any important services to the Romans in their subsequent operations. (Appian, Pun. 97, 100, 104, 107, 109; Zonar. ix. 27; Eutrop. iv. 10.)
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Mago. A Carthaginian who, according to Justin, was the founder of the military power of that city, being the first to introduce a regular discipline and organisation into her armies. He is said to have himself obtained by this means great successes; and still farther advantages were reaped by his two sons Hasdrubal and Hamilcar, who followed in their father's footsteps. (Justin, xviii. 7, xix. 1.) If the second of his two sons be correctly identified with the Hamilcar that was killed at Himera [HAMILCAR, No. 1], we may conclude that Mago himself must have flourished from 550 to 500 years before Christ. (See Heeren, Ideen, vol. iv. p. 537.)
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Juvenalis, St., a physician at Carthage in the 4th century after Christ, who was also in priest's orders. He afterwards left Africa, and went to Rome, where he was consecrated bishop of Narnia in Umbria, May 3, A. D. 369. He converted many of the people to Christianity, and is said to have performed several miracles, both during his life, and also by his relics after his death, which took place Aug. 7, A. D. 376. His epitaph is preserved, and also a rhyming Latin hymn, which used to be sung in his honour by the church of Narnia, on the day on which his memory was observed, viz. May 3. (Acta Sanctor. May, vol. i. p. 376 Surius, de Probatis Sanctor. Histor. vol. vii. p. 361; Bzovius, Nomencl. Sanc. Profess. Medicor.)
247 - 182
The Carthaginian general Hannibal was one of the greatest military leaders in
history. His most famous campaign took place during the so-called Second Punic
War (218-202), when he caught the Romans off guard by crossing the Alps.
Youth
When Hannibal (in his own language: Hanba'al, mercy of Baal) was born
in 247 BCE, his birthplace Carthage (the capital of what is now Tunisia)
was losing a long and important war. It had been the Mediterranean's most prosperous
seaport and possessed wealthy provinces, but it had suffered severe losses from
the Romans in the so-called First Punic War (264-241). After Rome's victory, it
stripped Carthage of its most important province, Sicily; and when civil war had
broken out in Cartage, Rome
seized Sardinia and Corsica
as well. These events must have made a great impression on the young Hannibal.
He was the oldest son of the Carthaginian general Hamilcar Barca,
who took the ten-year old boy to Spain in 237. There were several Carthaginian
cities in Andalusia: Gadir
('castle', modern Cadiz), Malkah ('royal town', Malaga) and New Carthage (Cartagena).
The ancient name of Cordoba
is unknown, although the element Karth, 'town', is still recognizable in its name.
Hamilcar added new territories to this informal empire. In this way,
Carthage was compensated for its loss of overseas territories. The Romans believed
that Hannibal's father forced his son to promise eternal hatred against the Romans.
This may be an invention, but there may be some truth in the story: the Carthaginians
had good reasons to hate their enemies.
When Hamilcar died (229), Hannibal's brother-in-law Hasdrubal took
over command. The new governor secured the Carthaginian position by diplomatic
means, among which was intermarriage between Carthaginians and Iberians. Hannibal
married a native princess. It is likely that the young man visited Carthage in
these years.
In 221, Hasdrubal was murdered and Hannibal was elected commander
by the Carthaginian army in Spain.
The Carthaginian government confirmed the decision. He returned to his father's
aggressive military politics and attacked the natives: in 220 he captured Salamanca.
The next year, he besieged Saguntum, a Roman ally. Since Rome
was occupied with the Second Illyrian War and consequently unable to support the
town, Saguntum fell after a blockade of eight months.
Already in Antiquity, the question whether the capture of Saguntum
was a violation of a treaty between Hasdrubal and the Roman Republic was discussed.
It is impossible to solve this problem. The fact is, however, that the Romans
felt offended, and demanded Hannibal to be handed over by the Carthaginian government.
From Saguntum to Cannae (218-216)
While these negotiations were still going on, Hannibal continued to
extent Carthage's territory: he appointed his brother Hasdrubal (not to be confused
with Hannibal's brother-in-law) as commander in Spain, and in May 218 he crossed
the river Ebro in order to complete the conquest of the Iberian peninsula. On
hearing the news, Rome declared the Second Punic War and sent reinforcements to
Sicily, where they expected a Carthaginian attack.
Hannibal interrupted his campaigns in Catalonia,
and decided to win the war by a bold invasion of Italy before the Romans were
prepared. In a lightning campaign, he crossed the Pyrenees with an army of 50,000
infantry, 9,000 cavalry and 37 elephants; next, he crossed the river Rhone (at
Arausio, modern Orange). His elephants were ferried across the water on large
rafts - a remarkable achievement. Thence, by a heroic effort, made difficult by
autumn snow, he crossed the Alps, probably taking the Col du Mont Genevre. In
October 218, 38,000 soldiers and 8,000 knights had reached the plains along the
river Po in the vicinity of the Italian town Turin.
The Po-plains were inhabited by Gauls, who had recently been subjected
to Rome, and were only too willing to welcome Hannibal and throw off the Roman
yoke. The Romans were aware of the danger that Hannibal might entice the Gauls
into rebellion, and immediately sent an army to prevent this. However, in a cavalry
engagement at the river Ticinus (east of Turin), the Carthaginians defeated their
opponents. Now, some 14,000 Gauls volunteered to serve under Hannibal. Thanks
to their help, Hannibal won a second victory at the river Trebia (west of modern
Piacenza), defeating a Roman army that had been supplemented with the Roman troops
that had been sent to Sicily
earlier that year (December 218).
In March 217, Hannibal left his winter quarter at Bologna,
traversed the Apennines and ravaged Etruria
(modern Tuscany). During
a minor engagement, he lost an eye (although some historians claim that he suffered
from opthalmia). The Romans counterattacked with some 25,000 men, but their consul
Flaminius was defeated and killed in an ambush between the hills and lake of Trasimene.
Two Roman legions were annihilated. Hannibal expected that Rome's allies would
now leave their master and come over to Carthage. This, however, did not happen,
and he was forced to cross the Apennines a second time, hoping to establish a
new base in Apulia, the 'heel'
of Italy.
While he tried to win over Rome's allies by diplomatic means, the
Romans appointed Quintus Fabius Maximus as a dictator (a magistrate with extraordinary
powers). He tailed the invader, but evaded battle; the Romans found Fabius' strategy
unacceptable and called him 'the dawdler' (Cunctator). This was not entirely fair:
Fabius' policy had been successful. Besides, a Roman army had attacked Carthage's
African possessions, which prevented the Carthaginians to sent reinforcements.
And, contrary to Hannibal's expectation, Rome's allies remained loyal.
In 216, the Roman senate decided that time had come to solve the problem
by one great, decisive battle. Taking no risks, the two consuls raised an army
of no less than 80,000 men, whereas Hannibal's army counted some 50,000 men. In
July, the Romans pinned down the Carthaginian army in the neighborhood of Cannae
on the Italian east coast; battle was engaged on the second of August. Hannibal's
convex, crescent shaped lines slowly became concave under pressure of the Roman
elite troops in the center, which, being encircled and finally surrounded by the
Carthaginian cavalry in the rear, failed to break through the Carthaginian lines
and were destroyed. After this event, many Roman allies switched sides. Sardinia
revolted; Capua became Hannibal's capital in Italy. The successful commander was
thirty years old when he entered Capua, seated on his last surviving elephant.
From Cannae to Zama (216-202)
However, the Roman senate refused to come to terms and Rome's allies
in central Italy remained loyal. Therefore, Hannibal endorsed a larger strategy
to make the Romans dissipate their strength. In the winter, he launched a diplomatic
offensive, and in 215 he secured an alliance with Macedonia.
Syracuse became a Carthaginian
ally in 214.
Meanwhile, the Romans regained self-confidence and ground: Hannibal's
attempts to capture ports like Cumae
and Puteoli -necessary to receive fresh troops- failed. Hannibal decided that
he had to abandon his offensives in central Italy. He had been in Italy for almost
four years, and his army still needed reinforcements. Therefore, he turned his
attention to the south of Italy, where he took Tarentum and several other ports
(213), facilitating the supply of new soldiers from Macedonia and Carthage. Rome
countered this by an alliance with the Greek towns in Aetolia, who started a war
against Macedonia. Although Carthage sent an army to Sicily, Hannibal himself
received hardly any troops.
In 212, Rome was able to take the initiative again and started to
cut off Hannibal's lines of contact: first, it sent armies to recapture Syracuse
and Capua. Syracuse was betrayed and re-entered the Roman alliance. The siege
of Capua lasted for a long time, but Hannibal knew that his exhausted troops were
unable to hold it. He tried to force the Romans to lift their siege by a diversionary
attack on Rome itself. He camped in front of the walls of Rome that can be seen
today in front of Stazione Termini, but the Romans knew their city could not be
taken. They continued the siege of Capua, and took it in 211.
Slowly, the Romans pushed Hannibal southward. In 209, they recaptured
Tarentum. Hannibal's situation became difficult and his government was unwilling
to risk extra troops: the lines of contact were too long. Therefore, Hannibal
decided to ask help from his brother Hasdrubal, who was still in Spain. This time,
the Romans were not surprised by the Carthaginian invasion across the Alps: Hasdrubal
was defeated at the river Metaurus before he could contact his brother (207).
Hannibal's hope of reinforcement had evaporated.
The Romans hunted him down in southern Italy, but Hannibal was able
to continue a kind of guerilla war in the 'toe' of Italy. (Several modern scholars
have argued that Hannibal destroyed the countryside of southern Italy,
but the archaeological data contradict this. There were several radical changes
after 200.)
Meanwhile, the Romans conquered Spain. This proved harder than they
had suspected. After some initial successes, the Roman generals were killed in
action and almost all was lost. However, a young commander, Publius Cornelius
Scipio, took the Carthaginian capital of Spain, Cartagena, by surprise and brought
the Spanish war to a good end (206). After a short while, Scipio was sent across
the Mediterranean and attacked Carthage itself. Unlike the Roman senate, which
had not panicked when Rome was under attack by Hannibal, the Carthaginian government
was disheartened and recalled Hannibal's still unconquered army from Italy (203).
The decisive battle of the Second Punic War was therefore, thanks
to Roman stubbornness, not fought on Italian soil, but in Africa: after some minor
engagements, Scipio and Hannibal clashed at Zama (October 19, 202). This battle
is also known as the battle of Naraggara. Hannibal tried to repeat
his Cannae tactics, but Scipio had better cavalry than the unfortunate consuls
fourteen years before. Hannibal's encircling movement failed, and the Carthaginians
were defeated. Hannibal escaped to Carthage, where he advised negotiations. In
201, peace was signed. Rome asked an enormous prize: it demanded the Carthaginian
fleet, recognition of the Roman conquests in Spain, and an indemnity of no less
than 10,000 talents, to be paid in fifty annual installments. And it forced Hannibal
to resign as a general. Hannibal Looking for revenge (202-182)
Carthage's economy was ruined and in 196 the people of Carthage choose
Hannibal as suffete (a kind of consul). In this capacity, Hannibal promoted a
modest democracy, reorganized the revenues and stimulated agriculture and commerce.
However, the constitutional reform clipped the wings of the landed aristocracy;
its members informed the Roman senate of Hannibal's plan to ally Carthage with
the Seleucid Empire (i.e., Turkey,
Syria, Palestine,
Iraq and Iran);
they suggested that Hannibal wanted to invade Italy a second time, if only the
Seleucid king Antiochus III gave him an army. It is unknown if this accusation
was true, but when the Romans sent a commission of inquiry, Hannibal fled to Antioch,
the capital of the Seleucid Empire. He had been in power for less than a year.
