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Epictetus, (Epiktetos). An eminent Stoic philosopher, born in a servile
condition at Hierapolis in Phrygia, about A.D. 50. The names of his parents are
unknown; neither do we know how he came to be brought to Rome. But in that city
he was for some time a slave to Epaphroditus, a freedman of Nero, who had been
one of his body-guard. An anecdote related by Origen, which illustrates the fortitude
of Epictetus, would also show, if it were true, that Epaphroditus was a most cruel
master. Epictetus, when his master was twisting his leg one day, smiled and quietly
said, "You will break it"; and when he did break it, only observed,""Did
I not tell you that you would do so?" It is not known how or when Epictetus
managed to effect his freedom, but he could not have been still a slave when he
left Rome in consequence of an edict against philosophers. This event, the only
one in his life the date of which can be assigned, took place, as has been said,
in the year A.D. 89, being the eighth year of Domitian's reign. Epictetus then
retired to Nicopolis in Epirus, and it is a question whether he ever returned
to Rome. The chief ground for believing that he did is a statement of Spartianus,
that Epictetus lived on terms of intimacy with the emperor Hadrian; while it is
agreed, on the other hand, that there is no good evidence of any of his discourses
having been delivered at Rome, but that they contain frequent mention of Nicopolis.
This argument, however, is hardly sufficient to overthrow the express testimony
of Spartianus. It is not known when he died. Suidas says that he lived till the
reign of Marcus Aurelius, yet the authority of Aulus Gellius is strong on the
other side. He, writing during the reign of the first Antonine, speaks of Epictetus,
in two places, as being dead.
Epictetus led a life of exemplary contentment, simplicity,
and virtue, practising in all particulars the morality which he taught. He lived
for a long while in a small hut, with no other furniture than a bed and a lamp,
and without an attendant; until he benevolently adopted a child whom a friend
had been compelled by poverty to expose, and hired a nurse for its sake. A teacher
of the Stoic philosophy, he was the chief of those who lived during the period
of the Roman Empire. His lessons were principally, if not solely, directed to
practical morality. His favourite maxim, and that into which he resolved all practical
morality, was "bear and forbear," anechou kai apechou. He appears to
have differed from the Stoics on the subject of suicide. We are told by Arrian,
in his Preface to the Discourses, that he was a powerful and inspiring lecturer;
and, according to Origen, his style was superior to that of Plato. It is a proof
of the estimation in which Epictetus was held, that, on his death, his lamp was
purchased by some aspirant after philosophy more eager than wise for 3000 drachmas,
or over $500. Though it is said by Suidas that Epictetus wrote much, there is
good reason to believe that he himself wrote nothing. His Diatribai were taken
down by his pupil Arrian, and published after his death in eight books, of which
four remain. The same Arrian compiled the Enchiridion or "manual,' an abstract
of the teaching of his master, and wrote a life of Epictetus, which is lost.
This text is from: Harry Thurston Peck, Harpers Dictionary of Classical Antiquities. Cited Nov 2002 from The Perseus Project URL below, which contains interesting hyperlinks
Epictetus, (Epiktetos), of Hierapolis in Phrygia, a freedman of Epaphroditus,
who was himself a freedman and a servile favourite of Nero, lived and taught first
at Rome, and, after the expulsion of the philosophers by Domitian, at Nicopolis,
a town in Epeirus, founded by Augustus in commemoration of his victory at Actium.
Although he was favoured by Hadrian -which gave occasion to a work which was undoubtedly
written at a much later time, the "Altercatio Hadriani cum Epicteto"-
yet he does not appear to have returned to Rome; for the discourses which Arrian
took down in writing were delivered by Epictetus when an old man at Nicopolis.
The statement of Themistius (Orat. v., ed.Harduin) that Epictetus was still alive
in the reign of the two Antonines, which is repeated by Suidas (s. v.), seems
to rest upon a confusion of names, since M. Aurelius Antoninus, who was an enthusiastic
admirer of Epictetus, does not mention him, but Junius Rusticus, a disciple of
Epictetus, among his teachers; in like manner, A. Gellius, who lived in the time
of the Antonines, speaks of Epictetus as belonging to tlle period which had just
passed away. Besides what is here mentioned, only a few circumstances of the life
of Epictetus are recorded, such as his lameness, which is spoken of in very different
ways, his poverty, and his few wants. The detailed biography written by Arrian
has not come down to us.