His house was destroyed.
In these years, both Rome and the Seleucid king tried to establish
a zone of influence in Greece
and Macedonia. Rome
was very successful, and Antiochus decided to invade Greece (192). In this Syrian
War, Hannibal advised Antiochus to invade Italy. It is easy to guess who was to
be the commander of the invading army. Instead, he was given only a minor naval
command and was eventually defeated in a naval battle off Side by Rome's maritime
ally Rhodes (190).
Rome inflicted a devastating defeat upon its enemy and Antiochus had
to accept that what is now Turkey
was to be added to the small kingdom Pergamum,
a Roman ally. One of the Seleucid governors became independent: his name was Artaxias
and he proclaimed himself king of Great-Armenia. Hannibal, whose life was in danger
when he remained at the Syrian court, stayed with Artaxias, who followed his advice
to built a new capital, Artaxata (modern Yerevan).
Later, Hannibal had to flee again: this time, he found refuge in Bithynia,
which he supported in its war against Pergamum. As an admiral, he celebrated his
last victory, defeating the Pergamene fleet (184). However, Rome intervened in
Pergamum's favor, and Hannibal poisoned himself to avoid extradition (winter 183/182).
The place where this happened, Libyssa, was venerated by later generations.
Among the pilgrims were Romans; the monument erected by the emperor Septimius
Severus was still visible in the eleventh century.
Assessment
The Mediterranean world of the third and second centuries was in a
process of transforming itself into some kind of unity. It had been a divided
region in the fifth and fourth centuries, but now it was reorganizing itself,
both culturally and politically. The creation of one, big Mediterranean Empire
was inevitable, and the issue of the Second Punic War was whether this Mediterranean
Empire was to be a Roman or a Carthaginian world.
This does not mean that either Rome or Carthage were actually aiming
at world dominion. It simply means that their imperia were a consequence of a
process of cultural homogenization; one way or another, some kind of Mediterranean
unity was bound to come, and the big question was whether the Greek-Roman or the
Phoenician-Carthaginian culture was to be the crystallization point.
After Hannibal's death, Roman power was not seriously challenged for
almost six centuries. We should probably be grateful, because a victory by Hannibal
would have given the development of the Mediterranean cultures a push into the
direction of the Phoenician-Carthaginian culture. A book on human rights in Carthage
would not be a big volume; on the other hand, the Romans offered the inhabitants
of Italy and -later- the Mediterranean world a civil law code that contained some
elements that we still consider to be important. (This is not to deny that Rome
could be a cruel and savage ruler.) In fact, this is why Rome won the war against
Hannibal. Its Italian allies knew that Rome had more to offer than Carthage.
Literature
The most important ancient sources on Hannibal are Livy's books 21-39
and books 3-16 of the World history by Polybius of Megalopolis. Both make excellent
reading. One of the many modern biographies: Serge Lancel, Hannibal (1995 Paris).
Jona Lendering, ed.
This text is cited July 2003 from the Livius Ancient History Website URL below, which contains interesting hyperlinks.
Hannibal. Son of Hamilcar Barca, and born in B.C. 247. At the age of nine he
went to Spain with his father, who, previous to his departure, took his son to
the altar, and, placing his hand on the sacrifice, made him swear that he would
never be a friend to the Romans. It does not appear how long Hannibal remained
in Spain, but he was at a very early age associated with Hasdrubal, who succeeded
his father in the command of the Carthaginian army in that country.
On the death of Hasdrubal, B.C. 221, he obtained the undivided command
of the army, and quickly conquered the Olcades, Vaccaeans, Carpesians and the
other Spanish tribes that had not been subdued by Hasdrubal. The inhabitants of
Saguntum, alarmed at his success, sent messengers to Rome to inform the Romans
of their danger. A Roman embassy was accordingly sent to Hannibal, who was passing
the winter at Carthago Nova, to announce to him that the independence of Saguntum
was guaranteed by a treaty between the Carthaginians and Romans (concluded B.C.
226), and that they should consider any injury done to the Saguntines as a declaration
of war against themselves. Hannibal, however, paid no regard to this remonstrance.
More than twenty years had elapsed since the termination of the First Punic War,
during which period the Carthaginians had recovered their strength, and had obtained
possession of the greater part of Spain; and now a favourable opportunity had
arrived for renewing the war with the Romans. In B.C. 219, Hannibal took Saguntum
after a siege of eight months, and employed the winter in making preparations
for the invasion of Italy. He first provided for the security of Africa and Spain
by leaving an army of about 16,000 men in each country. The army in Africa consisted
principally of Spanish troops, and that in Spain of Africans, under the command
of his brother Hasdrubal. He had already received promises of support from the
Gauls who inhabited the north of Italy, and who were anxious to deliver themselves
from Roman domination. Having thus made every necessary preparation, he set out
from Carthago Nova, late in the spring of B.C. 218, with an army of 80,000 foot
and 12,000 horse. In his march from the Iberus to the Pyrenees he was opposed
by a great number of the native tribes, but these were quickly defeated, though
with loss. Before crossing the Pyrenees, he left Hanno to secure his recent conquests
with a detachment from his own army of 11,000 men. He sent back the same number
of Spanish troops to their own cities, and with an army now reduced to 50,000
foot and 9000 horse he advanced to the Rhone. Meanwhile, two Roman
armies had been levied: one, commanded by the consul P. Cornelius Scipio, was
intended to oppose Hannibal in Spain; and a second, under the consul T. Sempronius,
was designed for the invasion of Africa. The departure of Scipio was delayed by
a revolt of the Boian and Insubrian Gauls, against whom was sent the army which
had been intended for the invasion of Spain, under the command of one of the praetors.
Scipio was therefore obliged to remain in Rome until a new army could be raised.
When the forces were ready, he sailed with them to the Rhone, and anchored at
the eastern mouth of the river, being persuaded that Hannibal must still be at
a considerable distance from him, as the country through which he had to march
was difficult, and inhabited by many warlike tribes. Hannibal, however, quickly
surmounted all these obstacles, crossed the Rhone, though not without some opposition
from the Gauls, and continued his march up the left bank of the river. Scipio
did not arrive at the place where the Carthaginians had crossed the river till
three days afterwards; and, despairing of overtaking them, he sailed back to Italy
with the intention of meeting Hannibal when he should descend from the Alps. Scipio
sent his brother Gnaeus into Spain, with the greater part of the troops, to oppose
Hasdrubal. Hannibal continued his march up the Rhone till he came to the Isara.
Marching along that river, he crossed the Alps, descended into the valley of the
Dora Baltea, and followed the course of the river till he arrived in the territories
of the Insubrian Gauls.
Hannibal completed his march from Carthago Nova to Italy in five months,
during which time he lost a great number of men, especially in his passage over
the Alps. According to a statement engraved by his order on a column at Lacinium,
in the country of the Brutii, which Polybius saw, his army was reduced to 12,000
Africans, 8000 Spaniards, and 6000 cavalry when he arrived in the territories
of the Insubrian Gauls. After remaining some time in the neighborhood of the Insubrians
to recruit his army, he marched south ward, and encountered P. Cornelius Scipio
on the right bank of the river Ticinus. In the battle which ensued the Romans
were defeated, and Scipio, with the remainder of the army, retreating along the
left bank of the Po, crossed the river before Hannibal could overtake him and
encamped near Placentia. He afterwards retreated more to the south, and intrenched
himself strongly on the right bank of the Trebia, where he waited for the arrival
of the army under the other consul, T. Sempronius. Sempronius had already crossed
over into Sicily with the intention of sailing to Africa, when he was recalled
to join his colleague. After the union of the two armies, Sempronius determined,
against the advice of Scipio, to risk another battle. The skill and fortune of
Hannibal again prevailed; the Romans were entirely defeated, and the troops who
survived took refuge in the fortified cities. In consequence of these victories,
the whole of Cisalpine Gaul fell into the hands of Hannibal; and the Gauls, who,
on his first arrival, were prevented from joining him by the presence of Scipio's
army in their country, now eagerly assisted him with both men and supplies.
In the following year, B.C. 217, the Romans made great preparations
to oppose their formidable enemy. Two new armies were levied. One was posted at
Arretium, under the command of the consul Flaminius, and the other at Ariminum,
under the consul Servilius. Hannibal determined to attack Flaminius first. In
his march southward through the swamps of the basin of the Arnus, his army suffered
greatly, and he himself lost the sight of one eye. After resting his troops for
a short time in the neighbourhood of Faesulae, he marched past Arretium, ravaging
the country as he went, with the view of drawing on Flaminius to a battle. Flaminius,
who appears to have been a rash, headstrong man, hastily followed Hannibal; and,
being attacked in the basin of Lake Trasimenus, was completely defeated by the
Carthaginians, who were posted on the mountains which encircle the valley. Three
or four days afterwards, Hannibal cut off a detachment of Roman cavalry, amounting
to 4000 men, which had been sent by Servilius to assist his colleague. Hannible
appears to have entertained hopes of overthrowing the Roman dominion, and to have
expected that the other States of Italy would take up arms against Rome, in order
to recover their independence. To win over the affections of the Italians, he
dismissed without ransom all the prisoners whom he took in battle; and, to give
them an opportunity of joining his army, he marched slowly along the eastern side
of the peninsula, through Umbria and Picenum, into Apulia; but he did not meet
with that co-operation which he appears to have expected. After the defeat of
Flaminius, Q. Fabius Maximus was appointed dictator, and a defensive system of
warfare was adopted by the Romans for the rest of the year. In the following year,
B.C. 216, the Romans resolved upon another battle. An army of 80,000 foot and
6000 horse was raised, which was commanded by the consuls L. Aemilius Paulus and
C. Terentius Varro. The Carthaginian army now amounted to 40,000 foot and 10,000
horse. Both armies were encamped in the neighbourhood of Cannae in Apulia. In
the battle which was fought near this place, the Romans were defeated with dreadful
carnage, and with a loss which, as stated by Polybius, is quite incredible; the
whole of the infantry engaged in battle, amounting to 70,000, was destroyed, with
the exception of 3000 men, who escaped to the neighbouring cities, and also all
the cavalry, with the exception of 300 belonging to the allies and 70 that escaped
with Varro. A detachment of 10,000 foot, which had been sent to surprise the Carthaginian
camp, was obliged to surrender as prisoners. The consul L. Aemilius and the two
consuls of the former year, Servilius and Attilius, were also among the slain.
Hannibal lost only 4000 Gauls, 1500 Africans and Spaniards, and 200 horse. This
vietory placed the whole of Lower Italy in the power of Hannibal, but it was not
followed by such important results as might have been expected. Capua and most
of the cities of Campania espoused his cause, but the majority of the Italian
States continued true to Rome. The defensive system was now strictly adopted by
the Romans, and Hannibal was unable to make any active exertions for the further
conquest of Italy till he received a reenforcement of troops. He was in hopes
of obtaining support from Philip of Macedon and from the Syracusans, with both
of whom he formed an alliance; but the Romans found means to keep Philip employed
in Greece, and Syracuse was besieged and taken by Marcellus, B.C. 214-12. In addition
to this, Capua was taken by the Romans, B.C. 211. Hannibal was therefore obliged
to depend upon the Carthaginians for help, and Hasdrubal was accordingly ordered
to march from Spain to his assistance. Gnaeus Scipio, as already observed, had
been left in Spain to oppose Hasdrubal. He was afterwards joined by P. Cornelius
Scipio, and the war was carried on with various success for many years, till at
length the Roman army was entirely defeated by Hasdrubal, B.C. 212. Both the Scipios
fell in the battle. Hasdrubal was now preparing to join his brother, but was prevented
by the arrival of the young P. Cornelius Scipio in Spain, B.C. 210, who quickly
recovered what the Romans had lost. In B.C. 210 he took Carthago Nova; and it
was not till B.C. 207, when the Carthaginians had lost almost all their dominions
in Spain, that Hasdrubal set out to join his brother in Italy. He crossed the
Alps without meeting with any opposition from the Gauls, and arrived at Placentia
before the Romans were aware that he had entered Italy. After besieging this town
without success, he continued his march southward; but, before he could effect
a junction with Hannibal, he was attacked by the consuls C. Claudius Nero and
M. Livius, on the banks of the Metaurus in Umbria; his army was cut to pieces,
and he himself fell in the battle. This misfortune obliged Hannibal to act on
the defensive; and from this time till his departure from Italy in B.C. 203, he
was confined to Bruttium; but, by his superior military skill, he maintained his
army in a hostile country without any assistance from his government at home.
After effecting the conquest of Spain, Scipio passed over into Africa to carry
the war into the enemy's country, B.C. 204. With the assistance of Masinissa,
a Numidian prince, he gained two victories over the Carthaginians, who hastily
recalled their great commander from Italy to defend his native State. Hannibal
landed at Septis, and advanced upon Zama, five days' journey from Carthage towards
the west. Here he was entirely defeated by Scipio, B.C. 202; 20,000 Carthaginians
fell in the battle, and an equal number were taken prisoners. The Carthaginians
were obliged to sue for peace, and thus ended the Second Punic War, B.C. 201.
After the conclusion of the war, Hannibal vigorously applied himself
to correct the abuses which existed in the Carthaginian government. He reduced
the power of the perpetual judges, and provided for the proper collection of the
public revenue, which had been embezzled. He was supported by the people in these
reforms; but he incurred the enmity of many powerful men, who represented to the
Romans that he was endeavouring to persuade his countrymen to join Antiochus,
king of Syria, in a war against them. A Roman embassy was consequently sent to
Carthage to demand the punishment of Hannibal as a disturber of the public peace;
and Hannibal, aware that he should not be able to resist his enemies supported
by the Roman power, escaped from the city and sailed to Tyre. From Tyre he went
to Ephesus to join Antiochus, B.C. 196, and contributed to fix him in his determination
to make war against the Romans. If Hannibal's advice as to the conduct of the
war had been followed, the result of the contest might have been different; but
he was only employed in a subordinate command, and had no opportunity for the
exertion of his great military talents. At the conclusion of this war Hannibal
was obliged to seek refuge at the court of Prusias, king of Bithynia, where he
remained about five years, and on one occasion obtained a victory over Eumenes,
king of Pergamus. But the Romans appear to have been uneasy so long as their once
formidable enemy was alive. An embassy was sent to demand him of Prusias, who,
being afraid of offending the Romans, agreed to give him up. To avoid falling
into the hands of his ungenerous enemies, Hannibal destroyed himself by poison
at Nicomedia in Bithynia, B.C. 183, in the sixty-fifth year of his age.
The personal character of Hannibal is known to us only from the events
of his public life, and even these have not been recorded by any historian of
his own country; yet we cannot read the history of these campaigns, even in the
narrative of his enemies, without admiring his great abilities and courage. Polybius
remarks: "How wonderful is it that in the course of sixteen years, during
which he maintained the war in Italy, he should never once dismiss his army from
the field, and yet be able, like a good governor, to keep in subjection so great
a multitude, and to confine them within the bounds of their duty, so that they
never mutinied against him nor quarrelled among themselves. Though his army was
composed of people of various countries--of Africans, Spaniards, Gauls, Carthaginians,
Italians, and Greeks--men who had different laws, different customs, and different
languages, and, in a word, nothing among them that was common--yet, so dexterous
was his management that, notwithstanding this great diversity, he forced all of
them to acknowledge one authority, and to yield obedience to one command. And
this, too, he accomplished in the midst of very varied fortune. How high as well
as just an opinion must these things convey to us of his ability in war! It may
be affirmed with confidence that if he had first tried his strength in the other
parts of the world and had come last to attack the Romans, he could scarcely have
failed in any part of his design".
This text is from: Harry Thurston Peck, Harpers Dictionary of Classical Antiquities. Cited July 2003 from The Perseus Project URL below, which contains interesting hyperlinks
Hannibal. Son of Hamilcar Barca, and one of the most illustrious generals of antiquity.
The year of his birth is not mentioned by any ancient writer, but from the statements
concerning his age at the battle of Zama, it appears that he must have been born
in B. C. 247, the very year in which his father Hamilcar was first appointed to
the command in Sicily. (Clinton, F. H. vol. iii.; but compare Niebuhr, Lect. on
Rom. Hist. vol. i.) He was only nine years old when his father took him with him
into Spain, and it was on this occasion that Hamilcar made him swear upon the
altar eternal hostility to Rome. The story was told by Hannibal himself many years
afterwards to Antiochus, and is one of the best attested in ancient history. (Polyb.
iii. 11; Liv. xxi. 1, xxxv. 19; Corn. Nep. Hann. 2; Appian, Hisp. 9; Val. Max.
ix. 3, ext. § 3.) Child as he then was, Hannibal never forgot his vow, and his
whole life was one continual struggle against the power and domination of Rome.
He was early trained in arms under the eye of his father, and probably accompanied
him on most of his campaigns in Spain. We find him present with him in the battle
in which Hamilcar perished (B. C. 229); and though only eighteen years old at
this time, he had already displayed so much courage and capacity for war, that
he was entrusted by Hasdrubal (the son-in-law and successor of Hamilcar) with
the chief command of most of the military enterprises planned by that general.
(Diod. Exc. Hoesch. xxv.; Liv. xxi. 4; Appian, Hisp. 6.) Of the details of these
campaigns we know nothing; but it is clear that Hannibal thus early gave proof
of that remarkable power over the minds of men, which he afterwards displayed
in so eminent a degree, and secured to himself the devoted attachment of the army
under his command. The consequence was, that on the assassination of Hasdrubal
(B. C. 221), the soldiers unanimously proclaimed their youthful leader commander-in-chief,
and the government at Carthage hastened to ratify an appointment which they had
not, in fact, the power to prevent. (Polyb. iii. 13 Appian, Hisp. 8; Zonar. viii.
21.)
Hannibal was at this time in the twenty-sixth year of his age. There
can be no doubt that he already looked forward to the invasion and conquest of
Italy as the goal of his ambition; but it was necessary for him first to complete
the work which had been so ably begun by his two predecessors, and to establish
the Carthaginian power as firmly as possible in Spain, before he made that country
the base of his subsequent operations. This was the work of two campaigns. Immediately
after he had received the command, he turned his arms against the Olcades, a nation
of the interior, who were speedily compelled to submit by the fall of their capital
city, Althaea. Hannibal levied large sums of money from them and the neighbouring
tribes, after which he returned into winter quarters at New Carthage. The next
year (220), he penetrated farther into the country, in order to assail the powerful
tribe of the Vaccaeans. and reduced their two strong and populous cities of Helmantica
and Arbocala. On his return from this expedition, he was involved in great danger
by a sudden attack from the Carpetanians, together with the remaining forces of
the Olcades and Vaccaeans, but by a dexterous manoeuvre he placed the river Tagus
between himself and the enemy, and the barbarian army was cut to pieces in the
attempt to force their passage. After these successes he again returned to spend
the winter at New Carthage. (Polyb. iii. 13-15; Liv. xxi. 5.)
Early in the ensuing spring (B. C. 219) Hannibal proceeded to lay
siege to Saguntum, a city of Greek origin, which, though situated to the south
of the Iberus, and therefore not included under the protection of the treaty between
Hasdrubal and the Romans, had concluded an alliance with the latter people. There
could be little doubt, therefore, that an attack upon Saguntum would inevitably
bring on a war with Rome; but for this Hannibal was prepared, or rather it was
unquestionably his real object. The immediate pretext of his invasion was the
same of which the Romans so often availed themselves,-- some injuries inflicted
by the Saguntines upon one of the neighbouring tribes, who invoked the assistance
of Hannibal. But the resistance of the city was long and desperate, and it was
not till after a siege of near eight months, in the course of which Hannibal himself
had been severely wounded, that he made himself master of the place. (Polyb. iii.
17; Liv. xxi. 6-15; Appian, Hisp. 10-12 ; Zonar. viii. 21.) During all this period
the Romans sent no assistance to their allies: they had, indeed, as soon as they
heard of the siege, dispatched ambassadors to Hannibal, but he referred them for
an answer to the government at home, and they could obtain no satisfaction from
the Caithaginians, in whose councils the war party had now a decided predominance.
A second embassy was sent after the fall of Saguntum to demand the surrender of
Hannibal in atonement for the breach of the treaty; but this was met by an open
declaration of war, and thus began the long and arduous struggle called the Second
Punic War. Of this it has been justly remarked, that it was not so much a contest
between the powers of two great nations,--between Carthage and Rome,0-as between
the individual genius of Hannibal on the one hand, and the combined energies of
the Roman people on the other. The position of Hannibal was indeed very peculiar:
his command in Spain, and the powerful army there, which was entirely at his own
disposal, rendered him in great measure independent of the government at Carthage,
and the latter seemed disposed to take advantage of this circumstance to devolve
all responsibility upon him. When he sent to Carthage for instructions as to how
he should act in regard to Saguntum, he could obtain no other reply than that
he should do as he thought best (Appian, Hisp. 10); and though the government
afterwards avowed and supported his proceedings in that instance, they did little
themselves to prepare for the impending contest. All was left to Hannibal, who,
after the conquest of Saguntum, had returned once more to New Carthage for the
winter, and was there actively engaged in preparations for transporting the scene
of war in the ensuing campaign from Spain into Italy. At the same time, he did
not neglect to provide for the defence of Spain and Africa during his absence:
in the former country he placed his brother Hasdrubal with a considerable army,
great part of which was composed of Africans, while he sent over a large body
of Spanish troops to contribute to the defence of Africa and even of Carthage
itself. (Polyb. iii. 33.) During the winter he allowed many of the Spaniards in
his own army to return to their homes, that they might rejoin their standards
with fresh spirits for the approaching campaign: he himself is said to have repaired
to Gades, and there to have offered up in the temple of Melkarth, the tutelary
deity of Tyre and of Carthage, a solemn sacrifice for the success of his expedition.
(Liv. xxi. 21.)