It is probable that he was still a slave when C. Musonius Rufus gained
him for the philosophy of the Porch, of which lie remained a faithful follower
throughout life. In what manner he conceived and taught it, we see with satisfactory
completeness from the notes which we owe to his faithful pupil, Arrian; although
of Arrian's eight books of commentaries four are lost, with the exception of a
few fragments. Epictetus himself f did not leave anything written behind him,
and the short manual or collection of the most essential doctrines of Epictetus,
was compiled from his discourses by Arrian. The manual (Enchiridion) and commentaries
of Arrian, together with the explanations of Simplicius to the former, and some
later paraphrases, have been edited by Schweighaiiser, who has added the notes
of Upton, his own, and those of some other commentators.
We may apply to Epictetus himself what he says of his Stoic master,
viz. that he spoke so impressively, and so plainly described the wickedness of
the individual, that every one felt struck. as though he himself had been spoken
to personally. Being deeply impressed with his vocation as a teacher, he aimed
in his discourses at nothing else but winning the minds of his hearers to that
which was good, and no one was able to resist the impression which they produced.
Far from any contempt of knowledge, he knows how to value the theory of forming
conclusions and the like. He only desired that logical exercises, the study of
books and of eloquence, should not lead persons away from that of which they were
merely the means, and that they should not minister to pride, haughtiness, and
avarice. He never devotes any time to disquisitions which do not, either directly
or indirectly, contribute towards awakening, animating, and purifying man's moral
conduct.
The true Cynic -and he is the same as the Stoic, the philosopher-
is in the opinion of Epictetus a messenger of Zeus, sent to men to deliver them
from their erroneous notions about good and evil, and about happiness and unhappiness,
and to lead them back into themselves. For this purpose he requires natural gracefulness
and acuteness of intellect, for his words are to produce a lively impression.
The beginning of philosophy, according to him, is the perception of
one's own weakness and of one's inability to do that which is needful. Along with
this perception we become aware of the contest which is going on among men, and
we grow anxious to ascertain the cause of it, and consequently to discover a standard
by which we may give our decision: to meditate upon this and to dwell upon it,
is called philosophizing. The things which are to be measured are conceptions,
which form the material; the work which is to be constructed out of them, is their
just and natural application, and a control over them. This just choice of conceptions
and our consent to or decision in their favour (pruairesis, sunkatathesis), constitute
the nature of good. Only that which is subject to our choice or decision is good
or evil; all the rest is neither good nor evil; it concerns us not, it is beyond
our reach; it is something external, merely a subject for our choice: in itself
it is indifferent, but its application is not indifferent, and its application
is either consistent with or contrary to nature. The choice, and consequently
our opinion upon it. are in our power; in our choice we are free; nothing that
is external of us, not even Zeus, can overcome our choice: it alone can control
itself. Our choice, however, is determined by our reason, which of all our faculties
sees and tests itself and everything else.Reason is our guide (to hegemonikon),
and capable of conquering all powers which are not subject to freedom; it is the
governing power given to man (to kurieion); hence only that which is irrational
cannot be endured by it. It is by his reason alone that man is distinguished from
the brute: he who renounces his reason and allows himself to be guided by external
things, is like a man who has forgotten his own face ; and he who desires or repudiates
that which is beyond his power, is not free.
That which is in accordance with reason coincides with that which
is in accordance with nature and pleasing to God. Our resemblance to God, or our
relationship to the Deity, and the coincidence of our own will with the will of
God, consist in our acting in accordance with reason and in freedom. Through reason
our souls are as closely connected and mixed up with the Deity, as though they
were parts of him; for mind, knowledge, and reason, constitute the essence of
God, and are identical with the essenceof good. Let us therefore invoke God's
assistance in our strife after the good, let us emulate him, let us purify that
which is our guide within us, and let us be pure with the pure within us, and
with the Deity!
The prophet within us, who announces to us the nature of good and
evil, is the daemon, the divine part of every one, his never-resting and incorruptible
guardian. He manifests himself in our opinions, which have something common with
one another and are agreeing with one another; for they are the things which are
self-evident, and which we feel obliged to carry into action, though we may combat
them. That which is good we must recognize as such a thing: wherever it appears,
it draws us towards itself, and it is impossible to reject the conception of good.
The opinions just described are the helps which nature has given to every one
for discovering that which is true. Wherever they are not recognized, as is the
case with the followers of the New Academy, our mind and modesty become petrified.