All his preparations being now completed, Hannibal quitted his winter-quarters
at New Carthage in the spring of 218, and crossed the Iberus with an army of 90,000
foot and 12,000 horse. (Polyb. iii. 35). The tribes between that river and the
Pyrenees offered at first a vigorous resistance; and though they were quickly
subdued, Hannibal thought it necessary to leave behind him a force of 11,000 men,
under Hanno, to maintain this newly acquired province. His forces were farther
thinned during the passage of the Pyrenees by desertion, which obliged him to
send home a large body of his Spanish troops. With a greatly diminished army,
but one on which he could securely rely, he now continued his march from the foot
of the Pyrenees to the Rhone without meeting with any opposition, the Gaulish
tribes through which he passed being favourably disposed to him, or having been
previously gained over by his emissaries. The Roman consul, P. Scipio, had already
arrived in the neighbourhood of Massilia, when he heard that Hannibal had reached
the Rhone, but was too late to dispute the passage of that river : the barbarians
on the left bank in vain endeavoured to prevent the Carthaginian army from crossing;
and Hannibal, having effected his passage with but little loss, continued his
march up the left bank of the Rhone as far as its confluence with the Isere. Here
he interposed in a dispute between two rival chiefs of the Allobroges, and by
lending his aid to establish one of them firmly on the throne, secured the co-operation
of an efficient ally, who greatly facilitated his farther progress. But at the
very commencement of the actual passage of the Alps he was met by hostile barbarians,
who at first threatened altogether to prevent his advance; and it was not without
heavy loss that he was able to surmount this difficult pass. For some time after
this his advance was comparatively unimpeded; but a sudden and treacherous attack
from the Gaulish mountaineers at the moment when his troops were struggling through
a narrow and dangerous defile, went near to annihilate his whole army. Surmounting
all these dangers, he at length reached the summit of the pass, and thenceforth
suffered but little from hostile attacks; but the natural difficulties of the
road, enhanced by the lateness of the season (the beginning of October, at which
time the snows have already commenced in the high Alps), caused him almost as
much detention and difficulty as the opposition of the barbarians on the other
side of the mountains. So heavy were his losses from these combined causes, that
when he at length emerged from the valley of Aosta into the plains of the Po,
and encamped in the friendly country of the Insubrians, he had with him no more
than 20,000 foot and 6000 horse. Such were the forces, as Polybius remarks (ii.
24), with which he descended into Italy, to attempt the overthrow of a power that
a few years before was able to muster a disposable force of above 700,000 fighting
men. (Polyb. iii. 35, 40-56; Liv. xxi. 21-37.)
The march of Hannibal across the Alps is one of the most remarkable
events in ancient history, and, as such, was early disfigured by exaggerations
and misconceptions. The above narrative is taken wholly from that of Polybius,
which is certainly by far the most trustworthy that has descended to us; but that
author has nowhere clearly stated by which of the passes across the Alps Hannibal
effected his march; and this question has given rise to much controversy both
in ancient and modern times. Into this discussion our limits will not allow us
to enter, but the following may be briefly stated as the general results:-- 1.
That after a careful examination of the text of Polybius, and comparison of the
different localities, his narrative will be found on the whole to agree best with
the supposition that Hannibal crossed the Graian Alps, or Little St. Bernard,
though it cannot be denied that there are some difficulties attending this line,
especially in regard to the descent into Italy. 2. That Caelius Antipater certainly
represented him as taking this route (Liv. xxi. 38); and as he is known to have
followed the Greek history of Silenus, who is said to have accompanied Hannibal
in many of his campaigns, his authority is of the greatest weight. 3. That Livy
and Strabo, on the contrary, both suppose him to have crossed the Cottian Alps,
or Mont Genevre. (Liv. l. c.; Strab. iv.) But the main argument that appears to
have weighed with Livy, as it has done with several modern writers on the subject,
is the assumption that Hannibal descended in the first instance into the country
of the Taurinians, which is opposed to the direct testimony of Polybius, who says
expressly that he descended among the Insubrians (kateipe tolmepos eis ta peri
ton Padon pedia, kai to ton Isombrpon ethnos, iii. 56.), and subsequently mentions
his attack on the Taurinians. 4. That as according to Livy himself (xxi. 29) the
Gaulish emissaries who acted as Hannibal's guides were Boians, it was natural
that these should conduct him by the passage that led directly into the territory
of their allies and brothers-in-arms, the Insubrians, rather than into that of
the Taurinians, a Ligurian tribe, who were at this very time in a state of hostility
with the Insubrians. (Polyb. iii. 60.) And this remark will serve to explain why
Hannibal chose apparently a longer route instead of the more direct one of the
Mont Genevre. Lastly, it is remarkable that Polybius, though he censures the exaggerations
and absurdities with which earlier writers had encumbered their narrative (iii.
47, 48), does not intimate that any doubt was entertained as to the line of his
march; and Pompey, in a letter to the senate, written in 73 B. C. (ap. Sallust.
Hist. Frag. lib. iii. ), alludes to the route of Hannibal across the Alps as something
well known: hence it appears clear that the passage by which he crossed them must
have been one of those frequented in subsequent times by the Romans; and this
argument seems decisive against the claims of the Mont Cenis, which have been
advocated by some modern writers, that pass having apparently never been used
until the middle ages. For a fuller examination of this much controverted subject,
the reader may consult De Luc, Histoire du Passage des Alpes par Annibal, 8vo.
Geneve, 2d edit. 1825; Wickham and Cramer, Dissertation on the Passage of Hannibal
over the Alps, Lond, 1828, 2d edit.; Ukert, Hannibal's Zug. uber die Alpen, appended
to the 4th vol. of his Geographie d. Griech. u. Romer: in which works the earlier
dissertations and scattered remarks of other writers are discussed or referred
to. Of the latest historians it may be noticed that Niebuhr (Lect. on Rom. Hist,
vol. i.) and Arnold (Hist. of Rome, vol. iii., note M), as well as Botticher (Gesch.
d. Carthager), have decided in favour of the Little St. Bernard; while Michelet
(Hist. Romaine, vol. ii.) and Thierry (Hist. des Gaulois, vol. i. p. 276), in
common with almost all French writers, adopt the Mont Genevre or Mont Cenis.
Five months had been employed in the march from New Carthage to the
plains of Italy, of which the actual passage of the Alps had occupied fifteen
days. (Polyb. iii. 56.) Hannibal's first care was now to recruit the strength
of his troops, exhausted by the hardships and fatigues they had undergone: after
a short interval of repose, he turned his arms against the Taurinians (a tribe
bordering on, and hostile to, the Insubrians), whom he quickly reduced, and took
their principal city. The news of the approach of P. Scipio next obliged him to
turn his attention towards a more formidable enemy. Scipio had sent on his own
army from Massilia into Spain, while he himself, returning to Etruria, crossed
the Apennines from thence into Cisalpine Gaul, took the command of the praetor's
army, which he found there, and led it against Hannibal. In the first action,
which took place in the plains westward of the Ticinus, the cavalry and lightarmed
troops of the two armies were alone engaged, and the superiority of Hannibal's
Numidian horse at once decided the combat in his favour. The Romans were completely
routed, and Scipio himself severely wounded; in consequence of which he hastened
to retreat beyond the Ticinus and the Po, under the walls of Placentia. Hannibal
crossed the Po higher up; and advancing to Placentia, offered battle to Scipio;
but the latter declined the combat, and withdrew to the hills on the left bank
of the Trebia. Here he was soon after joined by the other consul, Ti. Sempronius
Longus, who had hastened from Ariminum to his support: their combined armies were
greatly superior to that of the Carthaginians, and Sempronius was eager to bring
on a general battle, of which Hannibal, on his side, was not less desirous, notwithstanding
the great inferiority of his force. The result was decisive: the Romans were completely
defeated, with heavy loss; and the remains of their shattered army, together with
the two consuls, took refuge within the walls of Placentia. (Polyb. iii. 60-74;
Liv. xxi. 39-48, 52-56; Appian, Annib. 5-7; Zonar. viii. 23, 24.)
The battle of the Trebia was fought late in the year, and the winter
had already begun with unusual severity, so that Hannibal's troops suffered severely
from cold, and all his elephants perished, except one. But his victory had caused
all the wavering tribes of the Gauls to declare in his favour; and he was now
able to take up his winterquarters in security, and to levy fresh troops among
the Gauls, while he awaited the approach of spring. According to Livy (xxi. 58),
he made an unsuccessful attempt to cross the Apennines before the winter was well
over, but was driven back by the violence of the storms that he encountered. But
as soon as the season permitted the renewal of military operations (B. C. 217),
he entered the country of the Ligurian tribes, who had lately declared in his
favour, and descended by the valley of the Macra into the marshes on the banks
of the Arno. He had apparently chosen this route in order to avoid the Roman armies,
which, under the two consuls, Flaminius and Servilius, guarded the more obvious
passes of the Apennines; but the hardships and difficulties which he encountered
in struggling through the marshes were immense, great numbers of his horses and
beasts of burthen perished, and he himself lost the sight of one eye by a violent
attack of ophthalmia. At length, however, he reached Faesulae in safety, and was
able to allow his troops a short interval of repose. Flaminius, with his army,
was at this time at Arretium; and Hannibal (whose object was always to bring the
Roman commanders to a battle, in which the superior discipline of his veteran
troops, and the excellence of his numerous cavalry, rendered him secure of victory),
when he moved from Faesulae, passed by the Roman general, and advanced towards
Perugia, laying waste the fertile country on his line of march. Flaminius immediately
broke up his camp, and following the traces of Hannibal, fell into the snare which
was prepared for him. His army was attacked under the most disadvantageous circumstances,
where it was hemmed in between rocky heights previously occupied by the enemy
and the lake of Thrasymenus; and its destruction was almost complete, thousands
fell by the sword, among whom was the consul himself; thousands more perished
in the lake, and no less than 15,000 prisoners fell into the hands of Hannibal,
who on his side is said to have lost only 1500 men. A body of 4000 horse, who
had been sent to the support of Flaminius, under C. Centenius, were also intercepted,
and the whole of them cut to pieces or made prisoners. (Polyb. iii. 77-86; Liv.
xxii. 1-8; Appian, Annib. 9, 10; Zonar. viii. 25.) Hannibal's treatment of the
captives on this occasion, as well as after the battle of the Trebia, was marked
by the same policy on which he afterwards uniformly acted: the Roman citizens
alone were retained as prisoners, while their Italian allies were dismissed without
ransom to their respective homes. By this means he hoped to excite the nations
of Italy against their Roman masters, and to place himself in the position of
the leader of a national movement rather than that of a foreign invader. It was
probably in order to give time for tllis feeling to display itself, that he did
not, after so decisive a victory, push on towards Rome itself; but after an unsuccessful
attempt upon the Roman colony of Spoletium, he turned aside through the Apennines
into Picenum, and thence into tile northern part of Apulia. Here he spent a great
part of the summer, and was able effectually to restore his troops, which had
suffered much from the hardships of their previous marches. But no symptoms appeared
of the insurrections he had looked for among the Italians. The Romans had collected
a fresh army; and Fabius, who had been appointed to the command of it, with the
title of dictator, while he prudently avoided a general action, was able frequently
to harass and annoy the Carthaginian army. Hannibal now, therefore, recrossed
the Apennines, descended into the rich plains of Campania, and laid waste, without
opposition, that fertile territory. But he was unable either to make himself master
of any of the towns, or to draw the wary Fabius to a battle. The Roman general
contented himself with occupying the mountain passes leading from Samnium into
Campania, by which Hannibal must of necessity retreat, and believed that he had
caught him as it were in a trap; but Hannibal eluded his vigilance by an ingenious
stratagem, passed the defiles of the Apennines without loss, and established himself
in the plains of Apulia, where he collected supplies from all sides, in order
to prepare for the winter. During this operation the impatience of the Romans
and the rashness of Minuucius (who had been raised by the voice of popular clamour
to an equality in the command with Fabius) were very near giving Hannibal the
opportunity for which he was ever on the watch, to crush the Roman army by a decisive
blow; but Fabius was able to save his colleague from destruction; and Hannibal,
after obtaining only a partial advantage, took up his winter-quarters at the small
town of Geronium. (Polyb. iii. 85-94, 100-105; Liv. xxii. 7-18, 23-30, 32; Plut.
Fab. 3-13; Appian, Annib. 12-16; Zonar. viii. 25, 26.)
The next spring (B. C. 216) was a period of inaction on both sides:
the Romans were engaged in making preparations for bringing an unusually large
force into the field; and Hannibal remained at Geronium until late in the spring,
when the want of provisions compelling him to move, he surprised the Roman magazines
at Cannae, a small town of Apulia, and established his head-quarters there until
the harvest could be got in. Meanwhile, the two Roman consuls, L. Aemilius Paullus
and C. Terentius Varro, arrived at the head of an army of little less than 90,000
men. To this mighty host Hannibal gave battle in the plains on the right bank
of the Aufidus, just below the town of Cannae. 1 We have no statement of the numbers
of his army, but it is certain that it must have been greatly inferior to that
of the enemy; notwithstanding which, the excellence of his cavalry, and the disciplined
valour of his African and Spanish infantry, gave him the most decisive victory.
The immense army of the Romans was not only defeated, but annihilated; and between
forty and fifty thousand men are said to have fallen in the field, among whom
was the consul Aemilius Paullus, both the consuls of the preceding year, the late
master of the horse, Minucias, above eighty senators, and a multitude of the wealthy
knights who composed the Roman cavalry. The otherconsul, Varro, escaped with a
few horsemen to Venusia, and a small band of resolute men forced their way from
the Roman camp to Canusium all the rest were killed, dispersed, or taken prisoners.
(Polyb. iii. 107-117; Liv. xxii. 36, 38-50; Plut. Fab. 14-16; Appian,Annib. 17-25;
Zonar. ix. 1.)
Hannibal has been generally blamed for not following up his advantage
at once, after so decisive a victory, by an immediate advance upon Rome itself,--a
measure which was strongly urged upon him by Maharbal [MAHARBAL]; and we are told
that he himself afterwards bitterly repented of his error. Whatever may be the
motives that deterred him from such a step, we cannot but be surprised at his
apparent inactivity after the battle. lie probably expected that so brilliant
a success would immediately produce a general rising among the nations of Italy,
and remained for a time quietly in Apulia, until they should have had time to
declare themselves. Nor were his hopes disappointed: the Hirpinians, all the Samnites
(except the Pentrian tribe), and almost all the Apulians, Lucanians, and Bruttians
declared in favour of Carthage. But though the whole of the south of Italy was
thus apparently lost to the Romans, yet the effect of this insurrection was not
so decisive as it would at first appear; for the Latin colonies. which still without
exception remained faithful, gave the Romans a powerful hold upon the revolted
provinces; and the Greek cities on the coast, though mostly disposed to join the
Carthaginians, were restrained by the presence of Roman garrisons. Hence it became
necessary to support the insurrection in the different parts of Italy with a Carthaginian
force; and Hannibal, while he himself moved forward into Samnium, detached his
brother Mago into Bruttium, and Hanno, one of his ablest officers, into Lucania.
After securing the submission of the Samnites, he pushed forward into Campania,
and though foiled in the attempt to make himself master of Neapolis, which had
been the immediate object of his advance, he was more than compensated by the
acquisition of Capua (a city scarcely inferior to Rome itself in importance),
the gates of which were opened to him by the popular party. Here, after reducing
the small towns of Nuceria and Acerrae, he established his army in winter-quarters;
while he, at the same time, carried on the siege of Casilinum, a small but strong
fortress in the immediate neighbourhood. (Liv. xxii. 58, 61, xxiii. 1-10, 14-18;
Zonar. ix. 1, 2; Plut. Fab. 17.)
Capua was celebrated for its wealth and luxury, and the enervating
effect which these produced upon the army of Hannibal became a favourite theme
of rhetorical exaggeration in later ages. (Zonar. ix. 3; Florus, ii. 6.) The futility
of such declamations is sufficiently shown by the simple fact that the superiority
of that army in the field remained as decided as ever. Still it may be truly said
that the winter spent at Capua, B. C. 216-215, was in great measure the turning
point of Hannibal's fortune, and from this time the war assumed an altered character.
The experiment of what he could effect with his single army had now been fully
tried, and, notwithstanding all his victories, it had decidedly failed; for Rome
was still unsubdued, and still provided with the means of maintaining a protracted
contest. But Hannibal had not relied on his own forces alone, and he now found
himself, apparently at least, in a condition to commence the execution of his
long-cherished plan, --that of arming Italy itself against the Romans, and crushing
the ruling power by means of her own subjects. It was to this object that his
attention was henceforth mainly directed; and hence, even when apparently inactive,
he was, in reality, occupied with the most important schemes, and busy in raising
up fresh foes to overwhelm his antagonists. From this time, also, the Romans in
great measure changed their plan of operations, and, instead of opposing to Hannibal
one great army in the field, they hemmed in his movements on all sides, guarded
all the most important towns with strong garrisons, and kept up an army in every
province of Italy, to thwart the operations of his lieutenants, and check the
rising disposition to revolt. It is impossible here to follow in detail the complicated
movements of the subsequent campaigns, during which Hannibal himself frequently
traversed Italy in all directions, appearing suddenly wherever his presence was
called for, and astonishing, and often baffling, the enemy by the rapidity of
his marches. Still less can we advert to all the successes or defeats of his generals,
though these of necessity often influenced his own operations. All that we can
do is, to notice very briefly the leading events which distinguished each successive
campaign. But it is necessary to bear in mind, if we would rightly estimate the
character and genius of Hannibal, that it was not only where he was present in
person that his superiority made itself felt: as Polybius has justly remarked
(ix. 22), he was at once the author and the presiding spirit of all that was done
in this war against the Roman power, --in Sicily and in Macedonia, as well as
in Italy itself, from one extremity of the peninsula to the other.
The campaign of 215 was not marked by any decisive events. Casilinum
had fallen in the course of the winter, and with the advance of spring Hannibal
took up his camp on Mount Tifata, where, while awaiting the arrival of reinforcements
from Carthage, he was at hand to support his partisans in Campania, and oppose
the Roman generals in that province. But his attempts on Cumae and Neapolis were
foiled; and even after he had been joined by a force from Carthage (very inferior,
however, to what he had expected), he sustained a repulse before Nola, which was
magnified by the Romans into a defeat. As the winter approached, he withdrew into
Apulia, and took up his quarters in the plains around Arpi. But other prospects
were already opening before him; in his camp on Tifata he had received embassies
from Philip, king of Macedonia, and Hieronymus of Syracuse, both of which he had
eagerly welcomed ; and thus sowed the seeds of two fresh wars, and raised up two
formidable enemies against the Roman power. (Liv. xxiii. 19, 20, 30-39, 41-46;
xxiv. 6; Plut. Marc. 10-12; Polyb. vii. 2, 9; Zonar. ix. 4.)
These two collateral wars in some degree drew off the attention of
both parties from that in Italy itself; yet the Romans still opposed to the Carthaginian
general a chain of armies which hampered all his operations; and though Hannibal
was ever on the watch for the opportunity of striking a blow, the campaign of
214 was still less decisive than that of the preceding year. Early in the summer
he advanced from Apulia to his former station on Mount Tifata, to watch over the
safety of Capua; from thence he had descended to the Lake Avernus, in hopes of
making himself master of Puteoli, when a prospect was held out to him of surprising
the important city of Tarentum. Thither he hastened by forced marches, but arrived
too late,--Tarentum had been secured by a Roman force. After this his operations
were of little importance, until he again took up his winter-quarters in Apulia.
(Liv. xxiv. 12, 13, 17, 20.)
During the following summer (B. C. 213), while all eyes were turned
towards the war in Sicily, Hannibal remained almost wholly inactive in the neighbourhood
of Tarentum, the hopes he still entertained of making himself master of that important
city rendering him unwilling to quit that quarter of Italy. Fabius, who was opposed
to him, was equally inefficient; and the capture of Arpi, which was betrayed into
his hands, was the only advantage he was able to gain. But before the close of
the ensuing winter Hannibal was rewarded with the long-looked-for prize, and Tarentum
was betrayed into his hands by Nicon and Philemenus. The advantage, however, was
still incomplete, for a Roman garrison still held possession of the citadel, from
which he was unable to dislodge them. (Polyb. viii. 26-36; Liv. xxiv. 44-47; xxv.
1, 8-11; Appian, Annib. 31-33.)
The next year (212) was marked by important events. In Sicily, on
the one hand, the fall of Syracuse more than counterbalanced the acquisition of
Tarentum; while in Spain, on the contrary, the defeat and death of the two Scipios
seemed to establish the superiority of Carthage in that country, and open the
way to Hasdrubal to join his brother in Italy; a movement which Hannibal appears
to have been already long expecting. Meanwhile, the two consuls, emboldened by
the apparent inactivity of the Carthaginian [p. 338] general, began to draw together
their forces for the purpose of besieging Capua. Hanno, who was despatched thither
by Hannibal with a large convoy of stores and provisions, was defeated, and the
object of his march frustrated; and though another officer of the same name, with
a body of Carthaginian and Numidian troops, threw himself into the city, the Romans
still threatened it with a siege, and Hannibal himself was compelled to advance
to its relief. By this movement he for a time checked the operations of the consuls,
and compelled them to withdraw; but he was unable to bring either of them to battle.
Centenius, a centurion, who had obtained the command of a force of 8000 men, was
more confident; he ventured an engagement with Hannibal, and paid the penalty
of his rashness by the loss of his army and his life. This success was soon followed
by a more important victory over the praetor Cn. Fulvius at Herdonea in Apulia,
in which the army of the latter was utterly destroyed, and 20,000 men cut to pieces.
But while Hannibal was thus employed elsewhere, he was unable to prevent the consuls
from effectually forming the siege of Capua, and surrounding that city with a
double line of intrenchments. (Liv. xxv. 13-15, 18-22.) His power in the south
had been increased during this campaign by the important accession of Metapontum
and Thurii: but the citadel of Tarentum still held out, and, with a view to urge
the siege of this fortress by his presence, Hannibal spent the winter, and the
whole of the ensuing spring (211), in its immediate neighbourhood. But as the
season advanced, the pressing danger of Capua once more summoned him to its relief.
He accordingly presented himself before the Roman camp, and attacked their lines
from without, while the garrison co-operated with him by a vigorous sally from
the walls. Both attacks were, however, repulsed, and Hannibal, thus foiled in
his attempt to raise the siege by direct means, determined on the bold manoeuvre
of marching directly upon Rome itself, in hopes of thus compelling the consuls
to abandon their designs upon Capua, in order to provide for the defence of the
city. But this daring scheme was again frustrated: the appearance of Hannibal
before the gates of Rome for a moment struck terror through the city, but a considerable
body of troops was at the time within the walls, and the consul, Fulvius Flaccus,
as soon as he heard of Hannibal's march, hastened, with a portion of the besieging
army, from Capua, while he still left with the other consul a force amply sufficient
to carry on the siee. Hannibal was thus disappointed in the main object of his
advance, and he had no means of effecting any thing against Rome itself, where
Fulvius and Fabius confined themselves strictly to the defensive, allowing him
to ravage the whole country, up to the very walls of Rome, without opposition.
Nothing therefore remained for him but to retreat, and he accordingly recrossed
the Anio, and marched slowly and sullenly through the land of the Sabines and
Samnites, ravaging the country which he traversed, and closely followed by the
Roman consul, upon whom he at length turned suddenly, and, by a night attack,
very nearly destroyed his whole army. When he had thus reached Apulia, he made
from thence a forced march into Bruttium, in hopes of surprising Rhegium; but
here he was again foiled, and Capua, which he was now compelled to abandon to
its fate, soon after surrendered to the Romans. Hannibal once more took up his
winter-quarters in Apulia. (Liv. xxvi. 4-14; Polyb. ix. 3-7 Appian, Annib. 38-43;
Zonar. ix. 6.)