To investigate this criticism of what is in accordance with nature, and to master
it in its application to individual things, is the object of all our scientific
endeavors, and ths mastery is obtained only by the cultivation of our mind and
by education.The practice in theory is the easier part; the application in life
is the more difficult one, and is the object of all theory. We find that as far
as practical application is concerned, many men are Epicureans and effeminate
Peripatetics, though they profess the doctrines of the Stoics and Cynics.In order
to obtain a mastery in the application of moral principles to life, a continued
practice is required; but this practice is first and chiefly to be directed towards
a control of our conceptions, and thereby also of our passions and desires, which
are themselves only modes of conception, and as such they press and force us;
one person being more under the influence of this kind, and another more under
the influence of another kind; for which reason every one, according to his personal
peculiarity, must oppose to them a continued practice. This first and most essential
practice must be accompanied by a second, which is directed towards that which
is appropriate (duty), and a third, the object of which is surety, truth, and
certainty; but the latter must not pretend to supplant the former.The unerring
desire after what is good, the absolute avoidance of what is bad, the desire ever
directed towards the appropriate, carefully-weighed resolutions, and a full consent
to them, are the nerves of the philosopher.Through them he acquires freedom and
entire independence of everything which is not subject to his choice, and in confiding
submission he leaves the management of it to Providence, whose universal rule
cannot escape the eye of an unbiassed and grateful observer of the occurrences
in the world. In this submissive confidence, and the consciousness of its necessity,
in order to be able to preserve unchanged our outward peace of mind in all the
occurrences of life, in sorrow and in want, we see the spirit of the modern, and
we may say, ennobled Porch; the same spirit is expressed in the energy and purity
of its sentiments, and in the giving up of principles whose harshness and untenableness
arose from the inflexible and abstract consistency of the earlier Porch.
Epictetus is well aware, that man, as such, is a member of the great
cosmic community of gods and men, and also that he is a member of the communities
of state and family, and that he stands to them in the same relation as a limb
to the whole organic body, and that therefore he can attain his full development
only with them. He recognizes the necessity of love and confidence, and he demands
of the Cynic, that is, the true philosopher, to renounce marriage and family life,
only that he may devote himself with all his powers to the service of the deity,
and to the duties of an unlimited philanthropy.It is true that with Epictetus,
too, the place of a political system and a considerable portion of ethics, are
supplied by the ideal of a philosopher -but how could a living consciousness of
the nature of a state have been formed in his time and in his circumstances? In
his endeavours to establish in himself and others a moral standard, unaffected
by the corruptions of his age, he does not perceive its close and necessary connexion
with the active and unchecked scientific and artistic efforts. But he acknowledges
their moral importance more than his predecessors, and he is impressed with the
conviction, that the individual must live for the whole, although he is not able
to determine the how in a manner productive of great results. Above all things,
however, he gave up the proud self-sufficieney which the Stoic philosopher was
expected to shew in his relation to the vicissitudes of the world and of man.
The maxim suffer and, abstain (from evil), which he followed throughout his life,
was based with him on the firm belief in a wise and benevolent government of Providence;
and in this respect he approaches the Christian doctrine more than any of the
earlier Stoios, though there is not a trace in the Epictetea to shew that he was
acquainted with Christianity, and still less, that lie had adopted Christianity,
either in part or entirely.
This text is from: A dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology, 1873 (ed. William Smith). Cited Oct 2005 from The Perseus Project URL below, which contains interesting hyperlinks
Editor's Information
The e-texts of the works by Epictetus are found in Greece (ancient country) under the category Ancient Greek Writings.
Antipater (Antipatros). A native of Hierapolis. He was the secretary of
Septimius Severus and praefect of Bithynia. He was the preceptor also of Caracalla
and Geta, and reproached the former with the murder of his brother.
Antipater (Antipatros), of Hierapolis, a Greek sophist and rhetorician of the time of the emperor Severus. He was a son of Zeuxidemus, and a pupil of Adrianus, Pollux, and Zeno. In his orations both extempore and written, some of which are mentioned by Philostratus, Antipater was not superior to his contemporaries, but in the art of writing letters he is said to have excelled all others, and for this reason the emperor Severus made him his private secretary. The emperor had such a high opinion of him, that he raised him to the consular dignity, and afterwards made him praefect of Bithynia. But as Antipater used his sword too freely, he was deprived of his office, and retired to his native place, where he died at the age of 68, it is said of voluntary starvation. Philostratus says, that he wrote a history of the life and exploits of the emperor Severus, but not a fragment of it is extant. (Philostr. Vit. Soph. ii. 24, 25.4, 26.3; Galen, De Theriac. ad Pison. ii.; Eudoc.)
This text is from: A dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology, 1873 (ed. William Smith). Cited Oct 2005 from The Perseus Project URL below, which contains interesting hyperlinks
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