The commencement of the next season (210) was marked by the fall of
Salapia. which was betrayded by the inhabitants to Marcellus; but this loss was
soon avenged by the total defeat and destruction of the army of the proconsul
Cn. Fulvius at Herdonea. Marcellus, on his part, carefully avoided an action for
the rest of the campaign, while he harassed his opponent by every possible means.
Thus the rest of that summer, too, wore away without any important results. But
this state of comparative inactivity was necessarily i injurious to the cause
of Hannibal: the nations of Italy that had espoused that cause when triumphant,
now began to waver in their attachment; and, in the course of the following summer
(209), the Samnites and Lucanians submitted to Rome, and were admitted to favourable
terms. A still more disastrous blow to the Carthaginian cause was the loss of
Tarentum, which was betrayed into the hands of Fabius, as it had been into those
of Hannibal. In vain did the latter seek to draw the Roman general into a snare;
the wary Fabius eluded his toils. But Marcellus, after a pretended victory over
Hannibal during the earlier part of the campaign, had shut himself up within the
walls of Venusia, and remained there in utter inactivity. Hannibal meanwhile still
traversed the open country unopposed, and laid waste the territories of his enemies.
Yet we cannot suppose that he any longer looked for ultimate success from any
efforts of his own : his object was, doubtless, now only to main tain his ground
in the south until his brother Hasdrubal should appear in the north of Italy,
an event to which he had long looked forward with anxious expectation. (Liv. xxvii.
1, 2, 4, 12-16, 20 ; Plut. Fab. 19, 21-23, Marc. 24-27; Appian, Annib. 45-50;
Zonar. ix. 7, 8.)
Yet the following summer (208) was not unmarked by some brilliant
achievements. The Romans having formed the siege of Locri, a legion, which was
despatched to their support from Tarentum, was intercepted in its march, and utterly
destroyed; and not long afterwards the two consuls, Crispinus and Marcellus, who,
with their united armies, were opposed to Hannibal in Lucania, al lowed themselves
to be led into an ambush, in which Marcellus was killed, and Crispinus mortally
wounded. After this the Roman armies withdrew, while Hannibal hastened to Locri,
and not only raised the siege, but utterly destroyed the besieging army. Thus
he again found himself undisputed master of the south of Italy during the remainder
of this campaign. (Liv. xxvii. 25-28; Polyb. x. 32; Plut. Marc. 29; Appian, Annib.
50 ; Zonar. ix. 9.)
Of the two consuls of the ensuing year (207), C. Nero was opposed
to Hannibal, while M. Livius was appointed to take the field against Hasdrubal,
who had at length crossed the Alps, and descended into Cisalpine Gaul. According
to Livy (xxvii. 39), Hannibal was apprised of his brother's arrival at Placentia
before he had himself moved from his winter-quarters; but it is difficult to believe
that, if this had been the case, he would not have made more energetic efforts
to join him. If we can trust the narrative transmitted to us, which is certainly
in many respects unsatisfactory, Hannibal spent much time in various unimportant
movements, before he advanced northwards into Apulia, where he was met by the
Roman consul, and not only held in check, but so effectually deceived, that he
knew nothing of Nero's march to support his colleague until after his return,
and the first tidings of the battle of the Metaurus were conveyed to him by the
sight of the head of Hasdrubal. (Liv. xxvii. 40-51; Polyb. xi. 1-3; Appian, Annib.
52; Zonar. ix. 9.)
But, whatever exaggeration we may justly suspect in this relation,
it is not the less certain that the defeat and death of Hasdrubal was decisive
of the fate of the war in Italy, and the conduct of Hannibal shows that he felt
it to be such. From this time he abandoned all thoughts of offensive operations,
and, withdrawing his garrisons from Metapontum, and other towns that he still
held in Lucania, collected together his forces within the peninsula of Bruttium.
In the fastnesses of that wild and mountainous region he maintained his ground
for nearly four years, while the towns that he still possessed on the coast gave
him the command of the sea. Of the events of these four years (B. C. 207-203)
we know but little. It appears that the Romans at first contented themselves with
shutting him up within the peninsula, but gradually began to encroach upon these
bounds; and though the statements of their repeated victories are doubtless gross
exaggerations, if not altogether unfounded, yet the successive loss of Locri,
Consentia, and Pandosia, besides other smaller towns, must have hemmed him in
within limits continually narrowing. Crotona seems to have been his chief stronghold,
and centre of operations; and it was during this period that he erected, in the
temple of the Lacinian Juno, near that city, a column bearing an inscription which
recorded the leading events of his memorable expedition. To this important monument,
which was seen and consulted by Polybius, we are indebted for many of the statements
of that author. (Polyb. iii. 33, 56; Liv. xxvii. 51, xxviii. 12, 46; xxix. 7,
36.)
It is difficult to judge whether it was the expectation of effective
assistance from Carthage, or the hopes of a fresh diversion being operated by
Mago in the north, that induced Hannibal to cling so pertinaciously to the corner
of Italy that he still held. It is certain that he was at any time free to quit
it; and when he was at length induced to comply with the urgent request of the
Carthaginian government that he should return to Africa to make head against Scipio,
he was able to embark his troops without an attempt at opposition. (Liv. xxx.
19, 20.) His departure from Italy seems, indeed, to have been the great object
of desire with the Romans. For more than fifteen years had he carried on the war
in that country, laying it waste from one extremity to the other, and during all
this period his superiority in the field had been uncontested. (Polyb. x. 33,
xv. 11; Corn. Nep. Hann. 5.) The Romans calculated that in these fifteen years
their losses in the field alone had amounted to not less than 300,000 men (Appian,
Pun. 134); a statement which will hardly appear exaggerated, when we consider
the continual combats in which they were engaged by their ever-watchful foe.
Hannibal landed, with the small but veteran army which he was able
to bring with him from Italy, at Leptis, in Africa, apparently before the close
of the year 203. From thence he proceeded to the strong city of Hadrumetum. The
circumstances of the campaign which followed are very differently related, nor
will our space allow us to enter into any discussion of the details. Some of these,
especially the well-known account of the interview between Scipio and Hannibal,
savour strongly of romance, notwithstanding the high authority of Polybius. (Comp.
Polyb. xv. 1-9; Liv. xxx. 25-32; Appian, Pun. 33-41; Zonar. ix. 13.) The decisive
action was fought at a place called Naragara, not far from the city of Zama; and
Hannibal, according to the express testimony of his antagonist, displayed on this
occasion all the qualities of a consummate general. But lie was now particularly
deficient in that formidable cavalry which had so often decided the victory in
his favour: his elephants, of which lie had a great number, were rendered unavailing
by the skilful management of Scipio, and the battle ended in his complete defeat,
notwithstanding the heroic exertions of his veteran infantry. Twenty thousand
of his men fell on the field of battle; as many more were made prisoners, and
Hannibal himself with difficulty escaped the pursuit of Masinissa, and fled with
a few horsemen to Hadrumetum. Here he succeeded in collecting about 6000 men,
the remnant of his scattered army, with which he repaired to Carthage. But all
hopes of resistance were now at an end, and he was one of the first to urge the
necessity of an immediate peace. Much time, however, appears to have been occupied
in the negotiations for this purpose; and the treaty was not finally concluded
until the year after the battle of Zama (B. C. 201). (Polyb. xv. 10-19; Liv. xxx.
33-44; Appian, Pun. 42-66; Zonar. ix. 14.)
By this treaty Hannibal saw the object of his whole life frustrated,
and Carthage effectually humbled before her imperious rival. But his enmity to
Rome was unabated; and though now more than 45 years old, he set himself to work,
like his father, Hamilcar, after the end of the first Punic war, to prepare the
means for renewing the contest at no distant period. His first measures related
to the internal affairs of Carthage, and were directed to the reform of abuses
in the administration, and the introduction of certain constitutional changes,
which our imperfect knowledge of the government of Carthage does not enable its
clearly to under stand. We are told that after the termination of the war with
Rome, Hannibal was assailed by the opposite faction with charges of remissness,
and even treachery, in his command--accusations so obviously filse, that they
appear to have recoiled on the heads of his accusers; and he was not only acquitted,
but shortly afterwards was raised to the chief magistracy of the republic, the
office styled by Livy practor--by which it is probable that he means one of the
suffetes. (Liv. xxxiii. 46; Corn. Nep. Hann. 7; Zonar. ix. 14.) But the virtual
control of the whole government had at this time been assumed by the assembly
of judges (ordo judicum (Liv. l. c.) apparently the same with the Council of One
hundred; see Justin. xix. 2, and Aristot, Pol. ii. 11), evidently a high aristocratic
body; and it was only by the overthrow of this power that Hannibal was enabled
to introduce order into the finances of the state, and thus pre pare the way for
the gradual restoration of the re public. But though he succeeded in accomplishing
this object, and in introducing the most beneficial [p. 340] reforms, such a revolution
could not but irritate the adverse faction, and they soon found an opportunity
of avenging themselves, by denouncing him to the Romans as engaged in negotiations
with Antiochus III. king of Syria, to induce him to take up arms against Rome.
(Liv. xxxiii. 45). There can be little doubt that the charge was well founded,
and Hannibal saw that his enemies were too strong for him. No sooner, therefore,
did the Roman envoys appear at Carthage than he secretly took to flight, and escaped
by sea to the island of Cercina, from whence he repaired to Tyre, and thence again,
after a short interval, to the court of Antiochus at Ephesus. The Syrian monarch
was at this time (B. C. 193) on the eve of war with Rome, though hostilities had
not actually commenced. Hence Hannibal was welcomed with the utmost honours. But
Antiochus, partly perhaps from incapacity, partly also from personal jealousy,
encouraged by the intrigues of his courtiers, could not be induced to listen to
his judicious counsels, the wisdom of which he was compelled to acknowledge when
too late. Hannibal in vain urged the necessity of carrying the war at once into
Italy, instead of awaiting the Romans in Greece. The king could not be persuaded
to place a force at his disposal for this purpose, and sent him instead to assemble
a fleet for him from the cities of Phoenicia. This Hannibal effected, and took
the command of it in person; but his previous habits could have little qualified
him for this service, and he was defeated by the Rhodian fleet in an action near
Side. But unimportant as his services in this war appear to have been, he was
still regarded by the Romans with such apprehension, that his surrender was one
of the conditions of the peace granted to Antiochus after his defeat at Magnesia,
B. C. 190. (Polyb. xxi. 14, xxii. 26.) Hannibal, however, foresaw his danger,
and made his escape to Crete, from whence he afterwards repaired to the court
of Prusias, king of Bithynia. Another account represents him as repairing from
the court of Antiochus to Armenia, where it is said he found refuge for a time
with Artaxias, one of the generals of Antiochus who had revolted from his master,
and that he superintended the foundation of Artaxata, the new capital of the Armenian
kingdom. (Strab. xi.; Plut. Lucull. 31.) In any case it was with Prusias that
he ultimately took up his abode. That monarch was in a state of hostility with
Eumenes, the faithful ally of Rome, and on that account unfriendly at least to
the Romans. Here, therefore, he found for some years a secure asylum, during which
time we are told that he commanded the fleet of Prusias in a naval action against
Eumenes, and gained a victory over that monarch, absurdly attributed by Cornelius
Nepos and Justin to the stratagem of throwing vessels filled with serpents into
the enemy's ships! (Liv. xxxiii. 47-49, xxxiv. 60, 61, xxxv. 19, 42, 43, xxxvi.
7, 15, xxxvii. 8, 23, 24; Appian, Syr. 4, 7, 10, 11, 14, 22; Zonar. ix. 18, 20;
Corn. Nep. Hann. 7-11; Justin. xxxii. 4.) But the Romans could not be at ease
so long as Hannibal lived; and T. Quintius Flamininus was at length despatched
to the court of Prusias to demand the surrender of the fugitive. The Bithynian
king was unable to resist, and sent troops to arrest his illustrious guest; but
Hannibal, who had long been in expectation of such an event, as soon as he found
that all approaches were beset, and that flight was impossible, took poison, to
avoid falling into the hands of his enemies. (Liv. xxxix. 51; Corn. Nep. Hann.
12; Justin. xxxii. 4.8; Plut. Fiamin. 20; Zonav. ix. 21.) The year of his death
is uncertain, having been a subject of much dispute among the Roman chronologers.
The testimony of Polybius on the point, which would have appeared conclusive,
is doubtful. From the expressions of Livy, we should certainly have inferred that
he placed the death of Hannibal, together with those of Scipio and Philopoemen,
in the consulship of M. Claudius Marcellus and Q. Fabius Labeo (B. C. 183); and
this, which was the date adopted by Atticus, appears on the whole the most probable;
but Cornelius Nepos expressly says that Polybius assigned it to the following
year (182), and Sulpicius to the year after that (B. C. 181). (Corn. Nep. Hann.
13; Liv. xxxiix 50, 52; Clinton, F. H. vol. iii. p. 72). The scene of his death
and burial was a village named Libyssa, on the coast of Bithynia. (Plut. Flmin.
20; Appian, Syr. 11; Zonar. ix. 21.)
Hannibal's character has been very variously estimated by different
writers. A man who had rendered himself so formidable to the Roman power, and
had wrought them such extensive miischief, could hardly fail to be the object
of the falsest calumnies and misrepresentations during his life; and there can
be no doubt that many such were recorded in the pages of the historian Fabius,
and have been transmitted to us by Appian and Zonaras. He was judged with less
passion, and on the whole with great impartiality, by Polybius. (ix 22-26, xi.
19, xxiv. 9. An able review of his character will be found also in Dion Cassius,
Ecc. Peiresc. 47, Exc. Vat. 67.) But that writer tells us that he was accused
of avarice by the Carthaginians, and of cruelty by the Romans. Many instances
of the latter are certainly recorded by the Roman historians; but even if we were
content to admit them all as true (and many of them are even demonstrably false),
they do not exceed, or even equal what the same writers have related of their
own generals: and severity, often degenerating into cruelty, seems to have been
so characteristic ot the Carthaginians in general, that Hannibal's conduct in
this respect, as compared with that of his countrymen, deserves to be regarded
as a favourable exception. We find him readily entering into an agreement with
Fahius for an exchange of prisoners; and it was only the sternness of the Romans
themselves that prevented the same humane arrangements from being carried throughout
the war. On many occasions too his generous sympathy for his fallen foes bears
witness of a noble spirit; and his treatment of the dead bodies of Flaiminius,
of Gracchus, and of Marcellus (Liv. xxii. 7, xxv. 17; Plut. Marc. 30), contrasts
most favourably with the barbarity of Claudius Nero to that of Hasdrubal. The
charge of avarice appears to have been as little founded: of such a vice in its
lowest acceptation he was certainly incapable, though it is not unlikely that
he was greedy of money for the prosecution of his great schemes, and perhaps unscrupulous
in his modes of acquiring it. Among other virtues he is extolled for his temperance
and continence (Justin. xxxii. 4; Frontin. iv. 3.7), and for the fortitude with
which he endured every species of toil and hardship (Dion Cass. Exc. Peiresr.
47.) Of his abilities as a general it is unnecessary to speak : all the great
masters of the art of war, from Scipio to the emperor Napoleon, have concurred
in their homage to his genius. But in comparing Hannibal with any other of the
great leaders of antiquity, we must ever bear in mind the peculiar circumstances
in which he was placed. He was not in the position either of a powerful monarch,
disposing at his pleasure of the whole resources of the state, nor yet in that
of a republican leader, supported by the patriotism and national spirit of the
people that followed him to battle. Feebly and grudgingly supported by the government
at home, he stood alone, at the head of an army composed of mercenaries of many
nations, of men fickle and treacherous to all others but himself, men who had
no other bond of union than their common confidence in their leader. Yet not only
did he retain the attachment of these men, unshaken by any change of fortune,
for a period of more than fifteen years, but he trained up army after army; and
long after the veterans that had followed him over the Alps had dwindled to an
inconsiderable remnant, his new levies were still as invincible as their predecessors.
Of the private character of Hannibal we know very little--no man ever
played so conspicuous a part in history of whom so few personal anecdotes have
been recorded. Yet this can hardly have been for want of the opportunity of preserving
them, for we are told (Corn. Nep. Hann. 13) that he was accompanied throughout
his campaigns by two Greek writers, Silenus and Sosilus; and we know that the
works of both these authors were extant in later times; but they seem to have
been unworthy of their subject. Sosilus is censured by Polybius (iii. 20.5) for
the fables and absurdities with which he had overlaid his history; and Silenus
is only cited as an authority for dreams and prodigies. The former is said also
to have acted as Hannibal's instructor in Greek, a language which, at least in
the latter years of his life, he spoke with fluency (Cic. de Or. ii. 18), and
in which he even composed, during his residence at the court of Prusias, a history
of the expedition of Cn. Manlius Vulso against the Galatians. (Corn. Nep. l. c.)
If we may believe Zonaras (viii. 24), he was at an early age master of several
other languages also, Latin among the rest: but this seems at least very doubtful.
Dion Cassius, however, also bears testimony (Fr. Vat. 67, ed. Mai) to his having
received an excellent education, not only in Punic, but in Greek learning and
literature. During his residence in Spain Hannibal had married the daughter of
a Spanish chieftain (Liv. xxiv. 41); but we do not learn that he left any children.
The principal ancient authorities for the life of Hannibal have been
already cited in the course of the above narrative: besides those there referred
to, many detached facts and anecdotes, but almost all relating to his military
operations, will be found in Valerius Maximus, Polyaenus, and Frontinus: and the
leading events of the second Pnnic war are also given by the epitomizers of Roman
history, Florus, Eutropius, and Orosius. Among modern writers it may be sufficient
to mention Arnold, the third volume of whose History of Rome contains much the
best account of the second Punic war that has yet appeared; and Niebuhr, in his
Lectures on Roman History (vol. i. lect. 8-15). The reader who desires military
commentaries on his operations may consult Vaudencourt (Hist. des Champagnes d'Annibal
en Italie, 3 tom. Milan, 1812) and Guischard (Memoires Militaires sur les Grecs
et les Romains, 4to. La Haye, 1758). There are few separate histories of the second
Punic war as a whole: the principal are Becker's Vorarbeiten zu einer Geschichte
des zweiten Punischen Krieges, and a work entitled Der Zweite Punische Krieg und
der Kriegsplan der Karthager, by Ludwig-Freiherr von Vincke.
(1) The battle of Cannae was fought, according to Claudius Quadrigarius (ap. Macrob.
i. 16; Gell. v. 17.2), on the 2nd of August; but it seems probable that the Roman
calendar was at this period considerably in advance of the true time, and that
the battle was fought in reality at least as early as the middle of June. (See
Arnold's Rome, vol. iii.; Clinton, F. H. vol. iii.; where the words "behind
the true time" are evidently an accidental error.)"
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Hannibal. Son of Gisco, and grandson of the Hamilcar who was killed at Himera B. C. 480. He was one of the suffetes, or chief magistrates, of Carthage at the time that the Segestans, after the defeat of the great Athenian expedition to Sicily, implored the assistance of the Carthaginians, to protect them against the Selinuntines. The senate of Carthage, having determined to avail themselves of the opportunity of extending their power and influence in Sicily, Hannibal was appointed to conduct the war: a small force was sent off immediately to the support of the Segestans, and Hannibal, having spent the winter in assembling a large body of mercenaries from Spain and Africa, landed at Lilybaeum the following spring (B. C. 409), with an army, according to the lowest statement, of not less than 100,000 men. His arms were first directed against Selinus, which, though one of the most powerful and opulent cities of Sicily, appears to have been ill prepared for defence, and Hannibal pressed his attacks with such vigour, that he made himself master of the city, after a siege of only nine days: the place was given up to plunder, and, with the exception of some of the temples, almost utterly destroyed. From hence Hannibal proceeded to lay siege to Himera, into which place Diocles had thrown himself, at the head of a body of Syracusans and other auxiliaries; but the latter, after an unsuccessful combat, in which many of his troops had fallen, became alarmed for the safety of Syracuse itself, and withdrew, with the forces under his command, and a part of the citizens of Himera, leaving the rest to their fate. The remnant thus left were unable to defend their walls, and the city fell the next day into the power of Hannibal, who, after having abandoned it to be plundered by his soldiers, razed it to the ground, and sacrificed all the prisoners that had fallen into his hands, 3000 in number, upon the field of battle, where his grandfather Hamilcar had perished. After these successes, he returned in triumph to Carthage. (Diod. xiii. 43, 44, 54-62; Xen. Hell. i. 1.37.) It appears that Hannibal must have been at this time already a man of advanced age, and he seems to have been disposed to rest content with the glory he had gained in this expedition, so that when, three years afterwards (B. C. 406), the Carthaginians determined on sending another, and a still greater, armament to Sicily, he at first declined the command, and was only induced to accept it by having his cousin Himilco associated with him. After making great preparations, and assembling an immerse force of mercenary troops, Hannibal took the lead, with a squadron of fifty triremes, but was quickly followed by Himilco, with the main army; and having landed their whole force in safety, they proceeded immediately to invest Agrigentum, at that time one of the wealthiest and most powerful cities in Sicily. But while the two generals were pushing their attacks with the utmost digour on several points at once, a pestilence sudvenly broke out in the camp, to which Hannibal himself fell a victim, B. C. 406. (Diod. xiii. 80-86.)
This text is from: A dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology, 1873 (ed. William Smith). Cited Nov 2005 from The Perseus Project URL below, which contains interesting hyperlinks
5th century BC
Hamilcar, (Hamilkas and Amilchar, the latter form occurs in Appian only). The
two last syllables of this name are considered by (Gesenius Linguae Phoeniciae
Monumenta) to he the same with Melcarth, the tutelary deity of the Tyrians, called
by the Greeks Hercules, and that the signification of the name is "the gift of
Melcarth." The name appears to have been one of common occurrence at Carthage,
but, front the absence of family names, and even in most cases of patronymies,
among the Carthaginians, it is often impossible to discriminate or identify with
certainty the different persons that bore it, many of whom are only incidentally
mentioned by the Greek or Roman historians.
The commander of the great Carthaginian expedition to Sicily B. C.
480. He is called by Herodotus (vii. 165) the son of Hanno, by a Syracusan mother:
the same historian styles him king (Basileus) of the Carthaginians, a title by
which the Greeks in general designate the two chief magistrates at Carthage, who
are more properly styled suffetes or judges. There can be little doubt that this
Hamilcar is the same as the person of that name mentioned by Justin (xix. 1, 2)
as having served with great distinction both in Sardinia and Africa, and having
been subsequently killed in the war in Sicily, though he is said by that author
to have been the son of Mago. If this be so, it is probably to his exploits in
those countries that Herodotus refers, when he says that Hamilcar had attained
the dignity of king, as a reward for his warlike valour; and the same services
may have caused him to be selected for the command of an expedition, undoubtedly
the greatest which the Carthaginians had yet undertaken, although we cannot but
suspect some exaggeration in the statement of Herodotus and Diodorus, that the
army of Hamilcar amounted to 300,000 men. He lost several ships on the passage
by a storm, but arrived with the greater part of the armament in safety at Panormus.
From thence, after a few days' repose, he marched at once upon Himera, and laid
siege to that city, which was defended by Theron of Agrigentum, who shut himself
up within the walls, and did not venture to face the Carthaginians in the field.
Gelon, however, who soon arrived to the assistance of his father-in-law, with
a'considerable army, was bolder, and quickly brought on a general engagement,
in which the Carthaginians, notwithstanding their great superiority of numbers,
were utterly defeated, and their vast army annihilated, those who made their escape
from the field of battle falling as prisoners into the hands of the Sicilians.
(Herod. vii. 165-167; Diod. xi. 20-22; Polyaen. i. 27.2.) Various accounts are
given of the fate of Hamilcar himself, though all agree that he perished on this
disastrous day. A story, in itself not very probable, is told by Diodorus, and,
with some variation, by Polyaenus, that he was killed at the beginning of the
action by a body of horsemen whom Gelon had contrived by stratagem to introduce
into his camp. Herodotus, on the other hand, states that his body could not be
found, and that the Carthaginians accounted for this circumstance by saying, that
he had thrown himself, in despair, into a fire at which he was sacrificing, when
he beheld the total rout of his army. A remarkable circumstance is added by the
same historian (vii. 167), that the Carthaginians, after his death, used to sacrifice
to him as a hero, and erected monuments to his memory not only at Carthage, but
in all their colonial cities. Such honours, singular enough in any case as paid
to an unsuccessful general, seem strangely at variance with the statement of Diodorus
(xiii. 43), that his son Gisco was driven into exile on account of his father's
defeat. According to Justin (xix. 2), Hamilcar left three sons, Himilco, Hanno,
and Gisco.
This text is from: A dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology, 1873 (ed. William Smith). Cited Nov 2005 from The Perseus Project URL below, which contains interesting hyperlinks
Hannibal, (Annibas). Many persons of this name occur in the history of Carthage,
whom it is not always easy to distinguish from one another, on account of the
absence of family names, and even of patronymics, among the Carthaginians. The
name itself signifies, according to Gesenius (Ling. Phoen. Monum. p. 407), "the
grace or favour of Baal; " the final syllable bal, of such common occurrence
in Punic names, always having reference to this tutelary deity of the Phoenicians.
A son of Hasdrubal, and grandson of Mago, mentioned only by Justin
(xix. 2), according to whom this Hannibal, together with his brothers, Hasdrubal
and Sappho, carried on successful wars against the Africans, Numidians, and Mauritanians,
and was one of those mainly instrumental in establishing the dominion of Carthage
on the continent of Africa.
This text is from: A dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology, 1873 (ed. William Smith). Cited Nov 2005 from The Perseus Project URL below, which contains interesting hyperlinks
Hanno. Surnamed the Great (ho Megas, Appian, Hisp. 4, Pun. 34, 49) apparently
for his successes in Africa, was during many years the leader of the aristocratic
party at Carthage, and, as such, the chief adversary of Hamilcar Barca and his
sons. He is first mentioned as holding a command in Africa during the first Punic
war, at which time he must have been quite a young man. We know very little of
his proceedings there, except that he took Hecatompylus, a city said to have been
both great and wealthy, but the situation of which is totally unknown. (Diod.
Exc. Vales, xxiv.; Polyb. i. 73.) Nor do we know against what nations of Africa
his arms were directed, or what was the occasion of the war, though it seems probable
that it arose out of the defection of the African cities from the Carthaginians
during the expedition of Regulus. Whatever may have been the occasion of it, it
appears that Hanno obtained so much distinction by his exploits in this war as
to be regarded as a rival to his contemporary, Hamilcar Barca. According to Polybius,
the favour with which Hanno was regarded by the government at home was due in
part to the harshness and severity he displayed towards their African subjects,
and to the rigour with which he exacted from these payment of the heavy taxes
with which they were loaded. (Polyb. i. 67, 72.) When the mercenaries that had
been eniployed in Sicily, returned to Africa after the end of the first Punic
war (B. C. 240), and were all assembled at Sicca, it was Hanno who was chosen
to be the bearer to them of the proposition that they should abate some part of
the arrears to which they were justly entitled. The personal unpopularity of the
envoy added to the exasperation naturally produced by such a request, and Hanno,
after vain endeavours to effect a negotiation through the inferior commanders,
returned to Carthage. But when matters soon after came to an open rupture, and
the mercenaries took up arms under Spendius and Matho, he was appointed to take
the command of the army which was raised in all haste to oppose them. His previous
wars against the Numidian and African troops were, however, far from qualifying
him to carry on a campaign against an army disciplined by Hamilcar; and though
he at first defeated the rebels under the walls of Utica, he soon after suftered
them to surprise his camp, and this proof of his incapacity was followed by others
as glaring. Yet notwithstanding that these disasters compelled the Carthaginians
to have recourse to Hamilcar Barca, and that general took the field against the
rebels, it would appear that Hanno was not deprived of his command, in which we
find him soon after mentioned as associated with Hamilcar. But the two generals
could not be brought to act together; and their dissensions rose to such a height,
and were productive of so much mischief, that at length the Carthaginian government,
finding it absolutely necessary to recal one of the two, left the choice to the
soldiers themselves, who decided in favour of Hamilcar. Hanno was in consequence
displaced: but his successor, Hannibal, having been made prisoner and put to death
by the rebels, and Hamilcar compelled to raise the siege of Tunis, the government
again interposed, and by the most strenuous exertions effected a formal reconciliation
between the two rivals. Hanno and Hamilcar again assumed the roint command, and
soon after defeated the rebel army in a decisive battle. The reduction of Utica
and Hippo, of which the one was taken by Hamilcar, the other by Hanno, now completed
the subjection of Africa. (Polyb. i. 74, 81, 82, 87, 88.) If we may trust the
statement of Appian (Hisp. 4, 5), llanno was again employed, together with Hamilcar,
in another expedition against the Numidians and more western tribes of Africa,
after the close of the war of the mercenaries; but was recalled from his command
to answer some charges brought against him by his enemies at home. From this time
forward he appears to have taken no active part in any of the foreign wars or
enterprises of Carthage. But his influence in her councils at home was great,
and that influence was uniformly exerted against Hamilcar Barca and his family,
and against that democratic party in the state by whose assistance they maintained
their power. On all occasions, from the landing of Barca in Spain till the return
of Hannibal from Italy, a period of above thirty-five years, Hanno is represented
as thwarting the measures of that able and powerful family, and taking the lead
in opposition to the war with Rome, the great object to which all their efforts
were directed. (Liv. xxi. 3, 10, 11, xxiii. 12, 13; Val. Max. vii. 2, ext. § 13;
Zonar. viii. 22.) It is indeed uncertain how far we are entitled to regard the
accounts given by Livy of his conduct on these occasions as historical: it is
not very probable that the Romans were well acquainted with what passed in the
councils of their enemies, and on one occasion the whole narrative is palpably
a fiction. For Livy puts into the mouth of Hanno a long declamatory harangue against
sending the young Hannibal to join Hasdrubal in Spain, though he himself tells
us elsewhere that Hannibal had gone to Spain with his father nine years before,
and never returned to Carthage from that time until just after the battle of Zama.
(Liv. xxi. 3, compared with xxx. 35, 37.) Still there can be no doubt of the truth
of the general fact that Hanno was the leader, or at least one of the leaders,
of the party opposed to Hannibal throughout the second Punic War. As one of those
desirous of peace with Rome, he is mentioned as interposing to preserve the Roman
ambassadors from the fury of the Carthaginian populace in the year before the
battle of Zama, B. C. 551; and, after that defeat, he was one of those sent as
ambassadors to Scipio to sue for peace. (Appian, Pun. 34, 49.) After the close
of the war, he is mentioned, for the last time, as one of the leaders of the Roman
party in the disputes which were continually recurring between the Carthaginians
and Masinissa (Appian, Ib. 68); but we have no information as to the period of
his death.
The character of Hanno will be found drawn in a masterly manner by
Sir W. Raleigh in his History of the World (book v. ch. i. sect. 11., Oxf. edit.);
though that writer has committed the mistake of confounding him with the general
defeated at the Aegates, an error into which Arnold also appears to have fallen.
(Hist. of Rome, vol. ii.) So far as we know concerning him, we cannot but wonder
at his bearing the title of " the Great," an epithet which few characters
in history would appear less to deserve.
This text is from: A dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology, 1873 (ed. William Smith). Cited Nov 2005 from The Perseus Project URL below, which contains interesting hyperlinks
Hasdrubal. A Carthaginian, son-in-law of the great Hamilcar Barca. He appears
to have early taken part in public affairs, and distinguished himself while yet
a young man as one of the most influential leaders of the democratic party at
Carthage during the interval between the first and second Punic wars. Community
of interests led to a close connection between him and Hamilcar Barca, whose daughter
he had married, and whom he accompanied into Spain in 238 B. C. From thence he
was sent back to Africa to take the command in a war against the Nnmidian tribes,
whom he completely defeated and reduced to submission. (Diod. Exc. Hoesch. xxv.
2.). At what time he returned to Spain we know not, but we find him there in B.
C. 229, when, after the death of Hamilcar, he hastened to collect together his
scattered forces, and was soon after nominated by the government of Carthage to
succeed him as commander-in-chief. Hasdrubal does not appear to have been distinguished
so much by his talents for war, as by his political management and dexterity,
and especially his conciliating manners: and these qualities, as they had first
gained him popularity at home, were now also of the utmost service in conciliating
the minds of the Spaniards, and gaining them over to the Carthaginian alliance.
Still more to increase this disposition, lie married the daughter of one of the
Spanish chieftains. (Diod. l. c.) At the same time, by the foundation of the city
of New Carthage, in a situation admirably chosen, on account of its excellent
port and easy communication with Africa, as well as from its proximity to the
silver mines of Spain, he contributed gr atly to the consolidation of the Carthaginian
empire in that country. Meanwhile he carried on warlike operations against the
more distant and hostile tribes; and these enterprizes, the conduct of which he
entrusted to the young Hannibal, are said to have been almost uniformly successful.
By these means he had already extended the dominion of Carthage over a great part
of the peninsula, when lie was assassinated by a slave, whose master he had put
to death (B. C. 221). He had held the command in Spain for a period of between
eight and nine years. (Polyb. ii. 1, 13, 36; Diod. Exc. Hoesh. xxv. 3; Appian,
Hisp. 4-8; Liv. xxi. 2; Zonar. viii. 19.)
According to Fabius (ap. Polyb. iii. 8), Hasdrubal had been so elated
by the successes he had obtained in Spain, that he repaired to Carthage, with
the design of overthrowing the constitution of his country, and establishing himself
in the possession of unlimited power; but failing in this object, he returned
to Spain, and thenceforth governed that country with uncontrolled and arbitrary
authority. Notwithstanding the censure of Polybius, there is certainly nothing
in itself improbable in this statement: the position of Hasdrubal in Spain, like
that of his predecessor and successor, was in great measure independent of the
government at home, a fact sufficiently proved by the remarkable circumstance
that the celebrated treaty which fixed the Iberus as the boundary of the two nations
was concluded by the Romans, not with the Carthaginian government, but with Hasdrubal
alone. (Polyb. ii. 13, iii. 27, 29; Liv. xxi. 2, 18, 19.) A splendid palace which
he erected at New Carthage was also pointed out as an additional proof of his
assumption of sovereign power. (Polyb. x. 10.9.)
This text is from: A dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology, 1873 (ed. William Smith). Cited Nov 2005 from The Perseus Project URL below, which contains interesting hyperlinks
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